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 New Orleans experienced elevated homicide rates throughout the 30 years between 1985 
and 2015.  The city’s homicides were especially prominent in socioeconomically disadvantaged 
communities.  This study explored the lived experiences of residents from one such 
neighborhood, Hollygrove.  Using qualitative methods of individual interviews, focus groups, 
and participant observation, the study explored homicide through three prominent theoretical 
lenses, Social Disorganization Theory, Subcultural theories, and Institutional Anomie Theory, to 
better understand the conditions in a high-homicide neighborhood that help to explain 
neighborhood-level violence.  While existing theories of homicide causation have taken a 
predominately quantitative approach that compare high-homicide neighborhoods, I took an 
ethnographic approach informed by a social constructivist paradigm to test existing theories 
against the lived experiences of those whose daily lives were impacted by neighborhood-level 
homicide in a single community. Interviews were conducted with neighborhood residents, 
community leaders, neighborhood politicians, and police officials. 
 The data indicated three conditions connected to high- or low-homicide risk in the 
community.  The neighborhood’s values-orientation moved between subcultural values and 
prosocial values.  Structural conditions in the community shifted between marginalization and 
enhanced social capital.  Finally, neighborhood boundaries were found to vacillate between 
porous and rigidly defensive.  Each of these conditions impacted the neighborhood’s ability to 
enact collective efficacy and to create a milieu that either resisted or enhanced the likelihood of 
homicide.  While none of the existing theories was sufficient to explain neighborhood homicide, 














 In January of 2002, 17-year-old Brandon Aggison was shot in front of the Olive 
Superette at the Corner of General Ogden and Olive Streets in Hollygrove.  Just months away 
from graduating high school, he had returned to the neighborhood to visit childhood friends from 
the days before his mother moved the family to a safer community.  During his visit a shooting 
erupted and Brandon was used as a human shield.  He was shot, dropped onto the sidewalk, and 
the intended target jumped into an escape vehicle.  The corner had become one of the most 
dangerous in a city that averaged almost one homicide per day.  “The Big Easy” had become 
“The Murder Capital of the United States.” 
 Since 1985 the city’s murder rate remained high, vacillating between a low of 27.1 
murders per 100,000 residents in 1985 to a high of 94.7 in 2007 (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, 
2015).  The raw numbers ranged from a low of 150 murders in 2014 to 424 in 1994 (FBI 
Uniform Crime Reporting, 2015).  For the 29-year period of 1985 to 2015 the city experienced 
7,334 total murders (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, 2015; Lane & Bullington, 2016).  Charts 1 
and 2 graphically represent the raw number of New Orleans murders between 1985 and 2014, 
and the rate per 100,000 residents.  Data for each of these years, except 2005, 2013, 2014, and 
2015 were drawn from the FBI Unified Crime Reports (UCR).  Van Landingham’s (2007) data 
for number of murders and murder rate was used for 2005, a year in which FBI data was 
unavailable.  Raw murder numbers in 2013 and 2014 are based upon the UCR data, while 2015 
data was drawn from the New Orleans Times Picayune (Lane & Bullington, 2016).  Population 
estimates to calculate murder rates for 2013 to 2015 were drawn from the Greater New Orleans 






  The majority of the city’s homicide victims, as well as their murderers were young, 
African American males.  Wellford, Bond and Goodison (2011), in a review of New Orleans 
Police Department crime data from 1985 to 2010, noted that over half of those arrested for 



















































































































































































































































































































Chart 2: Murder Rates, New Orleans, 1985-2015
3 
 
were male (p. 16).  They were also known to the police: 82% had prior offenses, 58.8% were 
violent offenders, 57.6% were drug offenders and 41.2% were charged with firearm offenses (p. 
17).  Victims were 86.5% male and 91.5% African American (Wellford et. al., 2011, p. 12).   
 Homicides in New Orleans were concentrated in specific neighborhoods.  In 2012 the 
city targeted three neighborhoods with high numbers of homicides for significant intervention: 
St. Roch, Central City and the Seventh Ward.  All three high-homicide communities shared 
demographic characteristics: a majority African American population, mean income below the 
city average, a percentage living below poverty higher than the city, a higher number of renters 
than homeowners, educational attainment well below the city’s average and high numbers of 
vacant homes.  












% Af. American 91.5 74.2 87.4 59.6 12.2 
mean income $27,400  $39,200  $32,442  $59,952  $70,883  
% below poverty 33.9 37.9 44.1 24.4 13.8 
% renters 55 76.9 64.8 52.2 34.9 
% less than High School Education 33.6 30 30.1 16.7 15.2 
% vacant houses 37.7 39.5 38.3 25.1 11.4 
  Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center analysis of 2010 U.S. Census data 
 The Hollygrove neighborhood of New Orleans was similar in many ways to the city’s 
three target communities: 93.9% of its residents were African American, mean income was 
$33,113, 49.3% of residents rented their homes, 32.9% of homes were unoccupied, and 32.4% of 
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residents earned less than the federal poverty standard.   One difference was educational 
attainment; only 18.3% of Hollygrove residents had less than a high school diploma (Greater 
New Orleans Community Data Center, 2014).  Like the three target neighborhoods, Hollygrove 
had a reputation for lethal violence, earned between the early 1980s and Katrina’s landfall.  
Based upon statistics provided by the NOPD’s second district, between 2010 and 2015 the 
neighborhood’s homicide rate ranged from a high of 182.77 in 2012 to a low of 45.69 in both 
2010 and 2015.  With the exception of 2010 the neighborhood’s homicide rate exceeded the 
city’s.   Hollygrove’s high homicide rate dropped substantially since 2012.  This suggested that 
Hollygrove residents might have a perspective on homicide which may reflect both an 
understanding of the connection between neighborhood and lethal violence, and what 
neighborhoods might do to reduce it.  
 
In 2014 there were 137 homicides in the city of New Orleans which equaled a citywide 
homicide rate of 39.9 per 100,000 residents (number of homicides multiplied by 100,000 and 
divided by total population of city according to census data).  By comparison, Central City’s 
homicide rate was 115.5, St. Roch’s was 150.8, the Seventh Ward’s was 98.1 and Hollygrove’s 


























according to the FBI’s Unified Crime Statistics was 9.3.  More affluent neighborhoods told a 
different story.  The Garden District, West Riverside and the Lakeshore/Lake Vista 
neighborhoods experienced no murders in 2014.  Demographically these neighborhoods were far 
different than the aforementioned high-homicide neighborhoods.  When compared with the city’s 
average, each of these neighborhoods had fewer African American, higher mean income, lower 
poverty, more education and fewer vacant homes.  While West Riverside’s renters slightly 
exceeded the city’s average, the other two communities had more homeowners than renters.  The 
difference between high and low homicide communities suggests that neighborhood violence is 
related to demographics. 
 












% Af. American 3.2 2.1 22.8 59.6 12.2 
mean income $128,701  $125,473  $74,441  $59,952  $70,883  
% below poverty 6.2 4.0 12.6 24.4 13.8 
% renters 47.3 16.2 54 52.2 34.9 
% less than High School Education 2.2 2.0 12.5 16.7 15.2 
% vacant houses 12.9 12.0 13.3 25.1 11.4 
 
In New Orleans, as in other U.S. cities, homicide rates vary by neighborhood.  Thus a 
city’s aggregate homicide rate only tells part of the story; each neighborhood is a chapter in the 
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overall tale.  This study focused upon the Hollygrove neighborhood, one with a reputation for 
violence but also for recent innovations that appear to have reduced violence in the community. 
Statistics provided by The New Orleans Police Department for the years 2010 through 
2015 indicate that Hollygrove had more shootings during the period than the city average.  There 
was complete information on victims of both shootings and homicides, the data regarding 
aggressors was incomplete.  In some cases there was no data on the aggressor, in others the race 
and gender was identified but not the age.  During this period there were 81 shootings in 
Hollygrove and 24 homicides.  A total of 53 cases had incomplete data on the aggressors, only 
nine of the homicides were complete.   
The data were consistent with the findings of Wellford et al (2011), both victims and 
offenders were black, male and young.  All of the identified aggressors and victims in 
Hollygrove between 2010 and 2015 were African American.  The majority of perpetrators were 
male, 95.5% (Chart 4), as were the majority of victims, 88.8% (Chart 5).  Most of the aggressors 
were 23 or under, 73%, and 69 % of these were between the ages of 17 and 23 (Chart 6).  
Likewise, the majority of victims, 56%, were under 23, and 47% were between the ages of 17 
and 23 (Chart 7). 
The hours between 6 PM and 12 AM were the most active times for shootings, with 45% 
of total shootings (Chart 8) and 42% of homicides (Chart 9) occurring during these hours.  The 
number of shootings (Chart 10) ranged from a low of five in 2015 to a high of 27 in 2012, while 
homicides reflected a low of two in 2015 to a high of nine in 2012 (one homicide in 2015 was 
the result of a stabbing, this was the sole non-shooting homicide in the data).  
From a neighborhood perspective, these homicides mirror national statistics.  First, 
shootings in the neighborhood were solely black-on-black, something not surprising given that 
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93% of its residents were African American.  Second, both perpetrators and their victims were 
young adult males which was consistent with neighborhood violence citywide.  Third, the 
majority of the violence occurred in the evenings after the typical work day concluded and when 
people returned to the neighborhood.  Finally, between 2012 and 2015 there was a drastic 
reduction in the number of violent incidents occurring there. 
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Age of Deceased Victim
Chart 7: Victims by Age 2010-2015
Chart 9: Times of Homicides
12 AM - 6 AM 6 AM - 12 PM
12 PM - 6 PM 6 PM - 12 AM
Chart 8: Times of Shootings
12 AM - 6 AM 6 AM - 12 PM





Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to explore the lived experience of violence and homicide at 
the neighborhood level to better understand the factors contributing to the high homicide rate in 
urban neighborhoods.  The study was informed by theories of neighborhood-level violence, i.e. 
social disorganization theory (Sampson, 2012), crime prevention through environmental design 
(Saville, 2009), anomie theory (Agnew, 2001; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997) and subcultural 
theories (Anderson, 1999).  It used a qualitative, ethnographic approach rooted in a social 
constructivist paradigm to elicit a grassroots understanding of the dynamics underlying 
neighborhood-level violence and homicide.  Beginning with an individual homicide at a violent 
corner, the study expanded outwards into broader circles incorporating the views of those living 
nearest the corner, other neighborhood residents, community leaders, and city officials.  Data 
gathered through semi-structured interviews and focus groups were supplemented by crime and 
census data, direct observation of homicide scenes, and photographs.  The data were coded, 






















Much of the existing research on neighborhood homicide was quantitative and studied 
communities on the aggregate level.  This allows researchers to make comparisons between 
neighborhoods across metropolitan statistical areas and draw conclusions based upon the 
differences.  Although this enhances the ability to generalize findings, macrosociological studies 
cannot explain the variations in lethal violence within an individual neighborhood.  Lethal 
violence is differentially located at specific geographical locations and some places within a 
neighborhood are more dangerous than others.  This pointed to a gap in existing research that 
could be addressed by limiting the focus of study to an individual neighborhood. 
New Orleans’ Hollygrove neighborhood had two factors that made it appropriate for such 
a study.  First, the neighborhood had a reputation for murder that developed throughout the 
1980s and 1990s and which continued to impact perceptions of those both inside and outside of 
the neighborhood.  Second, there was a marked reduction in the number of homicides from 2012 
to 2015.  This demonstrated that residents had experience with homicide and homicide reduction 
strategies, lived experiences that proved fruitful to a study attempting to bridge the gap between 
micro and macrounderstandings of the phenomenon. 
 Brandon Aggison’s murder was shocking to many.  To those who lived near the corner of 
General Ogden and Olive, however, it wasn’t a surprise.  This corner was marked by violence.  
A complete understanding regarding what happens at corners like this throughout the city is not 
possible apart from the voices of those directly affected by the violence.  They had valuable 
insights that served to richly inform my understanding of the phenomenon.  Brandon’s death, 
that corner, and this neighborhood began the study. 
 Hollygrove residents perceived a clash of values occurring in the neighborhood.  On the 
one hand there was a conservativism expressed as they delineated a set of values reflective of the 
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mainstream culture.  These included neighborliness, hard work and pride of ownership.  All of 
the residents considered prosocial values to be important and fundamental.  At the same time 
they described a neighborhood that was experiencing a clash between prosocial and subcultural 
values.  There was widespread concern that the subcultural values had become stronger while 
prosocial values were no longer being transmitted to succeeding generations.  This clash of 
values was especially pronounced in the younger participants who struggled to negotiate between 
the prosocial values of previous generations while daily living in a milieu where subcultural 
values demanded their attention.  This clash of values forced a sort of bi-cultural response 
between home and work on the one hand, and life on the street on the other.  The strongest value 
clash appeared to occur in the arena of conflict resolution.  Many residents were concerned that 
the subculture’s emphasis upon violence as a conflict resolution tactic had become normative 
and was destructive to the neighborhood. 
 The subculture was also seen as a destructive neighborhood force.  The younger residents 
had a name for the subculture and its value system, Keeping It Real.  This was a conflicted 
concept, however, as those who described its rules and values simultaneously pointed to its 
limitations.  One key limitation was termed “outchere” by a focus group of 20-something males 
who suggested that adherence to subcultural values limited one’s life chances by relegating their 
power and prestige to the neighborhood, while harming one’s ability to function outside the 
neighborhood’s boundaries.  The subculture they described had rules that, when broken, invited 
violent retribution.  They also described a neighborhood status hierarchy where those who 
adhered primarily to the rules and values of the subculture could rise to the top and become what 
they termed a Hood Star.  The processes of succumbing to or resisting the subculture was an 
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important facet of one’s chances beyond the neighborhood and comprised the final subthemes of 
the chapter. 
 Also concerning to those in the neighborhood was the illicit economy, especially the sale 
of drugs, and the violence that accompanied it.  Residents saw drug sales as the primary force 
driving both homicide and the Keeping It Real subculture in the community.  They pointed to 
alcohol beverage outlets as the homicide hotspots in the community, especially a two-block 
stretch in the neighborhood where a corner store operated during the day and a bar operated at 
night.  Rather than being allies in their fight against drugs and violence, Hollygrove residents and 
the police both described the presence of the police as akin to an occupying force.  This led to 
legal cynicism and mistrust, creating an environment where homicide flourished as residents felt 
powerless to stop it themselves but didn’t trust police to act in their best interests. 
 In an atmosphere of legal cynicism residents extended their mistrust beyond the police to 
most outsiders.  Many thought outside actors were creating the violent conditions inside the 
neighborhood rather than local residents.  The illicit economy and the influx of drug dealers and 
buyers were one group of outsiders thought to be driving violence.  Others were concerned about 
renters without an ownership stake in the community’s well-being, especially those displaced 
from various public housing projects that had been restructured after Hurricane Katina.  This 
mistrust of outsiders manifested itself in rigid definitions of who was from the neighborhood and 
who was not.  An unfortunate consequence occurred when this mistrust was extended to those 
who potentially were able to enhance the neighborhood’s social capital by providing valuable 
resources and connections.  The result was increased marginalization and disconnection.   
 Katrina’s widespread devastation of the neighborhood helped to reverse this.  Many of 
the first returnees were elderly homeowners with strong adherence to prosocial values and a 
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desire to rebuild the neighborhood better than before.  Neighborhood boundaries became more 
porous as these residents recognized the need for outside resources to assist them in the 
rebuilding.  Outside resources flowed into the community from concerned agencies.  Residents 
experienced improved relationships with politicians and police.  Their social capital was 
enhanced and this resulted in a newfound collective efficacy or “social cohesion combined with 
shared expectations for social control” (Sampson, 2012, p. 27).  This condition appeared to be 
connected with a significant reduction in neighborhood homicide after a peak in 2012. 
 Three constructs emerged as key to understanding the neighborhood’s high- or low-
homicide conditions.  First, Hollygrove residents’ value-orientation shifted from subcultural to 
prosocial values.  Second, the neighborhood experienced a shift from marginalization to 
enhanced social capital.  Finally, the neighborhood boundaries changed from rigidly defended 
against outside invaders to porously accepting of outside collaborative efforts toward community 
improvement.  These three constructs appeared to determine whether the neighborhood 
experienced high collective efficacy and lower homicide, or low collective efficacy and higher 
homicide. 
 The interrelationship of these constructs may prove a beneficial avenue of future 
research.  Sampson’s (2012) research has shown that collective efficacy affects homicide.  
Anderson (1999) discussed the impact of values and street codes on neighborhood violence.  
Numerous studies have shown the connection between a neighborhood’s structural 
marginalization and homicide (Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; 
Savolainen, 2000; Maume & Lee, 2003).  Little has been written about the porosity of 
neighborhood boundaries and its connection to homicide, making this an especially promising 
avenue for future homicide research.   
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 Because this study was limited to a single neighborhood in New Orleans, further studies 
might explore whether these findings can be replicated elsewhere.  One important challenge of 
the current study is the impact of Katrina.  Few other neighborhoods experience the opportunity 
to completely rebuild their community.  Further research is needed to determine whether these 
findings were unique to Hollygrove or if they have applicability in other, similar communities. 
 The study is divided into thirteen chapters.  The first includes an abstract, introduction, 
and the purpose of the study.  The second is devoted to theories of criminality and homicide and 
is divided into two sections: theories that attempt to explain crime from an individual or agency-
based perspective and those that use a social-structural lens to do so.  The third chapter is a 
review of the social-structural literature that informs neighborhood-based homicide and includes 
social disorganization studies, anomie studies, and subcultural studies.  Chapter four addresses 
this study’s design and includes explanations of the research design, methods, data, validity, 
reliability, and the role of the researcher. 
 Chapter five describes the setting of the study and describes the neighborhood as if one 
were walking from one border to the next down Olive Street.  The community’s marginalized 
status, its diversity, the epicenter of homicide at one corner, and its juxtaposition relative to more 
affluent neighborhoods is described.  This chapter was included in the study to provide the reader 
perspective on the study and includes a map and pictures to better set the stage for the 
subsequent findings. 
 Chapter six is the first of five dedicated to a description of the study’s findings.  This 
chapter describes the clash between prosocial and subcultural values in the community.  
Subtopics include: resident concerns regarding the failure of prosocial values to be transmitted 
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between generations, the value of caring neighbors, the value of hard work, values based on 
pride of place, and a clash between prosocial and subcultural conflict resolution strategies. 
 These values were experienced predominately in the Keeping It Real subculture, the topic 
of chapter seven.  Separated into five subthemes, it explores: life on the streets of Hollygrove, 
subcultural rules, status, and the processes of either succumbing to, or resisting the pull of the 
subculture.  Throughout this chapter the clash between prosocial and subcultural values is 
described as a process of living in a bi-cultural world, and the challenges this presents for 
younger Hollygrove residents.  Comparison is made to newly arriving immigrants struggling 
between the values of dominant American society and the values of their homeland.  
 Closely related to and deeply rooted in the subculture is the illicit economy, the subject of 
chapter eight.  Residents strongly connected the sale of drugs to the violence in the community, 
understanding the illicit economy to be the primary driver of neighborhood homicide.  This 
chapter explores four subthemes: the interrelationship between drugs and violence, the 
connection between alcoholic beverage outlets and violence, economic considerations of the 
illicit economy, and the struggle between the neighborhood and the police as part of the war on 
drugs in the community. 
 Chapter nine addresses residents’ perceptions of outsiders as agents of either community 
destruction or community improvement.  When neighborhood mistrust and cynicism was highest 
the residents took a decidedly negative approach toward outsiders, seeing them as the source of 
most of the neighborhood’s ills.  A second subtheme explores resistance to outside influences, 
including agents of positive change.  This chapter proved important in the study’s conclusion 
that neighborhood boundary maintenance helps explain conditions of high or low homicide. 
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 The final findings chapter explores resident thinking regarding solutions to 
neighborhood-level homicide.  Many of the homicide reduction strategies implemented by the 
City of New Orleans began as best practices elsewhere.  Yet local knowledge of neighborhood 
conditions suggests that those closest to the problem may have the best potential solution to 
violence in their neighborhood.  The solutions proposed fell into five categories: community-
based strategies, educational strategies, formal control strategies, quality of life strategies, and 
economic strategies.  Many were innovative and addressed the neighborhood’s physical, social, 
and economic infrastructure. 
 The discussion chapter begins by summarizing themes and subthemes that emerged from 
the data.  Next it situates the findings of the study amidst the social-structural literature.  Third, 
the constructs of neighborhood values, structure and boundary porosity are linked to collective 
efficacy and conditions of high- and low-homicide in the neighborhood.  Finally, the 
implications of the study are addressed as are avenues for future research. 
 The conclusion chapter connects the findings to the questions that drove the research.  
Then the chapter turns to policy and practice implications, making connections between the 
solutions to homicide proposed by neighborhood residents and those proposed by prominent 
social structural researchers.  While some of the resident solutions closely reflected those 
emerging from existing research, others did not and provide promising new directions for 
neighborhood-level homicide intervention strategies.  The chapter concludes with 

















Theories of Criminality 
 A good place to begin understanding why murders occur in certain neighborhoods would 
be a review of criminological theories.  Since the Enlightenment numerous theories as to the 
etiology of crime have arisen.  For the most part these theories fell into two camps: those that 
were focused upon the individual or the personal motivation to act in criminal fashion and those 
that focused on environmental factors creating conditions within which crime was more likely to 
occur.  This section will briefly address theories explaining violence by focusing on the 
individual before exploring social-structural theories that better inform the current study’s 
research questions and purpose. 
Enlightenment criminologists sought to explain criminal choices through the lens of 
individual self-interest.  Cesare Beccaria, whose On Crimes and Punishment (1764) was deeply 
grounded in the thinking of the Hobbesian Social Contract, proposed that people act in ways to 
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maximize pleasure and minimize pain.  Jeremy Bentham’s Introductions to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislations (1789) advanced a “felicity calculus” in which humans weigh the 
pleasure of behavioral choices against the potential pain that might accompany such choices.  
For both men crime was a conscious decision based upon a deliberate calculation. Both 
concluded that deterrence of crime would require punishment that was swift, certain and severe, 
but also just and humane, fitting the nature of the crime but also strong enough to avert most 
from making criminal choices.  This represented a significant movement from the thinking of the 
Dark Ages where punishment was seen as torture which was considered to cleanse the soul and 
was often far more severe than the crime.  The era’s theorized social contract, however, assumed 
that all rational humans fundamentally agree upon what is right and wrong, something generally 
considered utopian today.  Furthermore, the notion that swift, certain and severe punishment 
would deter crime is belied by both lifetime criminals and the chronic recidivism that is a 
byproduct of the prison system.  
 The burgeoning scientific method would mark a positivist turn for criminology at the 
beginning of the 19th century.  Franz Joseph Gall proposed a theory of phrenology, wherein 
which he postulated that the size and shape of one’s skull could lead to a better understanding of 
the brain and therefore could help predict who might be more prone to criminal behavior (van 
Whyte, 2002).  The newly emerging field of evolution, spearheaded by Charles Darwin, led 
some to propose that crime might be due to humans who had not developed sufficiently and thus 
were more prone to behave like primitive savages or barbarians, acting upon basic instincts and 
urges.  Cesare Lombroso, in 1876 concluded that some may be atavistic criminals or primitive 
humans who had degenerated to an earlier state and were more prone to base behaviors in 
violation of socially accepted norms (Wolfgang, 1961).  These thinkers thought a criminal 
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predisposition was inborn and highly individualistic, leading them to conclude that the scientific 
method had potential to explain why certain individuals engaged in criminal behavior. 
 Another twist in the positivist turn would signal the beginning of the demarcation 
between individual explanations for criminal offending and a new focus on social factors that 
could explain why crime occurred.  Quetelet and Guerry, who wrote in the early 1800s, observed 
correlations between crime and social factors and attempted to connect economic inequities and 
crime causation (Bohm & Vogel, 2011).  Their ability to show statistically that crime rates 
remain stable established that crime might be situated in social structures rather than in the 
choices of individuals as was the prevailing understanding.  Durkheim also theorized that crime 
may have roots in social conditions.  As societies made the transition from mechanical to 
organic, from rural to urban, and from collective cohesion to personal isolation, a breakdown in 
socially accepted values may occur, leading to anomie, moral uncertainty and lawlessness 
(Winters, Glokobar & Roberson, 2014). At the close of the 19th century the Chicago School 
sociologists began to expand Durkheim’s thinking regarding the breakdown of social 
organization in some urban neighborhoods.  They proposed that in transitional neighborhoods, 
ones where high poverty, ethnic heterogeneity and social disorganization were prevalent, there 
would be a concomitant elevation of crime (Park, Burgess & McKenzie, 1925).  Thus the 
beginning of sociological criminology would take root and form the basis of the divergence 
between agency-based explanations and those that are structural in nature. 
  
Agency-Focused Theories 
 In one theoretical camp lay those theories that attempted to explain criminality and 
violence as a product of an individual’s learning, psychopathology, development, choices, or 
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evolutionary adaptation.  Behavioral and social learning theories concluded that individual 
psychology was shaped by environmental reinforcers that rewarded deviant behavior.  Bandura 
(1973) understood aggression to be learned via modeling, reinforced by satisfying outcomes, and 
reinforced via practice.  Psychopathology approaches contended that some individuals were 
psychologically flawed and their deviant choices stemmed from internal conditions predisposing 
them to act in criminal fashion.  Rowe, Oswood & Nicewander (1990) proposed a Latent Trait 
Model that explained criminal behavior as a function of inborn, internal conditions and early 
environmental influences creating a propensity toward criminality.  Samenow (2014) concluded 
that violence was inborn and emerged throughout the lifespan as a character defect.  
Developmental theorists pointed to truncation or delays in the psychosocial or moral 
development that predisposed one to act in deviant fashion.  Thornberry, Lizotte, Krohn, 
Farnworth & Jang (1991) observed that an individual’s acceptance of norms, values orientation, 
and attachment to institutions such as family or school determined subsequent delinquency.  
Catalano & Hawkins (1996) developed a social development model where children’s ability to 
develop prosocial bonds determined whether they would choose a pro- or antisocial pathway and 
thus engage in later criminal behavior.  The Age-Graded theory of Samson & Laub (1995) 
connected criminal choices to weakened social controls, lack of individual social capital, and 
structural disadvantaged which mitigated the individual choice to engage in criminal behavior.  
Rational choice theorists contended that crime was a conscious decision made after an evaluation 
of the potential rewards versus the consequences (Cornish & Clark, 1986).  Evolutionary 
psychology considered deviance to serve an adaptive or functional purpose (Daly & Wilson, 
1999).  These theories situated responsibility for criminal choices upon the individual and thus 
sought to understand what happened to individual to prompt behavior that violated social norms. 
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Although these models were helpful for understanding the pathways to criminality, their 
ability to explain neighborhood factors leading to homicide had limited applicability to this 
study’s purpose.  Human learning and development occur in a context and not in isolation.  
Whether an individual makes a conscious choice to be delinquent or is driven by inner 
conditions, deviancy can only be defined in juxtaposition to society, its norms, its laws and the 
conditions under which people make decisions.  The individually-based theories were 
tautological in nature; many criminals do have underlying deficits and this may partially explain 
their choices but at the same time many psychologically flawed individuals choose not to commit 
crimes.  While criminal behavior may indeed be a conscious choice, choices are a means to an 
end, an end which can only be defined in the context of larger social structures.  One does not 
choose to steal, or have stealing behaviors reinforced, or differentially associate with other 
robbers unless stealing helps one to achieve a desirable end, something defined by the culture to 
be desirable.  Furthermore, if legitimate means to attainment were possible the need for illegal 
means would not be necessary.  Finally, what is legal and illegal and who gets convicted is a 
matter of both power and definition; the agency-based theories neglected to account for the fact 
that those defined as criminals and those that are not may be a matter of structural conditions.  
Those with less social capital experience diminished ability to participate as equals in the making 
and enforcing of laws.  With these challenges in mind the study focuses instead on social-
structural criminological theories which better inform the current research. 
 
Social-Structural Focused Theories 
 As noted previously, in the 19th century a shift in the understanding of crime causation 
began to occur.  Quetelet and Guerry separately noted connections between social conditions and 
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crime statistics leading them to both question individual will as the sole causative factor and to 
explore the interconnection between poverty and crime (Bohm & Vogel, 2011).  Beirne (1987) 
contended “by suggesting that crime was subject to causal laws of the order found in the natural 
sciences and by implying that criminal behavior was a much a product of society as of volition, 
Quetelet also opened up the possibility of a sociological analysis of crime” (p. 1166).  Upon this 
foundation Durkheim (2000) began to view the Industrial Revolution’s impact upon a primarily 
rural and agrarian society as it modernized from a mechanical society with largely shared values 
to an organic society with diverse, and sometimes competing values.  The breakdown of these 
shared values, to which he referred as the collective conscience, resulted in anomie or the pursuit 
of individualism to the detriment of the greater societal good.  Given the widely divergent values 
in heterogeneous societies crime was both normal and expected, and served three beneficial 
functions: establishing the outer boundary limits of morality, organizing a citizenry to address 
criminal behavior, and paving the way for social change.  Ultimately this divergence from 
agency-based theories of criminality would pave the way for the social-structural theories to be 
explored in this section.  These include Anomie/Strain Theory, Social Disorganization Theory 
and Subcultural Theories. 
Anomie Theory had its roots in the sociology developed by Durkheim (2004) who 
proposed that humans internalized cultural values, or social facts, which he defined as “every 
way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or 
again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time 
existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations” (p. 91).  These were 
internalized via enculturation which happened through education and socialization and gave rise 
to a collective conscience.  However, as society became increasingly more complex and 
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specialized, society’s collective exerted less influence upon individuals who, feeling 
disconnected, pursued individual goals sometimes in defiance of societal constraints.  This 
disconnection was termed anomie, or a sense of normlessness, which gave rise to deviant 
behavior. 
Merton (1938) was the first criminologist to apply Durkheim’s anomie to the study of 
criminology.  He posited two elements of social structure that were operative, separate but 
working in tandem.  The first consisted of culturally defined goals, purposes and interests.  The 
second was constituted of institutional structures that defined, regulated, and controlled the 
acceptable means of meeting these goals.  As long as there was balance between the two, social 
relations tended to be harmonious.  At times, however, one of two poles created tension, one 
being ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed goals and the other being a stress upon 
cultural goal realization without regard for institutional regulation.  When a segment of the 
population was barred from achieving the culturally important goals, anomie resulted.  In U.S. 
society financial success was a highly valued goal, yet inequalities in institutional structures 
prevented a significant portion of the population from achieving their economic ends.  The result, 
according to Merton was “countermores and antisocial behavior” (p. 674) acting in rebellion 
against the institutions of social control. 
Not all responses in reaction to societal restrictions of goal attainment were criminal, 
however.  Thus Dubin (1959) elaborated by adding to Merton’s institutional means the concept 
of institutional norms, which he defined as “the boundaries between prescribed behaviors and 
proscribed behaviors in a particular institutional setting” while proposing that institutional means 
were “the specific behaviors, prescribed or potential, that lie within the limits established by 
institutional norms” (p. 149).  The importance of this distinction allowed Dubin to differentiate 
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between whether it was the cultural goals being rejected, the institutional norms, or the 
behavioral pathway to achievement.  Dubin’s restatement served to normalize some behaviors 
that Merton considered deviant, rather they were adaptations to institutionally prescribed norms. 
Another important clarification noted that anomie was not monolithic; different 
perceptions of anomie would inevitably lead to a variety of personal reactions to similar stimuli.  
This led Agnew (2001) to further nuance the theory by concluding there were objective and 
subjective experiences of anomie.  Objective strains “refer to events or conditions that are 
disliked by most members of a given group” (p. 320) while subjective strains “refer to events or 
conditions that are disliked by the people who are experiencing (or have experienced) them” (p. 
321).  Objective strains resulted in subjective strain and involved “goal blockage, the loss of 
positive stimuli and/or the presentation of negative stimuli” (p. 323).  The characteristics of 
strain that were most likely to result in crime were those that were: seen as unjust (voluntary and 
intentional violation of social norms), seen as high in magnitude (sufficiently severe as to prompt 
criminal coping), associated with low social control (therefore reducing the cost of crime) and 
prone to create pressure or incentive to engage in criminal coping.  The types of strain strongly 
related to crime, according to Agnew, included: failure to achieve core goals that were not the 
result of conventional socialization and were easily achieved via crime; parental rejection; 
supervision/discipline that was strict, erratic, excessive and/or harsh; child neglect and abuse; 
negative secondary school experiences; work in the secondary labor market; homelessness 
(especially youth homelessness); abusive peer relations, especially among youth; criminal 
victimization; and experiences with prejudice and discrimination based upon ascribed 
characteristics such as race/ethnicity. 
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Anomie theory was especially helpful in explaining criminal behavior when understood 
in the context of the market-based economy.  Unequal economic development in an urban 
context led to a variety of social ills that created the conditions conducive to deviant behavior, 
something Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) have termed Institutional Anomie Theory.  
Institutional structures that restricted economic goal attainment by preventing participation in the 
formal economy resulted in goal attainment in ways that were not socially sanctioned and were 
thus considered illicit.  
The post-industrial, globalized economy led to chronic unemployment in central cities 
which precipitated participation in the underground economy (Venkatesh, 2006).  The 
institutional racism that created the ghetto, contended Wilson (1997), had been supplanted by 
institutional structures barring inner city residents from participation in the marketplace.  The 
resultant anomie of those who could no longer participate in the marketplace was theorized to be 
related to the higher rates of crime occurring in those communities. 
 Anomie/Strain Theory has tremendous potential to explain crime in underprivileged 
urban communities.  Institutional racism and the consequent economic inequalities bar 
participation in the marketplace, relegating a significant portion of the urban population to make 
drastic survival choices.  This is exacerbated by institutional choices to penalize individuals for 
their choices rather than change the structures that have facilitated them.  Thus a vicious cycle is 
created branding participants in the underground economy as deviant and creating more stringent 
barriers to participation in the institutionally sanctioned means of goal attainment.   
 Several challenges to Anomie/Strain theory present themselves.  First, given the sheer 
size of the underclass in America, the theory would suggest far more widespread participation in 
criminal behavior to achieve desired goals.  Secondly, there was an assumption that the goals of 
26 
 
society are uniformly desired across all social strata.  Finally, the theory had difficulty 
accounting for white collar crimes committed by those of the privileged class who have already 
achieved the goals for which those experiencing anomie/strain are purported to be striving.  
Proposing that cultural values may differ throughout society, especially between different 
socioeconomic strata, the subcultural theories attempted to accomplish what anomie/strain theory 
did not. 
 Anomie/Strain Theory’s focus on subcultural desires to achieve dominant cultural goals 
connected to another theoretical school, Subcultural Theories of criminality.  This theoretical 
orientation posited a divide between the values of the prosocial, dominant culture and 
subcultures within society.  Subcultural values espoused mores that deviated from the dominant 
culture.  They ranged from immigrant communities with a set of mores and behaviors that 
reflected the culture from which they emigrated, to neighborhood values that intentionally 
countered dominant values inadequately serving the population and viewed as hostile to the 
subculture.  Elements of subcultural theories helped to explain gaps in Anomie/Strain Theory, 
especially the recognition that value systems may not be monolithic even within subcultures, and 
that dominant values may not be the only set of values driving criminality. 
One of the first theorists to connect subcultures and crime was Louis Wirth (1931) who 
proposed that “human conduct presents a problem only when it involves a deviation from the 
dominant code or the generally prevailing definition in a given culture” (pp. 485-486).  While 
Wirth’s focus was immigrant communities, Miller (1958) addressed subculture from a class 
perspective, concluding that a unique subculture arose within the lower class community, one he 
noted was deeply rooted, distinctively patterned, and possessed an integrity of its own.  In its 
specific, subcultural context the delinquency of the underclass was a matter of definition; it was 
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normal and functional in the subculture while perceived as delinquent by the middle and upper 
classes.  Miller termed these divergent values the focal concerns of lower class culture and 
included dealing with trouble, physical and mental toughness, street smarts, creating excitement 
to counter drab routine, dealing with the vagaries of fate through fortune or luck, and autonomy 
from those in authority who would restrict or control their lives.  
Noting that homicides in Philadelphia were concentrated in black communities, 
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) sought to explain this by proposing a culture of violence running 
counter to dominant cultural values in these communities.  They submitted that this subculture is 
transmitted via social learning and differential association, and is viewed as an adaptive response 
to a hostile environment which in turn reframed criminal behavior and alleviated guilt.  
Anderson (1999) delineated the subcultural values of African American communities by 
describing the unique codes by which African Americans, relegated by structural racism to 
disadvantage, adapted to discrimination.  While most lived by the values of dominant society, or 
codes of decency, others lived by the code of the streets which were disharmonious with decent 
codes, consisting of “a set of prescriptions and proscriptions, or informal rules, of behavior 
organized around a desperate search for respect that governs public social relations, especially 
violence” (p. 9).  His premise was that ours was a culture in conflict, where different sets of 
values functioned to regulate behavior depending upon the specific arena in which we act.  
Related to these were Sykes and Matza’s (1957) proposed Techniques of Neutralization, which 
they used to explain subcultural criminal value systems.  They theorized that justifications and 
rationalizations for deviance served to mitigate feelings of having transgressed social norms.  
Knowing dominant values, and having internalized them to some degree, those who eventually 
subscribed to the code of the streets needed techniques to justify their behavior and neutralize 
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their guilt.  These techniques included: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, 
condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties.  While this school of thought 
was helpful to explain the rationale behind crime, it did not discriminate between those who were 
raised in the same neighborhood but chose a different life path.  It did, however, help to explain 
the thinking that preceded criminal activity and participation in the illicit part of the informal 
economy.  
 Values were transmitted through intimate peer groups.  They served to demonstrate 
which behaviors were valued and which were irrelevant.  Deviance happened when subcultural 
values were at odds with dominant values.  As the dominant cultural values had the power of 
institutions behind them they could serve to marginalize the subculture’s values and thus conflict 
arose. 
 Cultural values were learned through interactions with others, concluded Sutherland and 
Cressy (1974), whose view drew upon interactionism and social learning theory.  Through 
differential association individuals learned criminal codes via interaction with others in a manner 
similar to any other learning.  Both criminal and noncriminal behavior were expressions of the 
same needs and values, but learned criminal methods provided an alternative path to meeting 
those needs, especially in an environment where law-breaking was seen as a favorable alternative 
to self-fulfillment.  Thus learned subcultural values may express themselves in behaviors 
considered deviant by the dominant culture. 
 Cultural conflict theory posited that deviance may be a normal political process of inter-
group struggle for dominance (Keel, 2005).  Sellin (1938) concluded crime causation resulted 
from “a conflict of conduct norms” which occurred as “a result of contact between norms drawn 
from different cultural systems” and was a “process of group differentiation within a cultural 
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system” (p. 98).  Dahrendorf (1959) added that conflicts arose between the dominant cultural 
group and subcultural groups who organized themselves into conflicting factions along group 
interests which led to systemic change.  Agnew (2011) noted that criminal law reflected, in part, 
the interests and values of dominant groups who controlled legislation.  This intimated that 
“those behaviors that threaten the interests and value of dominant groups tend to be criminalized, 
while other harmful behaviors are less likely to be criminalized, particularly if they are 
committed by members of powerful groups” (p. 16).  Thus, according to the conflict theorists, 
when a subcultural group acted in defiance of the dominant group conflict occurred; this was 
defined as deviant or criminal. 
 Social constructionists argued that reality was objective and external to individuals while 
also being continuously created and recreated by society (Berger and Luckman, 1967).  Thus, 
what was “criminal” changed across time, space and cultures and “is a classification of behavior 
defined by individuals with the power and authority to make laws that identify some behavior as 
offensive and render its perpetrators subject to punishment” (Henry, 2009).  Therefore, as Hester 
and Eglin (1992) proposed, from a social constructionist viewpoint crime was a social 
construction.  Those who control the construction of cultural definitions, i.e. the media 
(Rhineberger-Dunn, 2013) were disproportionately able to define which cultural values were 
acceptable and which were not.  Those with less power found themselves outside of the nexus of 
control of these definitions and tended to be inordinately labelled as deviant.   
 Rose and McLain (1990) attempted to bridge the culturalist-structuralist divide with their 
“subculture of materialist aggression” view.  They contended that “one of the primary, negative 
externalities associated with the spread of post-industrialism is the heightened risk of violent 
victimization” (p. 241).  With Anderson (1999) and Wilson (1997) they proposed a link between 
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a group’s inability to participate in the legally-sanctioned marketplace and the rise of subcultural 
values rejecting the dominant culture.  Sampson and Wilson (2005) echoed this sentiment by 
positing “in structurally disorganized slum communities it appears that a system of values 
emerges in which crime, disorder and drug use are less than fervently condemned and hence 
expected as part of everyday life” (p. 185). These authors appeared to agree that the rise of, and 
participation in, the underground economy reflected a set of values labelled deviant, but which 
were necessary to survival in an inequitable society. 
 Summarizing the subcultural theorists Covington (2003, pp. 270-271) found four key 
themes emerging from the literature.  The first was The Self-Hating Black Male as described by 
Poussaint (1983), where the twin forces of institutional racism and negative images of blackness 
led to rage and self-hatred which was projected onto others, lowered the threshold for violence, 
and was manifested in black-on-black crime.  The second, The Brittley Defensive Black Male, 
was proposed by Curtis (1975) who attempted to use the macrosocial forces of slavery, the 
southern violence subculture, limited access to masculine roles via gainful employment, and 
ghetto overcrowding to explain the genesis of a contraculture thought to explain racial 
differences in violent crime.  A third was Oliver’s (1994) The Compulsively Masculine Black 
Male who, because of slavery, limited access to masculine roles, and unemployment responded 
with violence due to compulsive masculinity and perceived threats to personal autonomy.  The 
fourth theme was The Angrily Aggressive Black Male, who Bernard (1990) concluded engaged 
in black-on-black violence due to a subculture of angry aggression brought about by the forces of 
urban life, low social position, and racial discrimination resulting in heightened physiological 
arousal and transfer of anger toward whites onto other blacks.  Covington noted that these 
subcultural themes had been widely embraced in society and thus concluded with this warning 
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about subcultural stereotypes: “The fact that the image of black males, depicted in these theories, 
are already so widely accepted may explain why there has been so little outrage expressed over 
recent increases in the number of black males placed under criminal justice supervision” (p. 
279).  
 Like Anomie/Strain Theory, subcultural theories have limitations.  While there are higher 
rates of violence in poor, black communities, the vast majority of males living there do not 
choose to engage in violent, criminal behavior.  The danger of these theories is the potential they 
have to reify widely held notions that conflate race or minority status with crime, leading to the 
assumption that living in an urban, ghetto community necessarily means adopting violent 
subcultural values. There is also an implicit assumption of a monolithic black community, 
something Eugene Robinson (2010) has adeptly dispelled by purporting four black Americas 
with distinctly different values and viewpoints about their place in society. Also, as Covington 
(2003) concluded, there is a deterministic bent implicit in subcultural theories, implying that 
one’s geographical place in the urban environment determines both one’s cultural values and 
therefore one’s life chances.  However African Americans have always been able to negotiated 
two worlds, a theory forwarded as early as 1903 when W.E.B. Du Bois theorized the two 
consciousnesses in The Souls of Black Folks, and more recently by Elijah Anderson (1999) as he 
described the ability of many in the ghetto to successfully traverse both decent and street values.  
Subcultural theories may explain why micro-societies emerge and are sustained within the 
broader culture but their ability to fully explain criminal behavior is limited; a subcultural system 
that did not tolerate crime, for example African American communities in the River Parishes that 
don’t share New Orleans’ high homicide rates, mark the limits of the subcultural theoretical 
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perspective to explain crime.  This is an example of social organization or collective efficacy, 
something better explained by Social Disorganization Theory.   
 In 1925, Park, Burgess and McKenzie published The City and began an enduring 
dialogue as to the causes of crime.  They theorized that population declines in central cities 
resulted in a loss of social structures and cohesiveness, a key factor in social unrest.  They 
concluded that crime and delinquency resulted, stemming from the failure of families and key 
social organizations to function effectively in ways that maintained and enforced community 
values. 
 Fifteen years later Shaw and McKay (1942) wrote “rates of delinquents reflect the 
effectiveness of the operation of processes through which socialization takes place and the 
problems of life are encountered and dealt with.  Low rates of delinquents reflect the existence of 
stable institutional structure” (pp. 383-384).  Mapping juvenile crime, Shaw and McKay 
discovered that socially disorganized neighborhoods, those in the transition zone between the 
cities industrial center and the bedroom community for blue collar workers, had the highest rates 
of delinquency.  They inferred from this that the informal controls exerted by an engaged 
citizenry were failing to operate in the transition zone.  They understood this to be caused by 
residential transiency, fewer opportunities for prosocial community engagement and legitimate 
employment, and failure to assume conventional values.  They concluded that the neighborhood 
or community was the most appropriate unit for intervention, proposing that a united community 
acting in concert to re-assert social controls would improve community life and keep crime in 
check. 
 Building upon his predecessors, Faris (1955) theorized that healthy communities were 
ones that extended strong social controls.  When these falter crime resulted.  He asserted that 
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“the ‘crime problem’ is primarily a phenomenon of urban disorganization” (p. 198).  
Furthermore, as social disorganization led to crime, crime produced further social 
disorganization, creating a vicious, downward spiral.   
 What made neighborhoods safe, according to Jacobs (1961), was eyes on the street.  
When a neighborhood was alive and connected, thus organized, residents made eye contact, 
observed what is happening around them, and kept criminal behavior in check.  The converse, a 
neighborhood in decline, was marked by residents who either were afraid to see what was 
happening around them, fearing retaliation, or who chose to ignore the decaying cohesiveness 
that delineated a safe community. The declining concern for the community also precipitated the 
decay of the built environment.  A decaying community was one that signaled an environment 
where crime could occur (Newman 1973).  The opposite, a community comprised of well-
maintained homes and manicured lots, sent an altogether different message.  Both realities, eyes 
on the street and the quality of the built environment, were interconnected components of Social 
Disorganization Theory.    
As social controls decreased and communities became less organized, physical 
deterioration resulted, giving visible evidence of social disorganization.  Kelling and Wilson 
(1982) understood the physical decay of a disorganized community to send visual signals which 
tended to stimulate more criminal activity in what they called a developmental sequence.  
Evidence of community decay via neglect was interpreted by those observing the community as 
a lack of concern by residents, marking the neighborhood as one where criminals felt safe and 
law enforcement officers felt unwanted.  Thus Faris’ downward spiral was extended to include 
the physical concomitants of social disorganization.   
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 Social disorganization was thought to be most prevalent in central city communities with 
high levels of poverty and fewer opportunities. Rose and McClain (1990) tracked the economic 
changes facing these communities as the urban economy transformed from industrial to post-
industrial.  As those with skills left for better opportunity, homogenization occurred, resulting in 
“a congestion of households composed of individuals who demonstrate a willingness to prey 
upon others as a survival strategy” (p. 241).  Venkatesh (2006) described this world in detail, 
noting that the underground economy operated according to a street code that was both violent 
and predatory and could be maintained because the residents of the community either feared 
facing retribution or benefitted from the illicit activity.  In the absence of economic opportunity, 
these at-risk communities prohibited residents from achieving economic stability and social 
mobility, reifying the necessity of the underground economy and diminishing social controls. 
Weak communities, those often considered dangerous by those living outside the 
community, failed to exert what Sampson (2012) defined as collective efficacy or “social 
cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” (p. 27).  Communities with 
limited resources lacked the capacity to exert such social controls partially because of a sense of 
abandonment by politicians and law enforcement and reacted to deteriorating conditions with 
resignation.  Wilson (2012) concluded that deeply impoverished communities disproportionately 
suffered the effects of concentrated poverty which gave rise to social isolation, or a lack of 
collective efficacy.  Both considered macroeconomic conditions to exert uneven effects across a 
metropolitan area, where harder hit areas experienced an ongoing exodus of the middle class and 
left behind what Wilson termed the ghetto underclass.  According to Sampson these effects were 
enduring and resistant to change.  Thus, a lack of collective efficacy tended to breed further 
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social disorganization which, unless dramatic steps were taken, had the potential to become a 
permanent feature of the community. 
When communities exerted their collective efficacy, on the other hand, acting 
collectively to exert informal social controls, Social Disorganization Theory postulated that 
crime would diminish.  The SafeGrowth model espoused by Saville (2009) theorized that 
community residents possessed a better ability to understand their space, an intimate knowledge 
of its strengths and weaknesses, and a clear recognition of who belongs and who does not.  This 
model, also known as Second Generation Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, 
recognized that “safe places emerge less from outside experts implementing strategies to or for 
neighourhoods (sic), and more from neighbours (sic) creatively planning with prevention 
experts, police and security” (p. 386). It focused upon a community’s internal capacity to act in 
its own best interests and recognized that improved social cohesion, what Sampson terms 
Collective Efficacy, would result in lowered crime.  In addition to its explanatory value, the 
SafeGrowth model helped bridge the gap between Social Disorganization Theory as a 
macrosociological theory to its application at the neighborhood level; by bolstering collective 
efficacy the impact of social disorganization could be ameliorated as an individual community 
acted to improve itself and to reverse the self-fulfilling reputation as a dangerous and 
disorganized community. 
Summarizing the essential tenets of Social Disorganization Theory Siegel (2015) 
delineated five key components: 
1) Community disorder evidenced by physical and infrastructure deterioration, 
residential instability, family disruption and transiency; 
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2) Community fear which is experienced via victimization, expressed through incivility, 
propagated via narratives of danger and maintained by withdrawal and inaction; 
3) Siege mentality which begins as powerlessness, metastasizes via mistrust of 
authorities and may be exacerbated by either police inaction or harassment; 
4) Community change, especially changes brought about by the flight of the middle 
class from the inner city to outer neighborhoods and suburbs, and maintained both by 
the constant turnaround of new residents and perceptions of the neighborhood as a 
dangerous place, and 
5) Poverty concentration, where deep poverty marginalizes ghetto neighborhoods 
because a dearth of jobs assures the effects endure. 
These structural factors defined communities in terms of power and place, suggesting that one’s 
physical location increased risk factors for violent crime while simultaneously decreasing 
opportunities to engage in opportunities for personal and collective advancement.   
 Unlike anomie/strain and subcultural theories, Social Disorganization Theory was 
centered upon place.  Because homicides in New Orleans generally occur in a few, high-risk 
neighborhoods the theory may explain its rootedness in specific places.  As well, it has potential 
to inform prevention as collective efficacy and informal controls can be taught and reinforced. 
 Criticisms of this theory focused on definitions of disorganization, differential treatment 
of certain neighborhoods, conflation of disorganization and its effects, and the locus of 
responsibility for community disorganization.  Before being resurrected by Sampson and Groves 
(1989) the theory underwent a long period of disfavor.  The term disorganization may be partly 
to blame as some high crime neighborhoods were highly organized but around an illicit economy 
and accompanying violence.  A second challenge lay within the actual crime statistics; a socially 
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disorganized community may not truly have higher crime but rather may receive differential 
treatment by law enforcement and the courts, thus giving the appearance of higher crime.  Third, 
the historical definition of disorganization was weak, something brought about by the failure to 
adequately distinguish between disorganization and its effects (Bursik, 1988).  Finally, there was 
an implied assumption that those living in socially disorganized communities cause their own 
plight by allowing deterioration, abiding incivility, failing to act on their own behalf, leaving 
when achieving success rather than fighting to improve the community, and failing to adequately 
prepare for the job market, factors which lent themselves to a process of blaming the victim. The 
forces that created the ghetto, such as loss of jobs, flight of the middle class, deteriorating 
schools and public policies such as redlining played a far more important role.  There were also 
forces that maintained the ghetto, such as inadequate policing, poor schools, and a desire to 
maintain crime in certain communities lest it overspill the boundaries.  In short Social 
Disorganization Theory has potential to identify elements that co-occur in high crime 
neighborhoods but may not be either predictive or sufficiently powerful to provide direction for 
prevention. 
 Because homicide is overrepresented in a few at-risk New Orleans neighborhoods, these 
social-structural approaches to understanding crime may prove more valuable to understanding 
the complex interplay of neighborhood and homicide than individualistic explanations of 
causation.  Thus they will become the focus of this study.  Work to date found elements of each 
of these theories represented in interviews with community residents.  The study’s focus upon 
neighborhood-level factors undergirding homicide as experienced by community residents lends 





















 For much of recent history New Orleans had the highest murder rate in the nation.  As 
noted earlier, these homicides occurred in some neighborhoods but not in others.  Three 
criminological theories appeared to be especially suited to understanding neighborhood-level 
homicide: Anomie/Strain Theory, Subcultural Theory, and Social Disorganization Theory, each 
of which have unique elements that give partial, but incomplete explanations for neighborhood 
violence.  Most often, as will be discussed in the literature review, quantitative research has been 
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used to study rates of violence resulting in homicide.  While quantitative research has helped to 
explain variations in violence between neighborhoods it has limited ability to explain the factors 
leading to variations within an individual community. 
Scott (1998) proposed two approaches to understanding local conditions.  The first, 
which he called techne, was an approach which “is characterized by impersonal, often 
quantitative precision and a concern with explanation and verification” (p. 320).  This type of 
knowledge took a bird’s-eye view of the situation and brought a technocrat’s global knowledge 
to be applied to local conditions, an approach thought by many to be higher and more scientific 
than the alternative.  The second, which he termed metis, was practical and local, “as economical 
and accurate as it needs to be, no more and no less, for addressing the problem at hand” (p. 313).  
This knowledge reflected the learned experiences of those whose life history had been one of 
adaptation to a local environment in constant flux.  This type, often overlooked by technocrats, 
often was superior because it represented “a rudimentary kind of knowledge that can be acquired 
only by practice and that all but defies being communicated in written or oral form apart from 
actual practice” (p. 315).  The quantitative research done to date is more akin to techne than 
metis and, while valuable in scope and breadth, has missed an important element of 
understanding regarding what is happening with neighborhood-level violence.  Such knowledge 
is adaptive to local conditions and may help to explain why violence occurs in neighborhoods 
and how residents respond to it.  Residents may also have innovative solutions that have been 
overlooked by technocrats who lack understanding of local conditions.  
The central question of the study was “What factors at the neighborhood level, from the 
perspective of neighbhorhood residents, contribute to the high homicide rate in New Orleans?”  
Rather than study homicide from an top-down perspective, one which Scott would call techne, 
40 
 
this study approached the issue from the viewpoint of those whose lives were affected by 
homicide and by the routine violence in a socioeconomically disadvantaged community, seeking 
to understand the local knowledge, or metis, often overlooked in studies of homicide.  Several 
sub-questions were explored as well: 
1) Does the lived experience of residents in a high homicide community reflect existing 
theories or suggest new ones? 
2) Will the experience and knowledge of family members who have lost loved ones to 
homicide reflect existing theories or suggest new ones? 
3) Will the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and homicide that is 
reflected in the literature as a factor for homicide risk be reflected in the lived 
experience and local knowledge of those living in a high homicide community? 
4) Will social disorganization theory, anomie theory and subcultural theories be 
reflected in the narratives of those who live in high homicide communities? 
In short, this study attempts to bridge the gap between the predominately quantitative, 
macrosociological studies of social scientists and the daily, lived experience of those who cope 




In The City (1925) the pioneers of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology created a 
concentric circle model of urban development.  Its five circles began with a central business 
district, followed by a transition zone of mixed slum housing and industry, a zone of blue collar 
residences, a zone of middle class residences, and culminated with a commuter circle which, at 
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that point in Chicago’s history, was comprised of residences of the wealthy who could 
financially afford to travel into the center to work.  In this model neighborhood closest to the 
center became contested space where concentrated disadvantage was most likely to be located, 
where social controls were diminished, and where crime resulted.  Central city neighborhoods 
were the slums where new immigrants and African Americans moving northward in the 
industrial diaspora could afford to live.  These neighborhoods developed enduring and stable 
reputations as being unsafe, what Sampson (2012) termed neighborhood effects.  These were the 
economically and socially disadvantaged communities where the theorists hypothesized crime 
flourished and where higher rates of homicide occurred. 
 The criminological theories outlined in the previous section concluded that crime 
occurred disproportionately in some neighborhoods for three reasons.  First, underclass 
neighborhoods had historically been segregated from middle and upper class neighborhoods and 
over time had developed reputations for being dangerous.  Second, the underclass who were 
isolated in ghetto communities experienced anomie/strain; wishing to achieve societally 
sanctioned goals but unable to accomplish them through legitimate avenues, they found informal 
means to do so.  Third, as a result of the isolation both geographically and materially, a 
subculture arose that deviated from that of the dominant class.  Understanding homicide in an 
urban context requires studying these isolated communities.  This literature review focuses on 
empirical studies which addressed homicide in the neighborhood context, with specific emphasis 
on social disorganization, anomie, and subcultural studies of homicide. 
 
Social Disorganization Studies 
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 The importance of Social Disorganization Theory to this study was its ability to explain 
crime at the neighborhood level. There were two competing schools within the larger camp 
competing for preeminence, one focusing upon disorder as a cause of crime and the other 
focused upon a neighborhood’s internal organization.    
 The first was derived from the Broken Windows hypothesis of Kelling and Wilson 
(1982) which purported that disorder did not cause crime as much as “create the conditions in 
which crime can flourish” (Bratton and Kelling, 2006).  Physical disorder was evidenced by 
infrastructure decay and was ongoing while social disorder reflected behavioral decay, or 
incivility, and was episodic (Skogan, 1990).  Disorder created a negative spiral of impact: fear, a 
siege mentality, flight from the neighborhood of those that are able, and weakened social 
controls among those that remain.  Weakened social controls created an environment in which 
criminals were free to act, further weakening social controls and creating more disorder.  The 
implication of this hypothesis was that outside intervention was required to reduce disorder and 
thus prevent crime. 
 The second reflected the concept of Collective Efficacy (Sampson, 2012) which was 
defined as “social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” (p. 27).  These 
theorists would agree that disorder is destabilizing, leading to neighborhood abandonment and 
concentrated disadvantage.  They would further argue that it is the abandonment of the inner city 
neighborhood and the loss of informal social controls that impact crime, not disorder (Sampson 
and Raudenbush, 1999). In this theory the signs of disorder that were the hallmarks of Broken 
Windows were actually crimes (damage to property, graffiti, littering, loitering, etc.) and led to a 
conclusion that lack of collective efficacy was the link between neighborhoods and crime.  
Unlike Broken Windows, the lack of informal neighborhood social controls gave rise to 
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conditions favorable to crime.  While both hypotheses connected disorder and crime in 
structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods, the key distinction was whether disorder caused the 
breakdown of informal social controls or the breakdown of social controls led to disorder.   
 Skogan’s (1990) work on disorder formed much of the backbone of the Broken Windows 
hypothesis. Measuring disorder through surveys and direct observation the author concluded 
three things: residents generally agreed about what constituted disorder and how much was 
present in their community, there was a direct link between disorder and crime, and disorder both 
directly and indirectly, via its connection to crime, created neighborhood decline.  Subsequent 
research began to challenge the link between disorder and crime proposing that another variable 
may better explain both crime and disorder.  Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) questioned 
whether disorder caused crime or actually was crime (such as graffiti or public drunkenness), the 
implication being that another factor prior to the disorder would better explain its presence.  
Kane and Cronin (2009) found that disorder arrests did not deter violent crime unless they 
occurred in a neighborhood with high levels of residential instability, leading them to conclude 
that the lack of informal social controls brought about by high levels of neighborhood turnover 
and not disorder was the precipitant.  In their meta-analysis of the Broken Windows research to 
date, Braga, Welsh and Schnell (2015) found that order maintenance strategies did not generate 
significant crime reduction while community problem-solving approaches had, and thus they 
concluded that a community’s ability to work cohesively may better explain neighborhood 
crime.  St. Jean (2007) has forwarded several flaws in the Broken Windows hypothesis, 
including: 
1) Differing interpretations of disorder of those inside the community from outsiders, 
2) This middle-class bias of disorder, 
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3) A mistaken assumption that offenders choose to commit crimes based upon a 
community’s visible disorder, 
4) The inevitability of the sequence of disorder, crime, neighborhood decline, resident 
fear, neighborhood flight, criminal invasion and maximized dangerousness, 
5) Failure to situate disorder within a context of race, class and gender, and 
6) Failure to account for the motivations of offenders in their choices of crime locations. 
While physical and social disorder were linked to crime, it would appear that another mediating 
factor may better explain why crime rates were higher in structurally disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. 
Sampson and Groves (1989) groundbreaking study of Social Disorganization Theory 
paved the way for a resurgence of the theory after years of dormancy.  They surveyed British 
neighborhood residents asking about willingness to supervise neighborhood teens, the number of 
local friendships, and level of participation in neighborhood social organizations.  They 
concluded that “communities characterized by sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage 
peer groups, and low organizational participation had disproportionately high rates of crime and 
delinquency” (p. 799).  Years later Lowenkamp, Cullen and Pratt (2003) would replicate the 
findings and conclude “the major propositions specified by social disorganization theory—that 
certain structural characteristics of communities affect the ability of residents to impose social 
control mechanisms over their members, and that the loss of such control mechanisms affects 
rates of crime—are supported” (p. 366).  Unlike Broken Windows, this research addressed the 
primacy of community controls rather than increasing disorder as the important variable in 
explaining neighborhood crime. 
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In the late 1990s Sampson and his colleagues defined a new concept in the field of Social 
Disorganization Theory known as collective efficacy.  Up to this point the theory was predicated 
upon a fuzzy notion of neighborhood control as the variable that explained why crime rates were 
higher in socially and economically disadvantaged communities.  In 1997 Sampson, Raudenbush 
and Earls found that “the differential ability of neighborhoods to realize the common values of 
residents and maintain effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in 
violence” (p. 918).  In a study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods they were able to show that 
collective efficacy had a strong, negative relationship to violence and was negatively associated 
to both crime victimization and homicide.  Moreover, they hypothesized that a neighborhood 
with strong internal organization would also be able to attract external resources such as police 
participation, implying that strong informal control was connected to enhanced ability to secure 
greater formal controls.   
In 1999 Sampson and Raudenbush tested whether physical disorder or social disorder 
proved to have the stronger link to violent crime.  They concluded that lowered collective 
efficacy was more strongly connected to violent crime and that collective efficacy more 
completely explained physical disorder.  This was also reflected in the perceptions of 
neighborhood residents who, when they perceived their neighborhood to be violent, also 
perceived collective efficacy to be low (Duncan, Duncan, Okut, Strycker & Hix-Small, 2003).   
Collective efficacy was impacted by homicide levels as well; when homicides in a community 
increased whites moved away while blacks remained and the resultant residential instability and 
concentrated disadvantage diminished the ability of those remaining to exert informal controls 
(Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001).  Collective efficacy was also shown to be negatively 
associated with both intimate partner homicide rates and non-lethal partner violence especially in 
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neighborhoods with low tolerance for intimate partner violence (Browning, Feinberg and Dietz, 
2004).  Sampson (2012) summarized the research done on collective efficacy and homicide by 
concluding, “the greatest declines in homicide are found in neighborhoods that experience 
increases in collective efficacy and decreases in disadvantage” (p. 175).  In a meta-analysis of 
criminological studies, Pratt and Cullen (2005) found that the empirical evidence strongly 
supported the concept of collective efficacy and showed “considerable promise in predicting 
levels of neighborhood crime” (p. 427).   The significance of collective efficacy, therefore, was 
its ability to explain the means by which a neighborhood’s lack of organization manifested itself 
in higher rates of violent crime and homicide.   
One challenge to this theory was the presence of highly organized communities that were 
also high crime communities.  The research of Venkatesh on gangs (2008) and the informal 
economy (2006) found that neighborhoods may in fact be organized by groups whose subcultural 
value systems ran counter to traditional values and thus supported criminal undertakings.  Others 
noted that a substantial portion of neighborhood-level crime was committed by residents who 
were socially embedded in the community and whose removal by incarceration may create a 
destabilizing effect on informal controls, especially as regards the mass incarceration of black 
men that led to single-parent families (Rose and Clear, 1998; Alexander, 2012).  Furthermore, 
the system of network exchange and resulting obligations served an organizing effect and 
increased the social capital of offenders shielding them from informal social controls, something 
that Browning, Feinberg and Dietz (2004) referred to as negotiated coexistence.   
The corollary to this was a section of a neighborhood that experienced both low crime 
and low collective efficacy (St. Jean, 2007), where few places suited for crime were located.  
Although crime rates may be high for the neighborhood overall, parts of every neighborhood 
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would experience lower rates of crime as there were no strategic places there for crime to 
flourish.  While neighborhoods were treated by macrosociological theory as complete entities, 
there were microcommunities within them, blocks that were both well-maintained and without 
crime hotspots that exhibited low collective efficacy and low crime. 
A challenge of Social Disorganization Theory specific to this study is its 
macrosociological perspective which stemmed from an attempt to explain how structural issues 
in American society created the conditions in which crime could occur.  The concept of 
collective efficacy lends itself to a smaller scale study, one that might be termed a 
mezzosociological view.  The work of Saville (2009) has potential to bridge this gap.  In an 
extension of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), Saville proposed a 
second generation CPTED model named SafeGrowth that helped neighborhood residents 
envision, “create and self-regulate their own safety in collaboration with service providers such 
as planners and police” (p. 390).  This was a training model to help community residents build 
collective efficacy in an effort to combat neighborhood crime.  Duncan et al (2003) also posited 
a community psychology model where collective efficacy might be adapted to multiple levels in 
a neighborhood, micro, mezzo and macro.  Thus, while Social Disorganization has traditionally 
been seen as a macrosociological theory, there is potential to adapt it to the individual 
neighborhood context via a vehicle like SafeGrowth or community psychology. 
 The potential of Social Disorganization Theory for understanding neighborhood-level 
homicide lies within its ability to explain the connection between structural inequities and 
concentrated disadvantage and homicide.  Its explanation of neighborhood violence as a product 
of poor collective action and failure to exert informal controls serves to partially explain what is 
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happening at the neighborhood level. At the same time the limitations suggest other explanations 
may be needed to create a more thorough model of community violence.   
 
Anomie Studies 
 Another model that sought to explain how the inequalities of a market-based economy 
impacted crime in certain communities was Anomie/Strain Theory.  The loss of blue-collar jobs 
and the suburban outmigration of the middle-class created urban neighborhoods rife with 
concentrated disadvantage (Wilson, 1997).  Filled with the same aspirations as the middle-class 
but lacking in socially-sanctioned avenues for their fulfillment, the marginalized either competed 
for a diminishing pool of living wage jobs, compromised with a low-paying service sector job or 
participated in the informal economy (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2010; Venkatesh, 2006).  
Anomie/Strain Theory posited that crime occurred when the marginalized deviated from 
socially-sanctioned means of goal attainment and instead resorted to proscribed means. 
 Historical periods during which sweeping social changes occurred tended to have higher 
crime counts.  Comparing crime trends in Buffalo, NY between 1854 and 1956, to historic social 
changes, Powell (1966) found that the period of Reconstruction and the Progressive Era had 
higher than average rates of crime, which he contended were rooted in existential and 
institutional anomie.  He concluded that “when there is a near collapse of the institutional order” 
or “where expectations exceed the possibility of fulfillment” anomie exists and higher rates of 
crime were to be expected (p. 171).  The structural conditions that led to deeply entrenched 
economic disadvantage in contemporary urban neighborhoods like Hollygrove would seem to 
meet both of these conditions:  institutional order appears to have collapsed and aspirations for 
personal advancement were stymied. 
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 Recent anomie research has focused in two areas: individual strain theory such as 
Agnew’s (1992) General Strain Theory (GST) and institutional anomie theory such as Messner 
and Rosenfeld’s (1997) Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT).  In the former, Agnew attempted to 
cast anomie theory into social psychology parlance, noting that strain was a negative emotional 
state that resulted from three conditions caused by an external entity: prevention of achieving a 
positively valued goal, removal of a positively valued stimuli, or presentation of a noxious or 
negatively related stimuli.  Those lacking psychological, cognitive and social capital may choose 
delinquency when the benefits outweighed costs and when their social environment reinforced 
delinquent behavior.  This theory has received some empirical support.  At-risk homeless youth 
exhibited the expected connection between strains and resultant negative emotional states and 
these predicted crime, especially violent crimes, property crimes and drug abuse (Baron, 2004).  
Boston high school students were shown to have elevated rates of anger and hostility in response 
to negative life events which played a causal role in fostering more aggressive forms of 
delinquency (Aseltine, Gore and Gordon, 2000).  Responses to the National Youth Survey, 
which has measures for both delinquency and constructs consistent with GST, showed those who 
experienced elevated strain also reported higher levels of delinquency participation (Mazarolle 
and Maahs, 2000).  While GST does appear to have some empirical support, the theory is biased 
toward agency and is less useful for explaining neighborhood-level violence. 
 The Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) of Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) posited that the 
American dream had a dark underside: a cultural emphasis promoting productivity and 
generating pressure to succeed at all costs, a glorification of competition that fosters personal 
ambition while weakening the collective sense of community, and a preoccupation with 
monetary rewards that restricts the kinds of achievement to which people aspire (p. 8).  The 
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resultant focus upon economic success was detrimental to social institutions that once regulated 
norms and behavior because “under conditions of extreme competitive individualism, people 
actively resist institutional control” (p. 79).  The result was elevated crime rates, especially 
homicide rates, which far outstripped those of other capitalist societies, suggesting the problem 
lay not in capitalism as much as in the American dream.  In the disadvantaged African American 
community two forces worked together to foster crime, one was the assimilation of the black 
community into the values inherent in the American dream of financial success and the other was 
“the alienation of young black men from the major institutions of the larger society” (p. 81).   
 The research was mixed when it comes to supporting IAT.  One study found that 
instrumental crime increased when there was a high commitment to monetary success combined 
with a weak commitment to legitimate means of attainment, and this was exacerbated by the lack 
of participation in non-economic social institutions, low educational attainment, low economic 
attainment, and high economic inequality (Baumer and Gustafson, 2007).   Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1997) compared national homicide rates across 18 capitalist nations with a range of 
social safety nets thought to partially insulate individuals’ personal well-being from market 
forces.  They found that nations with higher degrees of decommodification of labor, or the 
dependence upon the market as the primary distribution mechanism for “the material resources 
for personal well-being” (p. 1394), had lower rates of homicide.  Replicating the study, but 
including Eastern Europeans nations that had newly adopted market-based economies, 
Savolainen (2000) found that strong social safety nets moderated the effects of an uneven market 
economy and were associated with lower homicide rates, concluding that nations with a smaller 
underclass experienced less anomie and therefore less homicide.  Asserting that different types of 
homicide may differently impact anomie, Maume and Lee (2003) explored instrumental 
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homicides, or “lethal violence in pursuit of some material gain” contrasted with expressive 
homicides, or “those committed in the context of a lover’s quarrel, or a fit of rage” (p. 1144).  
They found family inequality to be a strong predictor of both types of homicide, that welfare 
expenditure moderated the impact of economic inequality on both types homicide, and that non-
economic institutions played a mediating role via the impact of economic motivation upon 
instrumental homicides.  This suggested that IAT may explain homicides committed in the 
pursuit of economic gains. 
 Other studies proved less convincing.  Studying Russia as it made a transition from a 
command economy to a market economy Sang-Weon and Pridemore (2005) found that regions 
where economic conditions were worst showed higher homicide rates, that family strength and 
voter turnout (measures of non-economic institutions) were negatively associated with homicide, 
while education had no relationship. This led the authors to conclude only partial support for IAT 
but implied that the social structures may not have had sufficient time to adapt to the rapid social 
changes and thus may have lost some of their buffering capability.  In a cross-national study of 
IAT, Hughes, Schaible and Gibbs (2015) found homicide to occur most often in countries where 
free-market principles and practices drove the economy and where core cultural commitments 
were oriented toward achievement, individualism and fetishism of money but that the impact of a 
market-driven economy was not more pronounced in countries with weakened non-economic 
institutions.  They concluded that “countries with strong structural and cultural emphases on the 
economy and personal responsibility for achieving monetary success tend to experience the 
highest rates of lethal violence” (pp. 117-118) and that post-materialism and favorable structural 
conditions may actually buffer society from high rates of homicide.  Finally, Bjerregaard and 
Cochran (2008) were unable to show that either annual expenditures on social welfare or the 
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strength of the free-market economy in a country were significantly related to homicide but they 
did find that family disruption and low voter turnout (a measure of non-economic institutional 
strength) was directly related to higher homicide rates, as was high economic inequality, 
especially when coupled with a poor educational system.  
 The promise of anomie theory is its ability to explain the interplay between individual 
motivation and structural deprivation for explaining crime.  In the context of this study, the goal 
of which is attempting to understand homicide at the neighborhood level, anomie theory may 
prove to have some value.  This value is enhanced when coupled with the explanatory value of 
Social Disorganization theory and especially the concept of collective efficacy.  Conditions of 
low collective efficacy, when coupled with conditions of high anomie, would appear to be 
precursors to higher homicide rates.  Anomie theory also may provide a bridge between Social 
Disorganization theory and subcultural explanations for violence as it helps explain the structural 
conditions of concentrated disadvantage and the vantage point of a potential offender 
experiencing anomie in the context of a neighborhood where inequalities abound and a 
subculture develops to adapt.   
 
Subcultural Studies 
 Early studies connecting urbanization and crime, especially the Chicago School of Urban 
Sociology, paired Social Disorganization theory with subcultural theories.  Only later did these 
two streams diverge.  In his 1931 article Cultural Conflict and Misconduct Wirth explored 
cultural deviance in a criminal context.  Theorizing that law was the expression of the wishes of 
the dominant class he opined “when culture is homogeneous and class differences are negligible, 
societies without crime are possible” (p. 485).  The remedy for crime was assimilation which 
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was thought to reduce crime as immigrants and societal outcasts began practicing a moral code 
more synchronous with the mores of the dominant culture.  Sellin (1938) further refined this 
reasoning, adding that culture conflict was essentially a conflict of conduct norms which 
occurred as a group attempted to differentiate itself within a cultural system or area, or as the 
result of contact between the norms of different systems or areas.  In his study of gangs Miller 
(1958) noted that deviance was not the result of a delinquent gang subculture but rather reflected 
the values of the lower class, “a long-established, distinctively patterned tradition with an 
integrity of its own” (p. 5).  Lewis (1966) found that poor communities exhibited 
“disengagement from the larger society, there is a hostility to the basic institutions of what are 
regarded as the dominant class…[t]here is hatred of the police, mistrust of government” (p. 23).  
The implication was that poor communities experienced anomie and, when coupled with a low 
levels of internal organization, “gives the culture of poverty its marginal and anomalous quality 
in our highly organized society” (p. 23).   This thinking helped to bridge the gap between 
anomie, subcultural, and social disorganization theories by explaining how subcultural values 
arose in conditions of anomie and neighborhood disorganization and created conditions fostering 
violence.   
 The southern subculture of violence hypothesis proposed by Hackney (1969) and Gastil 
(1971) hypothesized that higher rates of homicide in the south may be due to high levels of gun 
ownership, a predisposition to violence, and a culture of honor and retribution.  This subculture 
was exported to the north during the African American diaspora and took root in urban 
communities which, according to the hypothesis, explained differential rates of violence in the 
south and in black, northern communities.  Research quickly arose suggesting the data and 
conclusions were flawed (Loftin and Hill, 1974) and cast doubt upon several of the fundamental 
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premises (O’Connor and Lizotte, 1974).  Blau and Blau (1982) studied data from the 125 largest 
standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), hypothesizing that urban violence was a product 
of differences in racial and socioeconomic inequalities.  They found criminal violence was more 
prevalent in the south (southern subculture of violence), was positively related to the proportion 
of African Americans (ghetto subculture of violence) and was positively related to poverty 
(subculture of poverty).  However, upon controlling for socioeconomic inequality they 
discovered that southern location no longer influenced rates of violence and that the connection 
between percentage of blacks in a community and homicide was greatly reduced.  Their 
conclusion was that inequality, rather than subculture, impacted violence and that if a subculture 
of violence did exist it was better explained by economic inequality.  Challenging Lofton and 
Hill’s focus upon states as units of study, Messner (1983) used 204 SMSAs as his unit of 
analysis.  Unlike Blau and Blau this study found location in the south and proportion of African 
Americans to have a positive effect on homicide independent of poverty.  Outside of the south, 
racial composition was found to have a strong correlation with homicide while in the south it did 
not, leading the author to note “perhaps racial differences in value orientations toward violence 
are greater in non-southern regions than in the south” (p. 1006). 
 There were three fundamental flaws with the research to date on the southern, black and 
poverty culture explanations of violence, concluded Parker (1989); first, neither the south nor 
African Americans were homogeneous in lifestyle and values, second, the pejorative indictment 
of urban minorities was unfair and racist, and third, these studies ignored the role of institutional 
racism that produced the conflations between violence and race.  The author noted that a 
subculture of violence, if one existed, would “be shared by a small enough group of individuals 
that evidence of its existence would be unlikely to show up in surveys, or in macro, aggregated 
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studies of cities or metropolitan areas” (p. 1002) and that more innovative methodological 
approaches would be required to find them. 
 More promising research on the subculture of violence addressed structural conditions, 
implying that culture alone was not sufficient to explain violence. This research recognized that 
“in structurally disorganized slum communities it appears that a system of values emerges in 
which crime, disorder and drug use are less than fervently condemned and hence expected as part 
of everyday life” (Sampson and Wilson, 1995, p. 50).  Much of the research in this areas has 
been ethnographic and has explored topics including the subculture of Puerto Rican crack dealers 
in New York City (Bourgois, 2003), homeless heroin addicts (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009), 
marginalized street vendors and hustlers of New York City (Duneier, 1999), street gangs in a 
high-rise Chicago housing development (Venkatesh, 2008), and the underground economy in 
Chicago’s south side (Venkatesh, 2006).  They described life on society’s margins from the 
viewpoint of those experiencing structural disadvantage, capturing the challenges of living 
between two cultures, their own and the dominant culture who made the rules.  Thus there was a 
substantial amount of qualitative and ethnographic literature affirming the subcultural 
explanations of violence. 
 Anderson (1999) described the complex interplay between these often competing values 
systems defining them as “street” values and “decent” values.  His proposed code of the street “is 
sanctioned primarily by violence and the threat of violent retribution” (p. 134) and became more 
normative as greater numbers of urban youth adopted the code.  The neighborhood was impacted 
when residents were “encouraged to choose between an abstract code of justice that is disparaged 
by the most dangerous people on the streets and a practical code that is geared toward survival in 
the public spaces of their community” (p. 134).  It was the structural inequities that gave rise to 
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and maintained the subcultural code of the streets and made it possible to partially explain 
differential rates of homicide in some communities. 
 In St. Louis Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) found that neighborhood disadvantage correlated 
strongly with retaliatory homicide and that retaliatory street killings reflected street codes.  They 
concluded that encounters resulting in retaliatory homicides were shaped by: disrespectful or 
challenging exchanges, community tolerance for lowered social control, and a reluctance of the 
community to call police.  They proposed four types of retaliatory homicides related to street 
culture: retribution for disrespect, insults toward female significant others, a policing vacuum, 
and community/family support for retaliation.  Kubrin (2005) also found that street codes 
transcended place and were transmitted via pop culture especially prominent rap music where 
violence was portrayed as a vehicle for establishing social identity, respect and social control. 
 Violent behavior has also been shown to be an instrumental tool for developing street 
credibility and impressing peers (Wilkinson, 2003).  Adopting street codes at an individual level 
has been shown to be useful as a predictor of violence for African American youth (Stewart, 
Simons & Conger, 2002) while also placing them at greater risk for violent victimization, 
especially in high-crime neighborhoods (Stewart, Schreck & Simons, 2006).  There was a 
cyclical aspect to neighborhood violence; using violence to prove one’s strength and street 
credibility resulted in retaliation as the offended party enacted retribution, creating a vicious 
cycle of dominance and victimization (Berg, Stewart, Schreck & Simons, 2012).  Widespread 
street culture adoption by a neighborhood has been shown to predict violent delinquency and to 
enhance adoption of subcultural values (Stewart and Simons, 2010).  These studies connected the 
prevalence of subcultural street codes and neighborhood violence. 
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 There was also a connection between neighborhood social controls and subcultural 
values.  When neighborhood residents were both strongly attached to their neighborhood and 
satisfied with the police they exercised more informal social controls (Silver and Miller, 2006).  
When trust in the police was poor, legal cynicism developed, something Kirk and Papachristos 
(2011) defined as “a cultural orientation in which the law and agents of its enforcement are 
viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to ensure public safety” (p. 1191). The 
result was behavioral choices that ran counter to dominant norms.  A community experiencing 
high levels of legal cynicism was also less likely to cooperate with the police when it came to 
arresting offenders for three reasons: fear of retaliation, experience with offenders being quickly 
released, and because those being arrested are a source of protection and/or goods in the informal 
economy (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011).  These studies proposed that neighborhoods high in collective 
efficacy were less likely to adopt subcultural values oppositional to dominant norms. 
 While earlier thinking about subcultural theories seem to have lost both favor and 
momentum to explain violence in certain impoverished communities, more recent studies that 
have bridged the structural-culture divide have received some empirical support.  Although 
broad, sweeping subcultural hypothesis such as the southern honor subculture of violence and the 
subculture of poverty may have limited value, Anderson’s street codes have shown promise for 
to explain neighborhood violence.  As noted previously, early attempts by the Chicago School of 
Sociology’s to explain violence via social disorganization relied heavily upon cultural elements 
to create the theory.  The divide between the two may be artificial and forced, as evidenced by 
the ethnographic work of Venkatesh (2006) and the theoretical partnership between Sampson 




 A more comprehensive theoretical formulation may require the addition of anomie.  The 
importance of social disorganization’s concept of collective efficacy is its ability to explain how 
disadvantaged communities lose cohesion and fail to exert informal controls to curtail violence.  
Street codes help explain the apparent paradox of a community that fails to exercise informal 
controls reflecting dominant norms while embracing those counter to them.  Anomie theory 
helps bridge the two by explaining the rejection of dominant norms by those who value 
culturally sanctioned goals but have limited means and hopes for their attainment.  Anomie leads 
to a street culture running contrary to dominant cultural norms, thus eroding the power of those 
who would exert informal controls in ways that enhance collective efficacy. 
 One informant, relating a story about growing up in Hollygrove, shared how when he was 
younger “every mama was your mama.”  Caught doing something wrong one ran the risk of 
being disciplined more than once before reaching home.  Contrasting then to present-day 
Hollygrove, he opined it now is “all about the money,” that monetary success at all costs has 
become the prevalent norm.  Then he described a neighborhood with deeply entrenched values, 
where violence erupts when people come to the neighborhood who “aren’t from back here.”  
This informant managed to connect collective efficacy, IAT and subcultural theories to explain 
Hollygrove’s violence and homicide in a single interview. 
 Each of these theories has some potential to explain why homicide occurs in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.  Each of them has empirical support.  While none of them may 







Studying Neighborhood-Level Homicide from a Qualitative Perspective 
 
 As the literature review showed there has been extensive research done from a 
quantitative perspective while it was difficult to find qualitative studies of neighborhood-level 
homicide.  Quantitative, macrosociological studies explained variations between neighborhood 
homicide rates, but further research was needed to explain conditions leading to homicide within 
individual neighborhoods.  To better explain New Orleans’ high homicide rate required drilling 
deeper into the subject matter by exploring the views of those whose lives were daily impacted 
by the phenomenon.  Thus this study used qualitative and ethnographic methods to adapt macro 
theories to a mezzo (individual neighborhood) level in an effort to bridge this gap in the 
literature.  The study attempted to connect macrosociological perspectives of violent crime to 
neighborhood views regarding its etiology in order to better understand homicide at the 
neighborhood level and thus explore how homicide might be mitigated.  The study explored 
Social Disorganization theory’s concept of collective efficacy, Institutional Anomie Theory’s 
explanation of what motivates offenders to eschew socially-sanctioned means of monetary 
pursuits, and Subcultural theory’s understanding of a counterculture in a neighborhood of 
concentrated disadvantage in an effort to apply these theories at a neighborhood level. 
Understanding a phenomenon like neighborhood-level homicide in some depth requires 
developing a “complex, holistic picture” (Creswell, 1998, p. 15) derived from the lived 
experience of those whose lives have been impacted by it.  Getting to this level requires 
gathering “information that is difficult to obtain through more quantitatively-oriented methods of 
data collection” (Guest, Namey, Mitchell, 2013, p.1).  Qualitative research seeks to uncover the 
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meanings that individuals ascribe to the phenomena, requiring researchers to “rely as much as 
possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied” (Creswell, 2014, p. 8).  To 
better understand homicide at the neighborhood level requires a study that could bridge the gap 
between macro studies about neighborhood-level homicide and the lived experience of those in a 
high homicide neighborhood whose lives are daily being impacted.  This study used a qualitative 
and ethnographic approach to connect the lived experience of neighborhood violence to existing 
theories in an effort to better understand how it occurs and what might be done to mitigate it. 
 
Research Design 
 Ethnography is a qualitative research design with roots in cultural anthropology 
conducted in the early 20th century (Creswell, 2014).  Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1925) 
concluded that neighborhood-level crime occurred due to the lack of cohesiveness of socially 
disorganized neighborhoods.  Out of this research several ethnographic studies emerged to 
describe the phenomenon (Shaw, 1930; Cressey, 1932; Sutherland, 1937; Whyte, 1943).  The 
importance of ethnography, according to Creswell (2014) is the focus upon a culture-sharing 
group even when the group is bounded and small, such as a single urban neighborhood.  Using 
an emic perspective, or “taking on the point of view of those being studied” (Babbie, 2013, p. 
301), this study followed the ethnographic tradition of telling the story of neighborhood 
homicide as viewed through the eyes of residents of the Hollygrove community, a New Orleans 
neighborhood that resembled the socially disorganized communities of Chicago studied by the 
urban sociologists of the early- to mid-twentieth century. 
 Beginning with a single homicide that occurred near one of the neighborhood’s crime 
hotspots, the study used snowball sampling to gradually expand outwards in concentric circles 
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that resembled the Chicago School of Urban Sociology’s concentric zones of the city.  Those 
closest to the murder, many of whom live in the adjacent blocks from where it occurred, formed 
the second circle, viewing the homicide from a personal perspective but once-removed.  Others 
in the neighborhood formed the third circle, those whose lives were impacted both by the 
specific homicide and other homicides that occurred throughout the neighborhood.  The fourth 
circle consisted of neighbors and neighborhood leaders who understood the neighborhood and 
had a wider perspective on neighborhood conditions.  Finally, city officials who understood the 
community were interviewed, including law enforcement officers, political figures and civic 





Figure 1: Concentric Circles of Interviews in Study 
Individual Homicide
Adjoining Block









Because a neighborhood social milieu has many elements that are visible primarily to 
insiders, data collection must begin there (Guest, Namey and Mitchell, 2013).  To gather insider 
knowledge this study employed qualitative research interviewing and focus groups as a method 
to “understand themes of the lived daily world from the subjects’ own perspective” (Saldana, 
2009, p. 24).  Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) posited that “interviewing is an active process where 
interviewer and interviewee through their relationship produce knowledge” (p. 17).  There were 
two types of data collection used in the study: individual, in-depth interviews and focus groups.  
All of the interviews and focus groups were semi-structured and began with a prepared set of 
questions but allowed for latitude to veer from scripted questions to explore emerging issues in 
more detail. They ranged from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours in duration. The use of focus group 
interviews to supplement the individual ones, according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), offered 
added potential to create spontaneous expression and deeper emotion through group interaction 
as contrasted with individual interviews which tend to be more cognitive (p. 150).   
Figure 2: Social Disorganization Theory Zones.   
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In addition to interviews and focus groups, photographs were used to help convey depth 
and detail.  Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) pictures of homeless addicts, while Duneier (1999) 
used pictures of sidewalk-based street vendors in New York, to help readers connect to the 
ethnography and better understand their project.  All of the photographs in the study were taken 
by the researcher.  None of the photographs identify study participants in order to protect their 
anonymity. 
The final research method was crime scene observation.  Creswell (2013) noted that the 
advantage of observation is the ability of the observer to use all five senses to collect data.  The 
researcher observed an investigation of a shooting, spoke to neighborhood residents present 
when the shooting occurred, and discussed the scene with police detectives who were treating the 
scene as a homicide investigation because they expected the victim to die from his wounds.  
Observation also included visiting scenes of previous shootings where makeshift memorials to 
deceased victims had been erected.  Observation of an active investigation provided greater 
depth of understanding of the process police used, allowed the researcher to better understand the 
interaction between the police and the neighborhood members who were bystanders at the time 
of the shooting.   It also presented a unique, intimate experience with the family members who 
lived nearby and to whose home the victim ran and collapsed after the shooting.  Finally, this 
observation offered perspective regarding how control of space changed hands when crime scene 
tape was used to limit the ability of local residents to enter the two-block stretch where the 
shooting was being investigated. 
Snowball sampling was employed to identify potential informants.  Babbie (2013) 
defines snowball sampling as “a process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other 
subjects” (p. 191).  He cautions that the procedure results in samples with questionable 
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representativeness and notes that it is best utilized for exploratory purposes.  While this study 
explored the lived experience of neighborhood homicide from the perspective of those closest to 
it, the findings also suggest explanations regarding what happens at the neighborhood level to 
foster conditions of either higher or lower homicide. 
  
Data 
At the core of the study were 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews that began with a 
single murder near a neighborhood crime hotspot, a corner where several murders have taken 
place, including that of Brandon Aggison.  The interviews then expanded outward to secure the 
perspectives of residents throughout the neighborhood.  Neighborhood interviewees ranged in 
age from a male in his early 20’s, to senior citizens who had lived in the neighborhood for many 
years.  To provide broader perspective, several interviews were conducted with non-residents, 
including two high-ranking police officials, two political appointees of the Mayor, and the 
neighborhood’s city councilperson.  Three resident focus groups were conducted: the first with a 
group of three male males in their early 20s, a second with a group of seven neighborhood senior 
citizens, and a third with a group of six community leaders actively engaged in community 
development.  With the exception of three participants in the community leaders focus group, all 
resident voices were African American.  Seventeen photographs of the community were included 
to add depth and perspective on the data.  These included three crime scene pictures taken to 
show both an active investigation of a shooting and a makeshift memorial to a homicide victim 
as well as pictures of the neighborhood to better illustrate the neighborhood’s physical space and 
to add depth to the written description of the community.     
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The initial interview took place with the surviving family member of a homicide victim, a 
widow in her mid-20s whose common-law husband was shot and killed leaving her to raise their 
5-year-old son as a single mother.  She was a classmate of Brandon Aggison, currently resided 
one half block from the corner where he was killed, and was also raised in a home across the 
street from the corner store where he was shot.  The researcher’s existing work in the community 
brought him into contact with many acquaintances who lived within a block or two of that corner 
and those residents formed a second circle of interviewees.  Suggestions by these interviewees 
led to another circle of resident interviews representing those who lived farther from the corner 
of Brandon Aggison’s shooting and which provided a fuller perspective of the neighborhood.  
The researcher’s connections to multiple community leaders with a deep knowledge of the 
neighborhood provided a final set of interviews.   
 
Table 3: Race, Gender, and Age of Study Participants 
 Race Gender Age 
 Black White Male Female 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
Individual 
Interviews 88% 12% 68% 32% 20% 20% 20% 24% 16% 
Focus  
Groups 81% 19% 31% 69% 25% 13% 6% 6% 50% 
 
Validity and Reliability 
 Creswell (2014) concluded that validity in qualitative research required checking for the 
accuracy of the data, and posited eight primary strategies to assure valid data.  This study used 
three.  First, data was triangulated through the use of multiple sources that were converged to 
build valid themes.  Data sources included interviews with both residents and outsiders with a 
stake in the community, statistical data from multiple sources, and participant observations in 
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multiple settings and at varied times.  Second, the data gathered was checked by informants by 
allowing them to read transcripts of their interviews.  This occasionally involved calling or 
meeting with interviewees to verify or add further information to their statements.  Finally, 
because this was a dissertation, there was oversight of the study at every stage by the committee, 
assuring a deep level of accountability and regular auditing of the data, findings, and 
conclusions.  
 Creswell (2013) found that reliability could be assured by taking detailed field notes, by 
using a high-quality recording device, by transcribing the interviews carefully and in a manner 
that reveals conversational pauses and overlaps.  He also stressed checking transcriptions to 
assure there were no obvious transcription errors and avoiding coding drift by creating memos 
defining codes and the process by which they are used (Creswell, 2014).   Throughout each 
interview and observation, the researcher maintained detailed notes.  Interviews and focus groups 
were recorded using an Olympus WS-802 digital voice recorder.  Verbatim transcriptions were 
completed by the researcher and two paid assistants; whenever there were questions about the 
accuracy of the transcriptions the recordings were reviewed to assure accuracy of the 
transcriptions.  Finally, data were hand-coded in the margins of the transcription and checked 
against field notes to avoid coding drift and errors. 
 
Data Analysis 
All interviews and focus groups were recorded on an Olympus WS-802 digital voice 
recorder and transcribed verbatim by the researcher and two paid assistants.  Observations of the 
community and crime scenes were collected in a notebook with room in the margins for later 
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coding or for thoughts that occurred after it was concluded.  Each of the interview transcripts 
were printed to allow them to be hand-coded by the researcher. 
Coding has been described as the process of “aggregating the text or visual data into 
small categories of information” (Creswell, 2013, p. 184).  Saldana (2013) proposed a two-pass 
coding system consisting of a first set of broad codes generated during a first coding cycle, 
followed by a second coding cycle that narrows the number of codes as the researcher identifies 
similar and common codes.  He suggested that the second cycle of coding should combine codes 
to generate themes, or broad descriptors, drawn from the codes that more fully explain the data. 
These themes can then be connected to the existing literature in an effort to extend existing 
theories or suggest new ones. 
The interviews and focus groups were hand-coded using deductive, inductive and in-vivo 
codes (Saldana, 2013). Line-by-line coding generated a massive number of first-pass codes.  A 
second pass found numerous similarities and allowed the researcher to see commonalities and 
thus reduce the number of codes. These were organized into five key themes:  the community’s 
clash of values, the Keeping It Real subculture, the connection between drugs and violence, 
mistrust of outsiders/neighborhood boundary issues, and grassroots solutions to neighborhood 
homicide.  These themes were connected back to the existing literature to help contextualize the 
findings within existing understandings of neighborhood-level violence and homicide and to 
advance existing theoretical understandings of neighborhood-level homicide.  Several of the in-






Role of the Researcher 
 I spent two periods of my life in the community to be studied.  My family moved to 
Hollygrove during the summer after my 7th grade academic year and maintained a home there 
until my father’s death 36 years later.  I returned to the neighborhood after a 19-year sojourn in 
Chicago and began working as a community organizer and developer.  Throughout the next 16 
years I was privileged to be part of innovative change, much of it taking place after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita.  These experiences served both to deepen my ties within the neighborhood and 
to pique my concern for the high number of homicides among young, African-American males 
in the community.  Some of them were friends of mine, many were acquaintances and all of 
them made an indelible impact upon my thinking.  This is what motivated me to return to school 
and the reason I chose this topic and this neighborhood for my dissertation research. 
 My perspective was both as an insider and an outsider.  While I grew up in the 
community and had maintained ties there all my life, I was white.  Hollygrove is 
overwhelmingly African American.  Thus I was frequently described as “the white guy.”  My 
longstanding work in the community had brought me a level of respect and access that most 
white males were rarely afforded.  My childhood in the community provided a bi-cultural 
perspective that few whites ever experience.  Yet, at the end of the day, I was still white and 
there was a divide that I would never fully cross. 
 Finally, my work in the community predated my academic studies at the University of 
New Orleans.  I was first a community member and only later have I become a researcher.  Thus, 
while I brought a unique, insider’s perspective to the research, it was a perspective that 
necessitated careful bracketing to maintain distance from the research and to assure my personal 
perspective on the community did not interfere with the validity of the findings. 
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Chapter 5: Setting 






Hollygrove’s Olive Street represented the best and worst of New Orleans. A grand, 
inviting entrance was marked by a canopy of mature live oak trees and two magnificent 
buildings from a former, more opulent era of New Orleans’ history.  The entry concealed the 
disinvestment that lay beyond.  The first four blocks were the domain of a white middle class 
Figure 3. Google Maps (2016) Map of 
the Hollygrove Neighborhood. 
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who resided elsewhere, driving into the community to use the post office, shop at a pocket farm 
with an attached market, and use recreational facilities.  After that it suddenly changed into an 
inner-city neighborhood comprised of a hodgepodge of residences, many of which were 
abandoned, vacant lots, a corner store, a second neighborhood park and then a dead end at 
Airline Highway.  An entire city’s issues were writ large on this one street. 
You enter the neighborhood from Carrollton Avenue, one of the city’s major arteries, 
passing between the Waldo Burton Boy’s home and the Carrollton Branch of the United States 
Postal Service. The Waldo Burton was “endowed and built in the 1920s by cypress lumber 
businessman and philanthropist, William L. Burton (1847-1927) who wished to establish an 
enduring memorial to his only child, William Waldo Burton” (Waldo Burton Memorial Boy’s 
Home: Tulane University Special Collections).  Constructed in the 1920s as an orphanage for 
boys it was an imposing, grand two-story structure with an expansive green front lawn, an ornate 
wrought iron fence, and stately Live Oak trees along the circular driveway.  The property 
spanned one city block in width and two deep.  The rear yard was equally lush but could not be 




                
 
 On the other side of Olive Street was the Carrollton Branch post office.  Claude, in his 
late 80s, remembered when it was the Cloverland Dairy, “the largest dairy in the South” 
(Cloverland Dairy Products, Inc. website).  At one point in its history it employed noted New 
Orleans trumpeter Louis Armstrong (Armstrong, 1993, p. 25).  It would later become home to 
the Sealtest Dairy before becoming the post office in the 1980s.  While much of the dairy was 
razed by the postal service, the façade remained, constructed with glazed white tiles and arched 
windows.  Behind the post office, which extended two blocks down Olive Street, was parking for 
delivery vehicles and an overgrown vacant lot surrounded by a chain link fence topped with 
barbed wire also owned by the federal government and used by the Carrollton Playground for 
parking.  The post office and the boys’ home were magnificent structures facing the main avenue 
that belied the neighborhood’s issues farther along the street.  
Figure 4. Front entrance of the 
Waldo Burton Memorial Boys 
Home. 
Figure 5: Rear yard of the 








Behind the Burton Home was the Carrollton Playground, also known as Lincoln Park.  It 
was a series of athletic fields used primarily by the children of affluent, white families for 
baseball and soccer.  Several residents described this as the “white park,” one that was off limits 
to most neighborhood residents.  It was operated by the Carrollton Booster Club whose 
leadership, with the exception of one African American, was white according to their website.  
There were several smaller baseball diamonds behind chain link fences, one larger ballpark 
complete with stands and a concession area.  When the fields were being used there was a 
constant police presence monitoring them to maintain safety, notifying the surrounding 
community that they were being observed and were not welcome.  While the boosters have 
attempted to engage the community in their programs by offering scholarships for youth to 
participate, those overtures had been rebuffed.  Neighborhood youth noted they feel more 
welcome, at Conrad Playground which lay six blocks further down Olive Street. 
Figure 6. The Carrollton Branch 
of the Post Office, site of the 







Across from the playground was the Hollygrove Market and Farm (HGMF).  It occupied 
property that was once a gardening supply store and plant nursery but was abandoned after 
Katrina.  It was originally conceived to address two neighborhood issues: health problems related 
to poor diet and Hollygrove’s lack of grocery stores.  It was a one-acre pocket farm that both 
grew produce and imported it from local growers.  Many came to the market from throughout the 
city, few from Hollygrove.  HGMF had attempted to engage the community by providing 
discounts to local residents, cooking and nutrition classes, meeting space, and jobs for local 
residents.  Like the ball fields across the street, however, the market served a primarily white 
clientele. 
 Next to the HMGF was Phase III Body Shop and Wrecker Service, a black-owned 
business whose owner told me the business had operated there for 36 years.  The body shop was 
always busy with cars parked along Olive Street awaiting repairs.  Phase III stood out in these 
first few blocks because it primarily served an African American clientele.  Even this space was 
contested, however.  The Booster Club worked with the city to make traffic on Olive Street 
Figure 7. The Carrollton 
Playground. 
Figure 8. The Hollygrove 
Market and Farm. 
74 
 
travel one way, from Carrollton Avenue into the neighborhood.  The boy’s home, post office, 
market and ball fields were continuous; there were no side streets that crossed Olive in these first 
four blocks.  Accessing Phase III legally required traveling out of the neighborhood to Carrollton 
Avenue and then back into the neighborhood at Olive Street.  Many residents ignored the 
directional signs and travelled the wrong way to get there. 
               
  
 
 One final portion of the first four blocks, situated on the remnants of an old railroad that 
once traversed diagonally through Hollygrove, was a Public Storage facility.  Owned by a 
Glendale, California company the facility provided storage lockers for rent.  The property was 
enclosed with a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire.  The road rose as one crosses Joliet 
Street, where the tracks once were elevated.  Across this former track bed lay the rest of 
Hollygrove.   
 One resident of the neighborhood remembered it as a formerly mixed neighborhood 
comprised of working-class Italians and African Americans. Several referred to the part of 
Hollygrove closest to Carrollton Avenue as the white part of the neighborhood.  The first four 
blocks of Olive Street, with the exception of Phase III, showed evidence of this racialized past. 
Figure 9. The Phase III Body 
Shop. 
Figure 10. The Public Storage 
Facility adjacent to Phase III. 
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One prominent feature marking Olive Street were the high voltage electrical lines running 
through the community.  There were two to three of these on every block on the left side of the 
street. Many of them had been tagged with graffiti.  There were also no curbs when one crossed 
Joliet Street and because Olive Street is higher than many yards this caused flooding.  Curbs 
would direct the flow of water to the drains, without them water flows into the adjacent yards. 




Between Joliet and Leonidas Street there were only four houses, all on the right side of 
the street.  Two of them were currently occupied, one had been under construction since Katrina 
and one was abandoned, blighted and in imminent danger of collapse.  Across the street, running 
diagonally away from Olive Street at Joliet, lay the abandoned railway and vacant land.  In 
recent years the Sewerage and Water Board (S&WB) buried drainage pipes underneath the 
railway, leveling its once-raised path to street level.  The S&WB ceded the first two blocks to the 
neighborhood for the creation of The Hollygrove Green Line.  The Carrollton Hollygrove 
Community Development Corporation collaborated with Tulane University’s City Center to 
develop this into a linear park, with an orchard of fruit trees and an innovative water retention 
Figure 11.  A view of Olive 
Street crossing the abandoned 
railway.  The Greenline begins 
on the left. 
Figure 12.  An abandoned house 
across from the Greenline. 
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project that drained rainwater into a large retention pond planted with native plants chosen for 
their ability to absorb water.  The first section of the Green Line, at the corner of Joliet and Olive 
Street, was paved with blacktop and surrounded by a chain link fence topped with barbed wire.  
 The next cross street was Leonidas, where public transit bus line traversed the 
neighborhood.  On the left sat a vacant home, a brick structure facing Leonidas that once was the 
family home of the Macaluso family.  This Italian family, once prominent citizens of the 
community, owned a number of homes in the adjoining area which were mostly vacant since 
Katrina.  Behind it a vacant land parcel stretched to the next cross street, also owned by the 
Macalusos.  On the right are two four-plex apartment buildings, abandoned since the storm.  
Much of that block was vacant land as well.  These buildings were two of four on that block, also 
owned by the Macalusos; one was once the home of Lil Wayne, a Grammy Award winning rap 
artist.  The buildings were weathered with boarded windows, their carports consisted of steel 
posts as the roofs were missing.  On this block the streets began to show significant disrepair 
with current potholes and evidence of frequent, hasty patches elsewhere.  In these first two 
blocks there were only two occupied homes, the remainder were vacant and blighted with the 
exception of one that had been slowly constructed in the ten years since the storm. 
 Between Leonidas and Eagle Street the number of homes increased.  To the right vacant 
lots, where blighted houses were razed, sat like parentheses at both ends of the block.  Between 
them were four single houses, all occupied.  To the left were two double shotgun houses, two 
single-family homes and two four-plexes, also occupied.  The most notable feature of this block 
was the sewer lift station jutting out into the street.  Above ground it is a nondescript cinder-
block building about five feet square and seven feet high; below ground was a massive pump, 
two stories below the street, which served to move sewerage on its route to the treatment plant at 
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the edge of the neighborhood.  For many years after Katrina a temporary pump blocked half the 
street, periodically leaking raw sewerage into a vacant lot and leaving a malodorous stench 
impacting the nearby neighbors. 
               
    
 
 The blocks of Olive Street between Eagle and General Ogden, then between General 
Ogden and Hollygrove, had been the location of multiple homicides.  On the left side a Habitat 
for Humanity home, newly constructed, began a stretch of shotgun doubles, ending with a vacant 
lot where an abandoned home was once used for drug sales until the neighbors successfully 
petitioned the city to raze it.  On the right a two-story four-plex was followed by a single home, 
vacant land belonging to St. Peter’s A.M.E. church, two doubles, an abandoned, blighted home 
and then the Olive Superette.  This corner was the impetus for this study, the place where 
Brandon Aggison was shot.   
 The Olive Superette was a one-story, brick structure at the corner of Olive and General 
Ogden, opening to Olive Street.  On the sides of the building were advertisements suggesting the 
store was a “Fresh Meat Market,” along with a widely-ignored “No Loitering” sign.  Another 
sign, protruding from the store so it could be seen from both streets, stated “Olive Food Store & 
Figure 13.  The vacant former 
home of the Macaluso family. 
Figure 14.  Abandoned 4-plexes 
across from the Macaluso home. 
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Meat Market, Hot Food.”  While it did provide an array of grocery items, the bulk of its sales 
appeared to be alcoholic beverages and drug-related paraphernalia.  Seven men were standing at 
the entrance of the store, most drinking; all but one walked inside the store when told I was 
taking a picture of the store.  The street outside was littered with trash, despite the nearby trash 
receptacle.   
 While writing this chapter on setting, I received a phone call that another shooting had 
occurred there.  Approaching the corner, I saw that the NOPD had stretched police tape across a 
1-1/2 block radius of the shooting and residents were gathered outside the tape watching the 
police collect bullet casings.  The ambulance had recently left the scene with the victim, a young 
African American man in his twenties.  One of the men sitting outside the tape greeted me by 
name and told me that the victim was his nephew, a man that I knew.  While no one seemed to 
know the aggressor, several had observed the shooting.  They told me that a car stopped near the 
intersection, a black male got out, pulled a gun and shot the victim four times with a pistol in full 
view of all on the corner.  This occurred around 1:30 PM, in daylight, just beyond range of the 
video camera on the side of the store.  Many of the residents thought the shooter knew the 
position of the camera and intentionally avoided it. 
       
  
 
Figure 15.  The Olive 
Superette. 




 Crime scenes are the domain of the police investigators.  Sections of the neighborhood 
become temporarily inaccessible to locals as the police assert their authority to claim the 
territory.  Bert, who was a participant in this study, walked over from his house inside the crime 
scene to tell me that his toilet had been shot and had leaked all over the bathroom floor.  He 
asked me to come with him to see it, lifting the tape and escorting me inside.  One of the 
detectives stopped us and ushered us back beyond the perimeter of the yellow tape, telling Bert 
that he was allowed inside the tape but I was not.  Another detective, an acquaintance of mine, 
walked over to talk with me about the importance of protecting the scene.  The detectives were 
treating it as a homicide scene believing the victim would not survive.  Several of those gathered 
outside the tape, neighborhood residents, were angry about being restricted from crossing the 
tape.  Because I was white and dressed in a suit it appeared that I was treated with a different 
level of respect than they were. 
         
 
 Once the tape was removed I was able to travel to the yard in front of a friend’s house 
where the victim had collapsed.  A neighbor had come with a shovel to remove the blood pooled 
Figure 17. Detectives investigating the 
scene of a shooting at Olive and 
General Ogden, November 3, 2016. 
Figure 18. Police tape marking the 




on the dirt in front of their porch.  Several other neighbors were gathered on the porch and told 
me that the victim had been standing next to a young man who was part of the 20-something 
male focus group in this study, someone I knew well.  It was the second time in the past several 
years that someone standing next to him was shot in broad daylight.  One of the neighbors on the 
porch had held the victim, urging him to stay alive because his brother had also been shot and 
killed and the family could not handle another shooting death.  Also on the porch was Arianne, 
another participant in this study who had lost her husband to gun violence and was a classmate of 
Brandon Aggison; at this moment the study had come full circle with two shootings at the Olive 
Superette, one at the beginning and the other at the end. 
 The block between General Ogden and Hollygrove Streets had been the site of several 
homicides as well.  Morris Smith, known in the neighborhood as Iceman, was killed on this 
block on December 12, 2012.  This drug-related shooting also occurred in the daytime, in front 
of a vacant, overgrown lot.  Iceman had been released from federal prison for drug trafficking 
nine months previous.  A newspaper article reported that the shooter’s brother had stolen drugs 
from him and was afraid that he would talk to the police about the incident (Purpura, 2015).  For 
several years afterwards a collection of stuffed animals was duct-taped to the telephone pole in 
front of the lot as a memorial. 
 The left side of the street on this block was a combination of seven single and double 
homes and a mixture of renters and homeowners.  There were two vacant lots, the one where 
Iceman was killed was overgrown and poorly maintained, the other had been converted into a 
garden by the adjacent homeowner.  One of these homes had been abandoned since Katrina and 
was in an advanced state of disrepair.  The right side of this block began with two units 
constructed immediately before Katrina to be used as Section 8 rental housing by a white man 
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who lives outside of the neighborhood.  The first is a four-plex unit, too large for the lot upon 
which it was constructed; one unit was vacant with plywood over the door.  This building had 
been a source of tension for some in the community when a drug dealer lived there.  Its location, 
across General Ogden from the Olive Superette, situated it near a source of customers for both 
the corner store and the drug dealer.  Several residents approached the landlord and notified him 
of the activities of his tenants which resulted in the drug dealer’s eviction.  The next unit was a 
double, painted to match the four-plex and owned by the same landlord.  An overgrown vacant 
lot stood between it and the next home, a pink modular unit built after Katrina by the young 
family who owned it.  The next three units were also homeowner occupied, all by elderly 
residents who had freshly painted them.  An overgrown vacant lot ended the block. 
 After Katrina such an array of vacant homes and lots, intermixed with occupied units, 
became known as the “jack-o-lantern” effect.  The comparison was to a carved Halloween 
pumpkin where the teeth had gaps between.  This block, along with the remaining four, were 
excellent examples of the jack-o-lantern effect. 
 Upon crossing Hollygrove Street to the left was the home of a recently-deceased 
matriarch of the community.  Her home was a modular, built by students at a trade school in 
New Hampshire and erected upon pilings using a crane that swung the two halves of the home 
into place.  The home where she previously lived was next door and was decaying; both were 
vacant.  Two homeowner-occupied singles and a vacant lot were followed by an occupied single, 
a one-story, four-unit cinderblock apartment and a red-brick two-story home that once was the 
residence of a local physician who operated a blacks-only clinic in the neighborhood during the 
Segregation Era.  On the right side of Olive Street was a futuristic-looking yellow home 
constructed after Katrina by a neighborhood pastor and his wife.  The next home was a single, 
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brick home abandoned since Katrina.  Two singles followed, the residences of elderly 
homeowners.  Completing the block was an overgrown lot and an abandoned eight-unit 
apartment building. 
 Hamilton Street crossed Olive at this point, an artery used by many to travel through the 
neighborhood to the suburbs, allowing motorists to avoid heavy traffic on Carrollton Avenue.  
On the left side of Olive was an abandoned brick single followed by an abandoned eight-unit 
apartment building.  Two vacant lots, both recently mowed, were followed by the only occupied 
home on the block.  Across the street was Conrad Playground, also known as Frederic Square.  
Unlike the Carrollton Booster playground six blocks away, Conrad was a place the neighbors felt 
welcomed.  It consisted of a large baseball diamond with bleachers on Olive and Hamilton, a 
yellow field house with a concession stand, a basketball court covered with a metal roof, and a 
small playground for children.  Both the baseball diamond and the basketball courts were lighted 
at night. The playground was built by a collaborative effort between Trinity Christian 
Community and KaBoom in 2011.  The park had a supervisor and offered programs for the 
community.  New chain link fences surrounded the park as did trees planted by volunteers after 
Katrina.  The park previously experienced significant flooding after heavy rains but a storm 
water management project by Tulane University City Center and the Carrollton Hollygrove 
Community Development Corporation had ameliorated it.  The park was inviting and played host 
to many community functions, including the recent Night Out Against Crime and a religious 
revival conducted by St. Joan of Arc Catholic Church. 
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 The park symbolized the divide between the first four blocks of Olive and the remainder.  
While Carrollton Playground was almost exclusively the domain of white New Orleanians 
traveling to the neighborhood from elsewhere, Conrad was almost exclusively used by African 
Americas from the community.  Claude, a study participant in his late 80s, remembered when the 
park was off-limits to blacks during New Orleans’ segregation years, “when we was comin’ up, 
we couldn’t go on the playground.  We’re black, and you couldn’t go in there.  Well, we used to 
go over there and jump then fence when there weren’t nobody there and play ball, and the police 
would come and run us out of there because by being black we wasn’t supposed to be in there.”  
He would later become president of the park’s booster club, using his contacts with Shell Oil to 
build the bleachers and equip the field house with park equipment.  While Conrad had changed, 
the racial divide still existed elsewhere in Hollygrove. 
 One block away from the park, on Hamilton, was the Carrollton Hollygrove 
Multipurpose Center, a newly-constructed community center dedicated in November of 2015.  It 
was once the site of the Robinson Clinic, a hospital that offered a wide array of medical services 
to African Americans who couldn’t receive treatment elsewhere due to segregation.  Claude 




remembered the clinic as a place where “whether you had any money or not, Dr. Robinson was 
gonna take care of you.” The clinic, also a reminder of Hollygrove’s racialized past, was 
converted into a senior center after its closure.  The original clinic building was razed after 
Katrina and its replacement was constructed using FEMA funds. 
 The final two blocks of Olive, before the street reached a dead end at the railroad tracks 
abutting Airline Highway, were almost equally divided between blighted and abandoned 
structures and livable dwellings.  Crossing Mistletoe, looking to the left was a double, a single 
unit occupied by a homeowner, a home undergoing renovation, two blighted structures, a single 
and a home that had been under renovation since Katrina.  On the other side of the street was a 
single, an overgrown vacant lot, a newly constructed single, a blighted home that has collapsed, a 
single and a vacant lot.  The neglected structures on this block stood in strong contrast to the 
habited units.  Overgrown grass, cracked sidewalks and broken windows marked the blighted 
units, while the occupied units were well-maintained and showed pride of ownership.  As I drove 
down the block young boys were playing basketball in front of one of the homes, the 
grandchildren of the retired postal worker who owned it.  Claude lived on this block, and he 
could often be seen on the porch watching Conrad Park across the street.  A proud, elderly 
homeowner possessing a strong commitment to the betterment of the neighborhood, he was one 
of the first to return and rebuild his home.  From his porch one could also see significant blight, 
testament to others who lacked his commitment to the neighborhood and, via neglect of their 
properties, negatively impacted his quality of life. 
 The final block of Olive Street, crossing Cherry, was only a half block, made triangular in 
shape by train tracks that run alongside Airline Highway.  On the left was a double rental unit, 
followed by a renovated single home, a blighted home with a semi-truck’s tractor parked in a 
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small driveway and two vacant, overgrown lots on each side of an occupied single.  On the other 
side of Olive were two homes that appeared to be in imminent danger of collapse.  The tracks at 
the end of the street were elevated and prohibited further travel.  Beyond those tracks, across 
Airline highway, lay the Metairie Country Club, self-described as “a haven of leisurely social 
elegance” (Welcome to the Metairie Country Club, 2016).  Those tracks, coupled with a drainage 
canal along the parish line, blocked two sides of the community and prevented either ingress or 
egress.  The major arteries on the remaining borders of the neighborhood, I-10, Carrollton 
Avenue, Earhart Expressway and Claiborne Avenue also encumbered vehicular traffic from 
Hollygrove. 
 The railway beds at either end of black Hollygrove served to delineate the 
neighborhood’s separation from white New Orleans, vivid symbols of the marginalization of this 
neighborhood.  The Monticello drainage canal and the major surrounding arteries also limited 
residents’ ability to move in and out of the community.  It was as if the neighborhood had been 
separated from the rest of the city, designed with visible reminders to those living there of their 
place and status.  
 Freeman (2006) described inner city neighborhoods like Hollygrove as “neighborhoods 
excluded from the mainstream of American life” (p. 188), places set apart by the abandonment of 
those with means and businesses that served them.  This occurred twice in Hollygrove.  First, the 
white flight of the 1970s transformed Hollygrove, leaving behind abandoned businesses, 
producing a plethora of absentee landlords and changing the racial mixture of the neighborhood.  
A second flight occurred after Katrina when a portion of the residents chose to abandon their 
flood-soaked homes and relocated elsewhere.  Olive Street’s vacant lots and abandoned homes 
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served as reminders of these twin exoduses and of its marginalization relative to more prosperous 
neighborhoods. 
 Massey and Denton (1993) concluded that marginalized neighborhoods like Hollygrove 
represented “the key institutional arrangement ensuring the continued subordination of blacks in 
the United States” (p. 18).  Later Sampson (2012) would further note that “racial inequality in the 
American city cannot be understood absent a direct consideration of the role of spatially 
inscribed social advantage and disadvantage” (p. 372).  The first four blocks of Hollygrove, were 
an almost exclusively white-controlled domain complete with private police patrols to insulate it 
from the challenges that Hollygrove residents faced daily.  Just beyond the tracks at the 
neighborhood’s conclusion was a bastion of privilege, the Metairie Country Club.  In between 
were the social ills wrought by years of segregation and subsequent neglect.  Olive Street bore 
witness to the institutional arrangements of New Orleans that isolate communities like 
Hollygrove, leading to social disadvantage and perpetuating racial inequality. 
 Wacquant (2008) posited that a grave mistake in theories of urban slums had been the 
transformation of sociological conditions into psychological traits.  Rather than understanding 
neighborhoods like Hollygrove via policy decisions that relegated African Americans to 
decaying neighborhoods, these theories pathologized the victims.  In this scenario Hollygrove 
was a bad neighborhood because bad people lived there.  Olive Street served as an example that 
the reality is more complicated.  While Olive Street did have one corner that was statistically 
more dangerous than others, it also had places of privilege like the Carrollton Playground, places 
of innovation like the Greenline, places of abandonment like the lots and vacant homes, places of 
structural neglect like the sewerage lift pump leaking into a vacant yard, and places of security 
like the occupied family homes newly constructed since Katrina.  In short, Olive Street served as 
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a visual reminder that neighborhoods are complex places requiring closer scrutiny if we are to 
better understand the dynamics that give rise to violent crime.  The following chapters describe 























Chapter 6: Findings 
Hollygrove’s Clash between Prosocial and Subcultural Values 
 
 In Hollygrove there was a strong sense that community values were changing.  On the 
one hand was a recognition that traditional values were important.  On the other was the reality 
that these values were at risk of not being transmitted by a new generation of parents ill-equipped 
for the task of parenting.  In addition, grandparents were raising a second, and sometimes third 
generation of children during a time of life when energy and motivation were flagging. While 
traditional values continued to be widely acknowledged as important to the well-being of the 
community, there was a strong fear that a younger generation had failed to adopt them.  The 
subsequent clash of values was thought to be important to the understanding of neighborhood-
level violence. 
Elderly residents were especially concerned that values long considered central to 
neighborhood stability were not being instilled in or espoused by a younger generation.  One 
community leader explained it this way “when we were growing up we had, it was a value 
system that was shared by a larger community” while a senior noted “the neighborhood has a lot 
more people who don’t have those values than before.”  The perceived failure of these values to 
be effectively transmitted to younger generations had many seniors concerned.  This chapter 
addressees the tension between long-established, prosocial values of the older residents of 
Hollygrove as they conflicted with newer values of a younger generation. 
Of the 20 values reflected in the data, five were most frequent while others appeared to 
be outliers mentioned only once or twice in the interviews.  The most prominent were that 
prosocial values transmission was lacking, that the ethic of caring neighbors had waned, 
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recognition that the perceived work ethic which built the neighborhood was disappearing, that 
pride of ownership was being lost, and that there had been a demise of prosocial conflict 
resolution skills.  In the following sections these values are discussed. 
 
A Lost Generation: Failing to Transmit Prosocial Values  
 Hollygrove residents understood the importance of prosocial values to be an important 
key to neighborhood safety.  At the same time many expressed anxiety that these values were 
neither being adequately transmitted to nor adopted by younger generations.  They connected 
this phenomenon to Hollygrove’s violence.  
During a focus group conducted with neighborhood senior citizens one commented, “It is 
a lost generation,” suggesting that older, prosocial societal norms written about by Lynd and 
Lynd (1959) were no longer being embraced by a younger generation.  A middle-aged 
neighborhood entrepreneur who relocated his neighborhood business from the community after 
Katrina thought this began “when the 80s came along and children started having children and it 
was like some kind of communication gap.”  Comments like this were widely reflected by the 
data and indicated a concern that modern childrearing practices were failing to impress upon 
children the importance of values considered important.  Study participants connected this to the 
advent of teen pregnancy and younger, less prepared parents.   A former police chief noted 
“families have got to start raising and taking care of their children and families have to force 
their children to comply to what has been now at least 2000 years of good social skills.”  A 
former drug dealer, now in his late 50s called it “a downhill generation gap” where a sort of 
entropic effect had occurred as prosocial values had lost their import simultaneous to the 
neighborhood’s increase in violence.  
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 This was not solely the sentiment of older residents.  A single mother in her late 20s 
whose spouse was killed in a neighborhood shooting reflected this understanding as she 
considered her younger sister’s parenting of preadolescent sons saying “she just let them go and 
let the streets raise them” and “they going to be the next generation, they going to be standing on 
the corner and they going to be the next bad boys.” Discussing what differentiates between those 
who sell drugs and those who do not, a male in his early 20s concluded it was because “you was 
raised up good, you had guidance.”  Another male, a single homeowner in his 20s, noted “they 
have to have values instilled in them at a young age.”  Thus there was a broad sense that 
something had changed in Hollygrove, that children lacked the values necessary for success. 
 The years between birth and five were considered to be a key period in values 
development by community members.  One grandmother, who ran a licensed neighborhood day 
care center, addressed community attitudes toward young, teen males this way, “people complain 
about the teenagers, but who raised the teenagers” adding “if you grow to 10, 11, 12 and you 
haven’t gotten it in those first five years, you gonna look at a child that is hardened.”  She 
concluded that adults needed “to focus on spending more time with kids.” 
A key concern for many was the age of those raising children.  One senior remarked 
“young ladies started having these babies early in life and they didn’t know how to take care of 
them and children raised themselves.”  It wasn’t just mothers that received such criticism, one 
20-something male added that “daddies don’t want to take care of them.”  A man in his 70s 
thought that “one of the biggest factors is single parent families” and “absentee daddies.”  
Residents also expressed concern about the longevity of this phenomenon. A former 
neighborhood resident, now a key city official, observed: 
when you have a grandmother that’s 35 or 36, alright, the daughter is what 16, okay, and 
then the child is two or three.  Alright then you got the grandmother that’s now 40, the 
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daughter is 20, and the child is like 6 or 7, the grandmother’s probably stopped in high 
school to have the baby but she didn’t go back or, you know, unfortunately had a very 
minimum wage job, and didn’t take any kind of means to get out of that so they caught is 
this system and all they know is the streets.  
  
Because values transmission was thought to occur primarily through families, residents 
considered the youthfulness of parents to be a key in the failure to pass prosocial values to the 
next generation.  
 Residents also expressed concern for grandparents upon whom parenting duties 
sometimes fell due to parental neglect.  One senior thought some grandparents were “being held 
hostage by their own grandchildren,” while another pointed out: 
a lot of children have parents that’s in prisons, a lot of ‘em parents are dead, because of 
the shootings and they have grandparents and relatives taking care of these kids and a lot 
of ‘em is not doing what they’s supposed to be doing with these kids.  
 
A community leader related a conversation with one grandparent living with four generations of 
offspring this way: 
she just accepted it as status quo, that’s just the way it is.  I said I couldn’t have my 
grandkids, um, you know walking across the store while there’s a drug deal going down 
and I know it’s going down, I just couldn’t do it.  She hunched her shoulders, you know. 
 
The grandmother being described was in her late 70s.  She had suffered a series of debilitating 
losses including a heart attack, losing her home to Katrina, the imprisonment of her daughter, all 
while attempting to hold her large family together.  Her exhaustion was palpable.   
 Newman (1999) wrote “Focusing on the deviant cases, on the whoring mothers, the 
criminal fathers, the wilding teenagers, and the abandoned toddlers merely confirms a knowing 
helplessness or worse: a Darwinian conviction that perhaps we should just ‘let it burn,’ 
sacrificing the present generation in the hope of rehabilitating future ghetto dwellers” (p. 187). 
Hollygrove residents, when considering the failure of the present generation to adequately 
transmit prosocial values, appeared to reflect this pessimism.  Addressing the current state of 
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community values, they expressed the widespread opinion that much of the responsibility for the 
community’s demise was rooted in a generation of children that do not reflect the values of 
previous generations, values considered to be paramount to community well-being.  Despite this 
sentiment, these values continue to be espoused across the spectrum of generations, although not 
without conflict.  Throughout the remainder of this chapter four of these conflicted values will be 
discussed through the voices of the community. 
 
A Place Where You Can Trust Your Neighbors: The Importance of Caring 
 Sampson (2012) defined collective efficacy as “social cohesion combined with shared 
expectations for social control” (p. 27).  Dr. T, a 30-something male physician who intentionally 
relocated to the community to be part of its revival, described it as “a place where you can trust 
your neighbors.”  Many Hollygrove residents appear to long for a nostalgic past where neighbors 
cared for each other, where doors could be unlocked, and where norms were shared and 
practiced.  There was widespread conviction that this was missing, but that there may be a 
revival of sorts that had begun to occur.  Meanwhile there was a tension between the ethic of 
caring neighbors described by older residents and the self-preservation valued by younger 
residents. 
 As we sat on his porch at sundown a neighborhood rapper in his 20s described street life 
as a value he described as “you bout yours.” This sentiment is part of a street code that younger 
residents term “Keeping It Real” which will be described at length in the next chapter.  This 
particular value, minding one’s own business while ignoring others, is important to this section 
as it conflicted with Sampson’s concept of collective efficacy.  It was echoed by Eldridge, a 
young homeowner in his late 20s, who noted the conflict between ‘being bout yours’ and the 
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value of neighborliness by noting “it’s hard, it’s like you got people that don’t want someone 
else in their business” adding “everybody got that it’s all about themselves type of viewpoint” 
while personally espousing the view that “we got to look out for each other.”  Claude, a lifelong 
resident of the neighborhood provided the conflicting view, held by many seniors like him, 
“Everybody’s hooray for me and Daniel!  I think the society has changed.  We don’t have that, 
that maybe the love for one another and most of all respect.” 
 Like Eldridge and Claude, those with a longer perspective on the community could recall 
a time when collective efficacy was the norm.  Charles, a reformed drug dealer in his late 50s 
remembered when “Hollygrove was like one big family,” where “everybody was close knit” 
while Tamika, a 40-something, recalled her childhood in the neighborhood as a time when “you 
kinda knew everybody” as contrasted with the present when “everybody is kinda to themselves.” 
Angela, a lifelong resident had lived in the center of the neighborhood all her life and saw 
firsthand the deterioration of the street in front of her home during the heyday of the violence.  
Now in her 60s she nostalgically described a Hollygrove where “it was not necessary to lock up” 
and when “we used to sleep on the front porch sometimes.”  The crime in her block, although it 
had lessened recently, made that impossible, as evidenced by her assertion that “now you cannot 
do any of that.”  She thought that crime had a deterring effect on the neighborhood’s ethic of 
mutual concern and people had become “frightened from helping other people.”   The fear that 
Angela described was more prominently expressed by those who lived closer to crime hotspots.  
Other parts of the community, especially those with high homeownership and distant 
from high-crime locations still subscribed to the older value of neighborliness.  Dr. T described 
these as places where there are “neighbors that speak and care about each other and look after 
each other.”  He thought this happened when residents had “been there long enough to care about 
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each other.”  The contrast between Dr. T’s and Angela’s comments indicated that those living 
more distant from neighborhood violence hotspots exhibited the value of caring while those 
nearer them were more prone to live by subcultural values. 
 The conflict between minding one’s business and caring for the community was 
perceived to have ramifications for neighborhood safety.   A focus group of community leaders 
addressed the challenge by suggesting that “community involvement has played a big part in 
Hollygrove” and “engaging people” was the way to produce positive change.  One police official 
further added that the recent successes in reducing crime were due to “the great work of the 
community” and noted “the only way that the masses can get rid of the few people that are 
terrorizing the neighborhood is to stand up and say, ‘We’re not going to do that anymore’.”  Dr. 
T thought also this value needed to be more widespread, that “it’s just getting out to the 
community that everybody has a part to play.”  One city official in the Mayor’s office proposed 
the key to neighborhood safety lay in “the ability for a neighborhood to set norms about 
appropriate behavior and you don’t do certain things here.”  This happened, he noted, when “a 
neighborhood working in concert can, in all the ways cultures are reinforced, through their 
language, through their shared behaviors, values, and all the rest, say this is not something that is 
happening here.”  These voices reflected Jacobs’ (1961) thinking that eyes on the street were an 
important facet of neighborhood safety, while minding one’s own business was detrimental. 
The complete destruction of the neighborhood following Hurricane Katrina forced a re-
envisioning of the community during which a community development association was founded, 
a neighborhood association became active, city officials were engaged, and outside resources 
came to the community through a variety of means.  The result was the engagement of residents, 
mostly seniors, who began working to re-establish collective efficacy.  The successes that 
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followed included a significant reduction in neighborhood violence between 2012 and 2015.  A 
sense of optimism had begun to take root, suggesting that caring relationships in the 
neighborhood had re-emerged.  At the same time several expressed concern that seniors could 
not sustain the efforts and thus the value of caring neighbors must be adopted by a younger 
generation.   In the words of a current police official “Hollygrove had a reputation and probably 
rightfully so—as a very violent neighborhood. Only in recent times, only I would say, only in 
post-2012, post-2010, has it really, the violence really dramatically dropped off compared to 
what it was.”  Yet he cautioned “it’s really hinging upon like, you know, community leadership; 
and is that gonna sustain? Some of the community leaders are, you know, a little older.”   
 While resident efforts to re-engage the community had borne some success, the tension 
between self-preservation and an ethic of caring for neighbors continued.  The work required to 
re-establish diminished prosocial values was daunting.  Although hard work was not foreign to 
the oldtimers in the community, there was strong sentiment that this value was another that had 
not been effectively transmitted to the younger generation.  
 
Raised to be Productive: Valuing Hard Work 
 While older residents thought hard work was an important facet of neighborhood safety, 
younger residents described structural impediments limiting their ability to engage in the formal 
economy.  This led to a second values clash in the community one between hard, legitimate work 
in the formal economy and the alternative pathways to economic success through the informal 
economy.  Older residents viewed younger residents as lazy and lacking commitment to 
education.  Conversely younger residents described an inadequate educational system coupled 
with structural forces that limited their ability to find gainful employment in a changing 
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economy.  Waquant (2008) described the modern urban ghetto as one that was segregated on the 
basis of race and class in the context of the retrenchment of the labor market and welfare state 
from the urban core and the subsequent deployment of the omnipresent police force.  Wilson 
(1990) chronicled the conundrum faced by inner city males as the availability of livable wage 
jobs requiring less than a college degree shifted away from the urban core replaced by low 
paying service sector employment.  Thus what appears to be laziness to longtime residents is 
seen by the younger generation as structural impediments to engagement in the formal economy. 
 In a focus group of young males one railed “you gotta think about how we got to the 
ghetto, like somebody put us here” while another added “we could sit up here and talk to you for 
300 and 400 years, however long it took to put black people in the position they in right now.”  
The harsh reality of urban joblessness was exacerbated by racism, as epitomized by another’s 
criticism, “when they try to do better and stuff like, then it’s like man, we not about to hire you, 
it’s like, damn, I just filled out for this job, I’m a dishwasher, the white man filled out and went 
straight to the bar” or “once I become white I’m normal, I’m what this country was made for.”  
One solution, espoused by the group was to avoid the formal market and participate in the illicit 
economy, “why would I go to work when I could make this much money on the corner” and 
“selling drugs is the first thing we see that can give us money like that (snaps his fingers) like at 
a constant pace.”   
 Despite these sentiments, the group expressed conflicting views about participation in the 
informal economy, stating “the young guys don’t want to work for what they want, they want to 
take it” and “that’s the problem with my generation, they don’t want to work for nothing.”  They 
were not alone.  Also expressing the conflict was Tameka, the 40-something homeowner who 
recognized the importance of the value of hard work juxtaposed with the lack of jobs for 
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neighborhood residents.  She stated, “Whatever it is, you have to work for it.  Nothing is given to 
you.  Not back then, not now, not ever. You have to work for it but if you can’t find a job where 
can you get these things.”   
 The senior citizens were less understanding.  Their adherence to the value of hard work 
for individual and collective success was captured by Claude, an 80-something retiree who 
helped numerous men find jobs in his career as a supervisor.  He noted “when you work, you can 
respect yourself” and “when you get it yourself, you can feel proud.  I worked and got this for 
mine.”  Claude told me that he worked two jobs in his youth, leaving a job at the paint factory to 
work nights as a hotel bellboy in order to provide an education for his children.  Zora, a 60-
something day care provider thought that “things has to be worked for” and that people need to 
“get off our butts and do what we need to do.”   
Seniors viewed the younger generation as lazy, implying they had no desire to find 
employment.  One member of the senior focus group stated “they don’t want to work” echoing 
the sentiments of Charles, the former drug dealer, who stated “the younger generation, they don’t 
do nothing” adding “they want to have an easy life, an easy income.”  He contrasted that with the 
way he was raised, adding “if you’re brought up properly, to be productive, that would stop…all 
that drugging.”  It was difficult for them to understand the younger generation’s lack of value in 
hard work believing that the younger generation had chosen to “sit down under the moon instead 
of trying to improve theyself” and “sit around the porch from one to the other, from morning to 
evening.”   A senior official in the city’s Department of Aging shared their sentiment noting, 
“they want to get by and that’s it.” 
 Still other seniors blamed the welfare system.  One focus group member thought the 
younger generation was content to “let somebody else take care of their family” implying that 
98 
 
somebody was the federal government.  Another stated young people “just wanna sit down, 
receive government money, receive government food.”  A third judged the government’s public 
assistance priorities to be misguided when she said “the government taking care of them and the 
poor seniors suffering trying to make it.”  Charles provided a more moderated view of the public 
assistance system proposing that “welfare is good because it helps you get on your feet but if you 
get comfortable with that you don’t have to do nothing.”  There was widespread thinking that 
welfare should be temporary lest it negate the importance of hard work for attaining personal and 
social good. 
 Most presumed that hard work was necessary for the success of the community.  The 
informal economy, a subject of a later chapter, was seen as either an unfortunate, but necessary 
alternative means of income or as an excuse for laziness by those who do not value hard work.  
While none in this study thought the illicit marketplace was good for the community, the 
younger generation expressed greater sympathy for those whose lives depend upon it given the 
structural impediments to participation in the formal economy.  Welfare was widely panned as a 
cause for failure to espouse the value of hard work.  Ultimately, while Hollygrove residents 
connected hard work and success, they disagreed about why some do not work; older residents 
attributed it to laziness and welfare dependency, while younger ones connected it to poor 
education and structural impediments to labor force participation. 
 
Homeowners Care More: Pride of Ownership 
 Hollygrove’s homeowners described a third value, pride of place, which they connected 
to valuing and protecting the community.  Wiese (2004), writing about homeownership in the 
black South, proposed that homeownership represented “evidence of permanence, a marker of 
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achievement, and the satisfaction of a long-deferred dream” and that African American 
communities were considered by many to be places of “social comfort and cultural affirmation if 
not racial pride, a ‘safe place’ in which to nurture families and educate children, a symbol of 
resistance to white supremacy and a foundation for politics, if not economic and racial power” 
(p. 8).  One community leader captured this value noting, “when you value even just the road 
that you live on, the house that you have, the flowers that you grow in your own garden, that 
kind of stuff, like I think it changes your whole perception of everything.”    
There was also the sense that younger, more transient residents who rented, especially 
those who used Section 8 housing vouchers, did not share this pride of place.  One senior focus 
group member epitomized this concern: 
In the neighborhood where you have homeowners, working people, retired people, 
they’re quiet.  But when you get the young people start migrating in after somebody die 
and the house is for rent, somebody found out about doing Section 8, they go in and make 
all the necessary adjustments, you move a family in, 4 or 5 children, that’s when it starts 
coming, the neighborhood starts going down.  So, with just a working class of people 
there, the senior citizens there, it was quiet.  Because everybody knew everybody, 
church-going people, but when they start getting younger people move in the 
neighborhood, moving in from outside, that’s it.  
 
This comment expressed the concern of many homeowners of all ages about the encroachment of 
rental properties.  There was a fear that a tipping point was imminent with potential to upset the 
balance between the long-term stability of those with an ownership stake in the community as 
contrasted with those who are less residentially stable.  Residents thought that a critical mass of 
homeownership was an important component of neighborhood safety. 
 Pride of ownership was best described by Claude as he recalled the day he purchased his 
home:   
I think by being a property owner, you’re gonna protect what you work hard to get, you 
know.  You take back when we bought this house.  I bought it from my brother-in-law 
because it was a family piece of property.  I think I paid $15,000 for the house.  And 
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man, that was one of my proudest days when I, when my wife and I signed the papers.  
We had, this was our house.  It’s, you know, that’s—that’s something to motivate you, 
self-motivation.  Yes, indeed.  That’s, when you’re hustling to get something and you 
know eventually it’s gonna be yours.  And that was during the time when people was 
proud when they owned something, and when they, especially when they bought an 
automobile, even a second-hand automobile.  You were proud of that. 
 
Several blocks away, across from a corner store shuttered since Katrina which was a noted crime 
hotspot, Charles commented on what he thought to be a diminished pride of ownership, “because 
I know everyone, I would see how this neighborhood is deteriorating and people are not taking 
care of their homes back here, taking care of their properties and don’t have pride in the 
neighborhood or for the community.”   
 Ernest, a community businessman, took a more militant approach to this values clash.  To 
him ceding his block to those who didn’t share his pride of ownership was like losing a battle, 
where the more violent places in the neighborhood had waved a white flag and given up: 
The parts that’s dangerous, they’re the parts that’s been surrendered.  I mean that nobody 
fighting for it, they’ve surrendered.  That block surrendered.  I had a block I ain’t 
surrendered my block until I left.  I used to round up all my neighbors when I do, we got 
a whole lot of block now, I can’t guarantee that block but we can secure this block for our 
children.  Just keep them off the next block, we got our block and then go talk to them 
about securing they block.  It was working for a while, you know just be firm, “Look, 
you can’t stand here, I understand you can stand at the park over here, Conrad Park, there 
are other places you can go, but you cannot sit here and congregate in front of my house 
and please do not sit on my steps.  You gotta move.”  You gotta do that every day for like 
two years til we got our block back. 
 
  This value reflected economic realities, according to a police official who said “the more, 
I guess material things people have, they’re less likely to want to lose them.”  He forwarded this 
equation, “as the economics of an area increase, crime goes down.”  He was not alone; Daneta, a 
single mom in her late 20s remarked that people with means who are “already set and maybe 
owning their houses and whatever the case may be, it’s just that they’re living in a different place 
from where these young black kids are out there,” suggesting that, although she is not a 
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homeowner herself, those who have purchased their home have a different set of priorities and 
are more protective of their space. 
 Many in this study thought that those who don’t own their home have a lesser stake in the 
long-term well-being of Hollygrove.  This may be exacerbated by the fact that a significant 
number of homes were abandoned after Katrina by those who moved away.  This, too, is 
connected to a feeling of danger.  Dr. T noted there are “some of the different parts of 
Hollygrove that haven’t been kept up as much, they give off a certain, certain, you know when 
you look at them you’re like, ugh, this is a rougher place.”  He refers to this as “a visual 
representation of what’s going on in the block.”  These sections of the community were 
considered by several respondents to be the domain of renters and absentee landlords who did 
not share the pride of place that longer-term homeowners embraced. 
Patillo (2007), in her study of Chicago’s south side neighborhoods, concurred with these 
voices noting that “What homeowners share is a financial investment in their homes and a desire 
to protect it” (p. 14).  Not everyone had sufficient means to purchase a home or was fortunate 
enough to inherit one.  The challenge Hollygrove residents faced is transmitting the pride of 
place to those who were not able to own their place of residence.  The neighborhood had 
experienced a drop in homeownership in the last 10 years, from 54.2% to 50.7% (Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center).  During the same period vacant housing units increased from 
10.9% to 32.9% (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center) driven in part by housing units 
abandoned after Katrina.  The loss of homeowners on the one hand and the increase of vacant 
dwellings may have exacerbated community fears regarding pride of place.  In the words of one 
police official: 
You know, how many haunted house–looking buildings, structures do you have back 
there, you know what I mean? So until Hollygrove can knock those buildings down—and 
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not only knock ’em down but I mean, having abandoned lots everywheres, even if the 
grass is maintained, still doesn’t give a person the impression of a healthy neighborhood, 
you know what I mean? I wouldn’t wanna live in a neighborhood that had abandoned lots 
every, you know, like almost like a jack-o-lantern effect… 
 
The changed in neighborhood ownership patterns left homeowners with two options: either find 
innovative methods of converting the vacant homes and lots into homeownership opportunities 
or develop means to transmit pride of place to renters.   
  
They Use Violence to Solve Problems: A Lack of Prosocial Conflict Resolution Skills 
 Hollygrove’s final major values clash was between those that adhered to prosocial values 
concerning how conflicts are resolved and those who used violence to resolve it.  Many residents 
observed a dangerous decline in the way younger community members resolve conflicts, that 
prosocial methods of conflict resolution had been abandoned for violent ones.   Dr. T described it 
by noting both the loss of ability to verbally resolve problems and the increasing lethality of 
conflict resolution strategies: 
Growing up, which I’m sure was the same way for you, it was never about a gun.  It was 
always you fight, the next day you talk it out, you’re fine.  Now it’s totally different, you 
do something to me you’re going to lose your life.  It’s weird to me because if people 
really appreciated life they wouldn’t resort to that.  That’s the big problem right there. 
 
Tamesha, a college student in her early 20s, connected Hollygrove’s violence to “how people 
handle their problems” noting that lack of conflict resolution skills had created a context where 
violence became acceptable.  Ernest described advice he gave to peers who had violent 
encounters with their significant others: 
If I ever talk to a friend of mine and I find they done struck or hit their girlfriend or wife, 
then I tell them, “Well that’s not as much an anger problem, that’s an intellectual 
problem.”  I say, “Because if she’s moved you to blows with word, that mean you ran out 
of words.  You got physical.  So she’s a little bit too intellectual for you, so you either 
need to come up to her level or let her go, cause she’s not going to come down to yours.  




Like Dr T, Tamesha and Ernest, many thought there were prosocial ways to manage conflict 
besides violence. 
Elijah Anderson (1999) referred to this clash as one between as the street and decent 
codes.  A former police chief addressed the street code of conflict resolution this way: “New 
Orleans has had an abnormally high murder rate since 100 years.  There’s some part of our 
culture that recognizes that violence is a way to dispute, mediation dispute that I’m not really 
seeing in other places.”  Anderson (1994) captured the two sides of this clash concluding it 
represented “two poles of value orientation, two contrasting conceptual categories” (p. 35).  This 
oppositional code of violence and aggression “springs from the circumstances of life among the 
ghetto poor—the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, the stigma or race, the fallout from rampant 
drug use and drug trafficking, and the resulting alienation and lack of hope for the future” 
(Anderson, 1994, para. 1).   
 Hollygrove residents saw the growing acceptance of violence as a conflict resolution 
tactic through three lenses: deeply entrenched poverty, normalization of violent strategies, and 
the emerging perception that the use of handguns had become a viable conflict resolution 
strategy.  Zora, the 60-something day care provider, reflected upon the first of these stating “if 
you have a poor class of people in a neighborhood, naturally you’re gonna have more anger.”  
The focus group with males in their early 20s yielded another reflection upon structural 
inequities as one pointed out “the worst thing for a black man who already who lost everything, 
feel like he don’t have nothing to lose” while another noted “it’s hard for us to keep our head 
held up high when we get held down.”  The anger they experienced had few appropriate outlets 
leading another to state “we broke, all of us got problems, we sit around and talk about our 
problems all day and we only know a few ways to solve ‘em.”  One community leader connected 
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this anomic condition to neighborhood violence noting, “if you allow yourself to feel this anger 
and if you allow yourself to feel you have no dignity, it would destroy you.”  She understood 
neighborhood violence to occur when some residents enacted their emotional distress through 
destructive behaviors directed toward the community rather than the systems that caused it. 
 Many residents observed that violence as a conflict resolution strategy had a long history 
in the community and was considered to be acceptable.  Charles, the former drug dealer, 
remembered a time in Hollygrove’s distant past when “you’d have a fight and then you’d go out 
to Conrad and play football” or “you’d have a fist fight and that’s about it.”  Kobe, a college 
student in his early 20s shared this nostalgic view of the past, even though he was too young to 
remember it: 
I mean at least from what I hear they used to settle it fighting, fist-fight, you know.  Even 
when I was younger that was kind of, still kind of a thing, you know?  Fight.  If you fight 
someone and y’all fight, I mean y’all both live and fight and you may have a bruise or a 
black eye or something but you’re living and go back to your family, you know, and it 
helps, it pretty much helps you know get that dirt off your chest if you will, that’s what 
we used to say, “Get that dirt off your chest.”  And, um, and it’ll be it, that’ll be it, it’s 
over with now. 
 
These views normalized neighborhood violence as a means for resolving conflicts, contrasting 
the older method of fist fighting with more lethal forms used currently.  They pointed to a 
perception that nonviolent options, at least for males, were considered insufficient solutions.  
When a neighborhood male failed to physically defend himself he was considered a punk, which 
is an expression used to describe one who was effeminate and prone to victimization.  Anderson 
(1994) pointed out that in the street codes of the inner city, backing down from conflict had the 
potential to “leave one’s self esteem in tatters” and thus “people feel constrained not only to 
stand up and at least attempt to resist during an assault but also to ‘pay back’—to seek revenge—
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after a successful assault on their person” (para. 27).  In a neighborhood context where violence 
was normalized, prosocial conflict resolution alternatives were neglected. 
 In recent years the methods of violence used to resolve conflicts had become more lethal.  
One city official commenting upon this shift noted “when I was growing up, you settled it with 
your fists.  Now you settle it with a 9mm.”  Another noted “There’s a common refrain that I hear 
from people is oh we, it wasn’t so bad back in the day, people would just fight it out or maybe 
someone feels really bad, someone gets stabbed but now it’s so much worse people take their 
life. Well all that really points to is a difference in the tool.”  This was also reflected in the 20-
something male focus group when one remarked “those oldtimers back in the day will tell you, 
man, we never shot guns, we fought to solve our problems.  We never, once my generation came, 
after the 90s, the 2000 generation, they was using guns for everything.”  Throughout the 
interviews there was common sentiment that something had shifted, that the tools used to resolve 
conflict had become more deadly. 
 Despite the normalization of violence as conflict resolution strategy there was a 
recognition that prosocial methods of conflict resolution are better for the neighborhood. Robert, 
whose choice of violence led to a prison term, told me: 
The few times I’ve been involved in them (lethal altercations) it just goes from a talk to a 
fuss to blunt out fussing and disrespecting each other to where it’s, alright I be right back 
or you ain’t gonna, you know.  If people sit there and think, you take five minutes out to 
think of the consequences of what you about to do, I would guarantee you wouldn’t do it.  
I say that all the time.  I say, man, if I had just thought about the consequences of my 
actions and what I’m about to do right now, I wouldn’t even be in here. 
 
He recognized that his choice to use guns to resolve conflict negatively impacted his life and 
harmed the community.  A former resident, now in city government, suggested “it’s a macho 
thing, it’s people want to (shoot), instead of having a disagreement and settle an argument 
through words.”  These comments reflected the voices of several others who understood that less 
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lethal conflict strategies would make the neighborhood a safer place and improve the life chances 
for community residents. 
 The conflict between prosocial values of nonviolent and violent conflict resolution 
strategies mirrored the conflict between street and decent codes about which Elijah Anderson 
had written.  He concluded the two orientations “socially organize the community, and their 
coexistence has important consequences for residents—especially children.  Above all, this 
environment means that even youngsters whose home lives reflect mainstream values—and the 
majority of homes in the community do—must be able to handle themselves in a street-oriented 
environment” (Anderson, 1994, para. 2).  Those subscribing to prosocial values understood that 
conflicts could be resolved through dialogue while street values normalized physical and lethal 
means.  The conflict between these two sets of values helped to explain the challenge that many 
younger residents experienced as they struggle to negotiate the street subculture inside the 
neighborhood and the world of decent values beyond Hollygrove’s borders. 
 
Summary 
 Throughout the rebuilding of Hollygrove, in the years since Katrina, there had been an 
attempt by neighborhood residents to re-establish the primacy of prosocial values.  This charge 
was led primarily by the seniors, those who could recall a time when Hollygrove was a much 
different neighborhood.  This hopefulness was tempered by a recognition that times had changed 
and that many neither shared their optimism nor subscribed to the values of the past, expressed in 
the words of Claude who said “their life values are not what they were when I was growing up.”  
In some ways the neighborhood was at a crossroads, possibly a tipping point, as epitomized by 
the ratio of homeowners to renters, an almost evenly-divided split.  On the one hand Hollygrove 
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had experienced a revival of sorts: crime was lower, a neighborhood bar long seen to be a 
hotspot for crime had been closed, there was a new school and a new community center, the 
police and politicians had taken a renewed interest in the neighborhood, property values seemed 
to be increasing—an increase in social capital.  On the other hand, many of the forces that led to 
its pre-Katrina violence appeared to have a continued, albeit less-powerful influence.   
 The clash of values in Hollygrove was in many ways a conflict between older and 
younger residents.  Those who lived through segregation and worked to create neighborhood 
pride recognized that interdependence and shared values were important to Hollygrove’s 
viability in the face of the structural inequities that limited opportunity for them.  They desired to 
see these values transmitted to the next generation, understanding that the community’s future 
depended upon them.   
 Meanwhile the younger generation, experiencing ongoing marginalization, had difficulty 
understanding the relevance of these values in their current context.  Adoption of prosocial 
values by an older generation did not create equality of opportunity for their parents or 
grandparents and had not for them.  Although younger residents recognized the importance of 
prosocial values, they did not function adequately in their experience.  This gave rise to the clash 
between the two values orientations. 
 The rejection of prosocial values by younger residents was enacted in three spheres.  
First, an oppositional subculture arose in the community where countercultural values came to 
dominate neighborhood street life.  Second, an underground economy developed to combat their 
limitations from participation in the formal economy.  Finally, failure to adopt prosocial values 
when combined with either or both of the two preceding spheres limited younger residents to the 
neighborhood in an atmosphere of mistrust for those beyond its borders.  Ultimately this clash of 
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values was key to understanding homicide in Hollygrove as it formed the base for the 
neighborhood’s transition from a working class haven of African American aspirations to one 























Chapter 7: Findings 
“Keeping It Real”: Life outside Prosocial Values in Hollygrove 
 
 The values clashes described in the preceding chapter were not idealistic, philosophical 
constructs for residents of Hollygrove; they were traversed daily by those who negotiated the 
neighborhood’s complex relationships.  Oppositional values manifested themselves in a 
subculture several young residents termed “Keeping It Real,” an environment where those 
outside the mainstream found refuge.  Kirk and Papachristos (2011) defined such a subculture in 
terms of its cultural orientation; when cynicism toward power structures was high, they found 
residents were more likely to reject prosocial values and to embrace street subculture.  Anderson 
(1994) described the impact of this values clash in neighborhoods like Hollygrove: 
The rules have been established and are enforced mainly by the street-oriented, but on the 
streets the distinction between street and decent is often irrelevant; everybody knows that 
if the rules are violated, there are penalties.  Knowledge of the code is thus largely 
defensive; it is literally necessary for operating in public.  Therefore, even though 
families with a decency orientation are usually opposed to the values of the code, they 
often reluctantly encourage their children’s familiarity with it to enable them to negotiate 
the inner-city environment (para. 3). 
  
The ability to negotiate between these often conflicting values orientations required both a 
knowledge of and an ability to enact street savvy.  The consequences for deviating from these 
codes can be difficult, if not lethal, for those living in Hollygrove. 
 From his shop in Hollygrove Ernest was one who lived between these two worlds.  His 
work screen printing t-shirts saw a booming business for a time from those who wished to 
memorialize victims murdered in the violence associated with the subculture.  He described the 
interaction of those competing worldviews as “culture killing society” where “society really 
exists and culture is fabricated.”  For Ernest society represented mainstream culture, what 
Anderson (1999) termed Decent Codes, the values of the dominant society that must negotiated 
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for success outside of Hollygrove. Culture, on the other hand, represented Anderson’s Street 
Codes and were thought by Ernest to be detrimental to the neighborhood’s well-being.  He 
contended that “the culture that the hood creates totally diminishes it (the neighborhood).”   
 The street culture of Hollygrove had been popularized in a variety of ways.   One 
entrepreneur designed a brand to emblemize it.  The 0017th logo, which signifies Hollygrove’s 
political ward designation, was seen on hats, bandannas, t-shirts and was a popular tattoo to some 
residents.  The logo featured prominently in a rap video entitled The Zoo by Hollygrove Keem 
and Jay Jones that could be watched on the 0017th website (www.0017th.com, n.d.). 
 Ernest, whose work brought him into frequent contact with the purveyors of the 007th 
brand, saw a downside to the brand.  For him ‘Keeping It Real’ glamorized a lifestyle that 
limited one’s life chances beyond Hollygrove’s boundaries.  Reflecting on the divide between 
the worldview of larger society and the subculture he expressed his concerns 
It’s only called being real until the moment when it get real.  You see that’s fake, that’s 
culture, it’s culture killing society.  Society is real.  Society is, you shoot somebody you 
go to jail.   
 
The challenge for those immersed in Hollygrove’s subcultural worldview in his words was “you 
become the culture,” which limits opportunity because: 
you have to deal with society as a whole.  I mean you deal with that, that’s two different 
worlds.  They have no understanding of that because they live their whole life in that 
culture and when they get to the society thing, it depletes them.   
  
Ernest’s comments reflected the challenge that residents of Hollygrove faced, they lived between 
two worlds, which Ernest termed society and culture.   
 This chapter is subdivided into five sections.  It begins with a description of what life is 
like on the streets of Hollygrove, a concept that was described as being ‘outchere’ or out here in 
the subculture.  There were three subthemes residents used to explain this, the notion of being 
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stuck on the streets with few options, the elements of anger and power that accompany life on the 
streets, and an understanding of how life on the streets limited one’s future prospects.  To better 
understand being ‘outchere,’ the second section explores the rules that define expectations for 
those living in the subculture.  Those who adopted these rules achieved a certain status, the 
pinnacle of which was known as being a ‘Hood Star,’ the subject of a third section.  The fourth 
and fifth sections look more closely at the twin processes of either succumbing or resisting the 
subculture, a constant challenge that was especially pertinent to the younger residents as they 
defined their personal identity relative to the subculture.   
 
“Outchere”: Life in the Street Subculture of Hollygrove 
 Bourgois (2003) argued that those who immersed themselves in the street subculture “are 
seeking an alternative to social marginalization” (p. 143) by refusing to accept structural 
victimization.  The challenge, he noted, is that by doing so “they become the actual agents 
administering their own destruction and their community’s suffering” (p. 143).  Efforts to 
enhance personal status within the subculture served to impair social capital outside the 
neighborhood.  This was reflected in the words of one 20-something male who stated:  
Something real dangerous happened after Katrina, it became cool to be outchere.  You 
gonna hear that word a lot from us.  Outchere means in the streets, no guidance, I don’t 
have no guidance, no ambition, I’m just outchere, head first. 
 
His statement described a ‘head first’ leap into a street life that limited one to the neighborhood’s 
social milieu and thus was considered to be dangerous.   This concept was described in three 
ways throughout the neighborhood.  First there was a notion of being stuck, where one’s life 
became increasingly limited to the borders of the neighborhood as one followed the rules of the 
subculture.  Second, anger and power elements of Keeping It Real were a destructive force for 
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both individuals and the community.  Finally, residents expressed concern that many who were 
“outchere” had no future.  
Many who abandoned prosocial values and embraced the subculture found themselves 
stuck in Hollygrove.  One of the 20-something males noted “these dudes, all they know is these 
four corners.”  Dr. T elaborated on this sentiment, adding: 
There are people in Hollygrove that are terrified of leaving Hollygrove.  There are kids 
that come to the summer camp that have never left Hollygrove.  Talk to them about, hey 
you guys ever been to the movies?  Nope.  Walmart?  Nope.  Winn Dixie on Carrollton?  
Nope.  Where you shop?  Ah, well we go to the corner store.  We’ll eat at Popeye’s.  If 
we need something, somebody will bring us some, our family will bring us something to 
Hollygrove so all they know is their neighborhood.  All they know is their setting and to 
get outside of there is scary. 
 
Outside of the community the rules were different and those who enforced these rules 
were unfamiliar.  A single mom who lived in a liminal state between the streets of Hollygrove 
and her job outside of the neighborhood told me that Keeping It Real “just works in the hood.”  
Leaving the neighborhood removed one from the subcultural context where the rules were 
known and understood and brought a unique set of dangers.  Anderson (2008) found that: 
the reality of daily life for too many young black men in areas of concentrated poverty 
revolves around simply meeting the challenge of ‘staying alive.’  To avoid being killed as 
they navigate their way in public within the disenfranchised community, they acquire 
personas with a street-toughened edge.  This image becomes generalized, supporting the 
negative stereotype that has become a dominant image of the black man throughout white 
society (p. 8). 
 
On the one hand residents faced daily the danger of transgressing turf, or as Charles described 
“I’ve seen people come from the other, from another neighborhood or another part of town, from 
across the river or something and come over here and I’ve seen them get shot.”  On the other 
hand, young residents faced the very real specter of racism and racial violence outside of 
Hollygrove.  Kobe, a young man from Hollygrove, attended college in a relatively crime-free 
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neighborhood in Jackson, Mississippi but felt less safe there than in the higher-crime environs of 
Hollygrove.  He described this fear: 
 Cause I mean even when I was here, now that I think about it, I never was really scared 
about any neighborhood or anybody I knew or anybody from this neighborhood ever 
gunning me down cause I just, I mean you probably would know me from seeing me 
around the area but I just never had any issues with anybody so they wouldn’t have a 
reason to.  But the Trayvon Martin killing, the white guy, that’s probably more of a 
scarier thing cause I don’t have to know him, I don’t have to have had any issues with 
him, you know, he just felt a certain way, acted on it. 
 
As the dangers faced by young black men are bleak both in and outside of Hollygrove some 
residents like Kobe preferred the known danger rather than an unknown one elsewhere. 
Being stuck inside the neighborhood meant one had limited opportunity for recreation 
and self-improvement.  Arianne, a single widow in her late 20s, had lived most of her life in a 
lethal two block radius between a corner store and a bar.  Describing a typical day for many she 
stated “everybody hung in the store, like on the corner, when the store closed they would go to 
Big Time Tips.”  Charles, who like Arianne grew up between the store and the bar, spent a lot of 
time meandering back and forth between the two and portrayed his day this way, “The bar was 
closed during the daytime so everybody hung on the corner.  When the store close and Snake 
came to open up, everybody moved from this store or this store around the corner and go to the 
bar.”  The shuttering of the bar meant that one recreational opportunity was removed.  There was 
a sentiment among younger residents, reflected through the voice of a community leader, that 
this was a significant loss to those immersed in the subculture.  She stated “even some of those 
young folks who used to go there and were kind of mad ‘cause they didn’t have any place to go, 
they understood.  You know it was not like they were really angry, it’s just like, but where we 
going to go now?”   
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Being stuck in the neighborhood may potentially result in loss of hope and the choice to 
hang out on the corner, a concept described by Ernest as “Catching the Wall” where “you see 
these guys by the store when you ride around the neighborhood, and you see around the grocery 
store and they just standing there, that’s guys that literally just gave up and caught the wall.”  
Eldridge also noted, “I notice like there’s like a block three blocks down from here and when I 
get off work there’s like always like a group of young men standing on the corner.”  The 
possibility that one “Catches the Wall” was exacerbated by an arrest and subsequent conviction 
record, which further limited opportunity.  Tameka explained: 
There are lots of men, especially African-American men, you know, young men, who 
may have been incarcerated, may have gotten into trouble, they get out of jail, got this 
record, can’t get a job.  So I’m back with my mom, you know she’s on me because I can’t 
find a job.  You know I have kids, can’t feed the kids, can’t find a job. 
 
One city official implied that getting stuck resulted from the structural limitations faced 
by those in the community: 
In a city with huge disparities in income, huge disparities in access, huge disparities in 
lots of different things, you couple that with just developmental markers of young men 
versus young women and I think it largely answers the question.  Certainly not anything 
that is intrinsic to the young men is that they disproportionately live in poverty and 
disproportionately are unemployed.  It’s a lot of that.  I mean across the country the 
disparities for African American men, in particular young African American men, are 
clear when it comes to the criminal justice system, the education system and the like. 
 
Robert described the impact of these limitations on his life, saying “And it’s just that when they 
took my scholarships away and I went to jail and once I got out of jail I had nothing.  I didn’t 
graduate from high school ‘cause I wound up going to jail.  I had no scholarships now, now what 
I’m going to do?  I ain’t qualified to do nothing.”  Robert was stuck, he was “outchere” with few 
options and had “Caught the Wall.” 
Because of the limitations imposed by the choice to adhere to the values of the 
subculture, one might question why one would make the choice to “Keep It Real.”  Anderson 
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(1999) found that negotiating the streets of a neighborhood like Hollygrove required a portrayed 
image of strength, which he termed “juice,” where one “must send the unmistakable, if 
sometimes subtle, message that one is capable of violence, and possibly mayhem, when the 
situation requires it, that one can take care of oneself” (p. 72).  Prosocial values may be enacted 
inside the home or beyond the boundaries of the neighborhood in the educational, economic and 
social worlds of larger society.  On the streets of the neighborhood, however, especially those 
surrendered streets where subcultural values predominate, one must be able to switch codes, 
largely in an effort for self-preservation.   
Bourgois (2010) described the dichotomy between these two cultures as a divide between 
“cultural capitals” (p. 135) which were differentially expressed between the two worlds that 
divide the inner city and the world beyond. Thus one must possess a bi-culturalism in order to 
live in a neighborhood like Hollygrove while also succeeding outside the community, something 
that became increasingly difficult the more one became invested in the subculture.  Keeping It 
Real was, therefore, a set of power-based survival skills required to be safe within the 
community but which translated poorly beyond the neighborhood boundaries. 
 In the previous chapter the use of violence as a problem-solving skill was explored.  
While older residents deplored this violence, those more immersed in the subculture were more 
likely to engage it, especially for defensive purposes.  Martin, a neighborhood rapper, described 
an interaction inside a corner store where he was required to shift codes between decent and 
street codes quickly in response to a slight by another male: 
Like I was at the store today, Belfast and Monroe, I found $5.00 when I came home from 
my job and I was in a good mood.  A woman, she didn’t have no money to get her kids 
nothing, she had maybe $2.00 in the car.  I was like, “I’ll give you $3.00, matter of fact, 
what’s this for?”  She said, “It’s for the kids.”  Like, “I’m a pay for it, get whatever you 
want for the children, I’m a pay for it.”  I got a black and mild cause I’m slowing down 
on the cigarettes.  So, he’s telling me to hurry up, or whatever, “that’s why I don’t like 
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you ‘N words’ this, that and a third.  By me having an anger problem and not being a 
bigger person, I snapped on him.  And next thing you know he said something smart 
about how, like I’m old enough to take mama jokes, but now my mama’s sick, that really 
hit me to my heart.  I turned back around and told him some words, next thing you know 
he went to grab his gun and cock it back ‘cause, you know the clip fall out.  Like how 
you going to handle a gun but your magazine falls out that holds your bullets.  Like I told 
him, next time you pull it, you better use it, I’m not afraid of no pistol, I’ve got God on 
my side.  You might think I’m scared but I’m not.   
 
Martin began by acting from a decent values mode, sharing his money with a woman in need, 
but at the perceived slight he shifted codes and violence erupted.  Note also that Martin was able 
to reflect upon his anger, “by me having an anger problem” and his inward clash between 
personal and subcultural values, “not being a bigger person.”  His recognition that there may 
have been prosocial ways of dealing with conflict were rejected as inappropriate in this situation 
because he did not want to appear frightened.   
Kobe saw the divide through a racial lens, commenting “White people, they have like 
these big, nice looking places and you know they are probably doing well, doing well financially 
and all that stuff like that, so it’s not a lot of reasons to just out and be angry and attack 
somebody versus out here where you have a lot of anger.”  His comment reflected a view that 
financial power shielded one from having to respond with aggression to perceived slights.  Both 
interviewees displayed an understanding of the need to exercise power in response to slights 
while simultaneously recognizing other operative codes that existed elsewhere. 
 Others made the connection between power and anger as well.  Dr. T noted that the 
ability to trust was part of the challenge faced by those in the subculture when he stated “where 
they didn’t trust someone or someone was showing violence or aggression towards them [they] 
reciprocated. They just gave it right back.”  Daneta described a similar dynamic where her 
cousin was shot in a power display occurring during a dice game, “They were playing or 
shooting dice or something and then the guy got mad because he lost the game, you know, and 
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then he just like took it out on the boy and started shooting at him and then he, I guess, went to 
retaliate and then my cousin got shot.”  Aggression in Hollygrove served a purpose, it let others 
know that perceived threats to one’s person would be met with power.  As will be seen later in 
this chapter, those with the most power became known as Hood Stars. 
 Displays of power may also become lethal when they escalated to the level of the ‘street 
beef,’ an ongoing feud between two members of the subculture.  Martin noted, “we get into a 
fight.  From now on whenever I see you it’s on and popping, we’re beefing.  And sometimes that 
beef escalates to violence.”  A street beef occurred when two residents had conflict.  Unless 
resolved through other means, something unlikely in the subculture, the beef could progress to 
lethal violence.  Ernest, who printed memorial t-shirts for many of those killed because of street 
beefs, chronicled the end result of such violence, “So that would be a group of eight guys come 
in and order shirts one day, and the next week it went to a group of seven, then a group of six, 
five, till there was none ‘cause they was killing each other.”  This was most intense during a 
period he entitled The Vacuum, a period at year-end when debts were collected, “the most 
violent time about November the 15th to January the 5th, I call it the vacuum, people just get 
sucked up.  It’s when all the debts get called in.”  His business in memorial t-shirts would peak 
during this period, when “60% of the shirts for the whole year for the funeral went down in just 
those few months.”    
While enhancing one’s personal power, lethal violence associated with the subculture 
was perceived to have a negative effect upon the life chances of those immersed in it.  Four of 
the study’s respondents understood that a distinct challenge of those living “outchere” was a 
constricted ability to plan for the future.  They reflected Anderson’s (1993) thinking as he wrote 
“the ghetto adolescent sees no future to derail, no hope for a tomorrow very different from 
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today” (p. 93).  A police precinct commander stated it thus “if you have nothing, what do you 
have to lose” and added “If I thought I would be dead in five years, why would I be planning for 
retirement?”  His comments addressed a hopeless that occurred for those without viable 
prospects and reflected an understanding of why neighborhood males were not afraid of 
violence, they had nothing to live for. 
 Daneta’s comments reflected an understanding of this reality.  She was a single mother 
trying to raise her son, whose father had succumbed to the Keeping It Real subculture.  She had 
chosen to break up with him and was now dating another young man who sat on the porch 
nursing a bullet wound received in a Hollygrove altercation.  Her understanding of the future of 
neighborhood youth reflected the police commander’s, “it’s just nothing to do here, it’s just the 
same old thing every day,” adding “they feel like they don’t have anything to live for” and “they 
have no money every day and they doin’ the same thing every day and they parents don’t want to 
do anything so how could you expect them to do, to change?”   She expressed the deep 
hopelessness that was also reflected in the words of one 20-something male “they out here with 
no ambitions, they don’t know, they not planning for nothing, they don’t have no goals in life.”  
Charles explained the thinking of those with no future, saying “their mentality is, you know, I’m 
going to get everything and get it now because they don’t have anything to look forward to.”  
With minimal future options outside of the neighborhood, they are limited to being “outchere” 
and to live by the rules of Keeping It Real, thus becoming agents of their own destruction. 
 
This Crazy Code of Honor: The Rules of “Keeping It Real” 
 Life in the Keeping It Real subculture was lived by well-defined rules, what one high-
raking police official described as “this crazy code of honor.”  Anderson (1999) found that these 
rules “prescribe both proper comportment and the proper way to respond if challenged” (p. 33).  
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Although most respondents acknowledged that these rules ran counter to prosocial values, 
residents understood that awareness of the rules were important “in order to enable them to 
negotiate the inner-city environment” (Anderson, 1999, p. 33).  The residents of Hollygrove 
delineated 14 rules of the Keeping It Real subculture, which were grouped in this section under 
the categories of Being Hard, Not Snitching on Others, Maintaining Respect, Protecting Turf, 
and Prohibitions against Violence toward Whites. 
 Martin and Daneta explained Keeping It Real through two lenses, the street definition and 
their personal definition.  These were excellent examples of how many residents negotiate the 
complicated interplay of publicly displayed street values and privately held prosocial values.  
Martin was raised in a family of Jehovah’s Witnesses, with a strong, prosocial value-orientation.  
Although he considered his religion important, his desire to be a rap artist and his occasional 
forays into drug dealing had led to his involvement in the neighborhood street life something he 
considered to be a mistake.  When asked to describe what it meant to keep it real he responded, 
“Real, real is mean, you bout yours, this is the street, the street Ebonics term, you real, you bout 
yours, you follow a code, you don’t snitch, you don’t break the rules, you ain’t gonna let nobody 
play you or punk you.”  Martin recognized the codified nature of the subculture and its 
importance to survival on the streets of Hollygrove.  He also expressed the divergence between 
his personal values and the street’s when he added a caveat, “real, to me, my definition, being 
real, as I said, being yourself, that’s the most realest thing you can be, why try to lie, especially 
to yourself?”   
 Daneta expressed a similar conflict between the street culture and prosocial values.  In 
this exchange she compared “white folks” values, or prosocial values, as contrasted to the values 
of the subculture: 
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D: Like we learn a lot from, well I guess the white folks, I don’t want to say it like that 
but we can learn a lot from them too, you know, because they see things differently 
versus the way we see stuff.  We just want to be real and what’s being real?  Being real is 
holding a gun in our hands every day, walking up the street with a stack of money that I 
made off selling whatever I just sold to a person, you know, but that’s not how it’s 
supposed to go.  Like that gets you fast money and quick money but as far as when 
somebody putting a book in front of your face you can’t read it. And you know, what’s 
the point in you don’t even know, you know, well it’s just (pauses) 
 
K: What is, you just mentioned something several other people have mentioned, being 
real. 
 
` D: Being real 
 
K: What does it mean to be real? 
 
D: Well to us, being real, being real is just, I guess, being hard, you know, like walking 
with your chest up.  That’s like being real like having people with fear in their hearts 
when they see you.  That’s being real.  Well that’s their definition of being real versus 
what real is really is (pauses) 
 
K: Who’s definition? 
 
D: to me, being real is a person that’s loyal, being true to yourself, knowing, you know, 
being true to yourself, you know, that’s what being real is, being yourself. 
 
As they explained the rules of the subculture both Martin and Daneta presented alternative 
definitions for Keeping It Real.  These ambivalent definitions showed how community residents 
negotiated between the subcultural and prosocial values, understanding the rules of the 
community while simultaneously recognizing the primacy of dominant societal definitions. 
 Both Martin and Daneta also pointed to the importance of being hard or being able to 
show a calloused, bold exterior to others, the first rules category.  Others expressed this rule in 
terms of violence and gun-ownership.  The 20-something males recognized that “you either real 
or you fake and you got to show that,” implying that acts of strength must be enacted in order to 
prove realness, something they understood to happen when one was “willing to shed blood from 
somebody” or, as Martin stated, “if you talk like you bout that, make sure you be bout that and 
you can back it up.”  Daneta added that backing it up meant “walking around every day with a 
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gun feeling like they have power over your life,” or as she stated in the previous paragraph, 
“holding a gun in our hands every day.”  It also meant being willing to use the gun, as the 20-
somethings suggested, “being willing to shed blood,” or as a former resident now in a politically-
appointed office put it “if you interfere with me then therefore, it’s better for me to take you out 
than to talk to you.”  These younger residents were opining that the subcultural rule of being hard 
was often accompanied by a weapon and a willingness to use it.  
Related to personal toughness was the prohibition against being involved in others’ 
business.  In Hollygrove’s subculture talking about others’ issues, especially to agents of formal 
control, was tantamount to personal weakness.  For Martin strength was shown by being “bout 
yours,” or not getting involved in others’ skirmishes, a part of the street code that Anderson 
(1999) phrased as “see but don’t see” (p. 133).  This was most prevalent in the rule that snitching 
or ratting on others was a major subcultural code violation.  Ernest, the neighborhood 
entrepreneur told me that “in this culture nobody’s gonna tell.”  Brandon Aggison’s killer, 
although known to people in the community, was never apprehended because of the prohibition 
against snitching. This rule was especially challenging for the police department who had 
difficulty finding information leading to an arrest. 
 The district commander connected this prohibition to the community’s collective 
efficacy when he contrasted an arrestee’s response as opposed to the community’s, “it’s not the 
criminals not snitching on each other cause guess what?  Once they get caught, you know what 
they doing?  They snitching.  It’s the citizens that live in the neighborhood that get caught up in 
that.”  There was good reason for this; violating the rule resulted in reprisal, often violence 
against the person who told or their families.  The commander noted, “by this crazy code of 
honor you have to avenge that with some type of violence.”  Tameka affirmed this statement 
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when she stated, “whoever committed the crime is gonna find out and they’re gonna come back 
and get me,” as did William when he said “most people that rat are looking to get killed.”  
Residents noted that these threats extended to the family of the informer, causing even more 
community anxiety.  Martin told me that “people still kill people’s families because, you know, 
you rat” and “if they can’t kill me they’re going to go to the next person that’s close to me,” 
while Caroline, whose mother was in prison for murder and whose boyfriend was shot in the 
head over turf issues, added “someone in the family doing that and they go and be looking for 
the person and kill ‘em all.”  The threat of retaliation posed a challenge to neighborhood 
collective efficacy; minding one’s business and keeping silent fostered an environment where 
violence was unchecked.   
 Failing to mind one’s own business was related to the third set of rules in Hollygrove’s 
subculture, don’t show disrespect.  Kubrin (2005) noted “disrespect can come in a variety of 
flavors include disrespect by testing or challenging someone, disrespect through victimizing—
usually robbing—someone, and disrespect by snitching” (p. 373).  One community leader 
connected the desire for respect to its roots in the nation’s history of slavery, connecting it to 
“taking away black mans’ dignity” and unhealed wounds from the past.  Others implied it was 
rooted in shame that came from living in what was considered to be a ghetto neighborhood.  
Tamesha described coming home from her elite public school with a white classmate and being 
concerned with what the classmate would think, “I didn’t want her to feel like she was going into 
a bad neighborhood…I kinda avoided saying Hollygrove so she wouldn’t feel unsafe.”   
Anderson (1999) writes “Many inner-city young men in particular crave respect to such a degree 
that they will risk their lives to attain and maintain it” (p. 76).  Charles illustrated this by saying 
residents had to “be very careful with what you say to people, you have to be careful how you 
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look at people” implying that using the wrong word or wrong look could be interpreted as 
disrespect and may be met with violence.   
Another term for respect was General Principle, or G.P., which Ernest described in the 
following vignette: 
Guy said he had gotten into a dice game with phony money.  And the other guy lost his 
money, George lost his money.  George didn’t know whether it was true but some guys 
on the corner by the store, “Aw, dude took all your money and had fake $100 bills, he 
didn’t even have real money.  You gonna let him play you like that George?  Huh, bruh?”   
 
“Man, he ain’t gonna play me like that, no uh unh, where he at?” 
 
“He around there by his house now.”  They just bucking him up, just to get some activity 
stirred up, just for some entertainment.  And George took this thing so serious, George 
went around there, “Man, where my money at, bruh?”   
 
Boy talking about, “What is you talking about?” 
 
“Man, uh uh, you played me out there, you had a phony $100 bill.” 
 
And so the boy said, “I ain’t got no money, man, go ahead on George, you be tripping.” 
Cause he knew him real good, see him every day, they was born there together, raised up, 
Dunbar together, you know?   
 
And uh, the boy’s grandmother was sitting on the porch, she said, “Oh no, please don’t 
kill my grandson, no, no.”  And she was saying about he owed a hundred dollars, the lady 
ran inside and got $200, tried to give it to him.  So he had $200.  “Please don’t kill my 
grandson.” 
 
George turned to that woman and told her, “I’m sorry, I gotta do it.  It’s G.P.” 
 
Ernest’s narrative described two respect principles: don’t play people, or make them appear 
foolish and don’t mess with others’ money, both being reasons to enact G.P.   
Charles related a story from his drug dealing days when somebody took his money but 
didn’t give him product in exchange.  For Charles to save face in the community he felt 
compelled to retaliate, “so finally I caught him and when I caught him he went to running and I 
grabbed him, knocked him down and I pulled a pistol on him” adding “I was going to shoot him 
too, Kevin, ‘cause he had put me in a bad spot.”  Both Ernest and Charles illustrated the danger 
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residents faced when they showed disrespect; dishonor must be met with violence in order to 
restore the honor lost in the exchange.  Langston, a wiry young man who lived equidistant 
between two neighborhood crime hotspots, summed up the concept by saying “they wanna take 
your life ‘cause they figure if you disrespect them, your life need to be taken.”   
 Respect extended beyond interpersonal boundaries to spatial boundaries and presaged a 
fourth rule of the subculture: respect for turf.  Jenks (2005) defined turf as “sites or spaces 
wrested from the constraints of capitalism and the dominant order” and “geographical metaphors 
such as ‘turf’, ‘territory’, ‘terrain’ and ‘space’ and the boundaries, which enable entry or 
exclusion, [which] are marked out by language and style” (p. 119). There were two sets of 
boundaries to be respected in Hollygrove: the neighborhood as a whole and those of individual 
players who carve out a portion of the community, such as a corner or a block, as their personal 
turf.   
In Hollygrove these contested spaces were prone to violent conflict between parties 
competing for control of them.  The 20-something males described neighborhood turf challenges 
this way, “Street real is, man we from the 3rd ward, they from the 17th, we don’t like them, let’s 
go air it out, that’s street real,” where airing it out meant shooting.  One example of a turf 
violation was dating women from a ward other than one’s own.  Charles described a shooting 
that occurred when young men from another neighborhood attempted to date women from 
Hollygrove: 
Mainly it was behind a female, it’s really pretty much what started it.   But if you in there 
from another neighborhood messin’ with the girls from back here, and then the guys that 
live back here, they’re like, “Well what you doing back here talking to our girls?”  That’s 
how they justify it.  Shouldn’t have been back here, this is not your area, shouldn’t be 




 In addition to delineating the neighborhood as turf there were individuals who carved out 
personal turf inside the neighborhood.  Caroline’s boyfriend was shot when he returned from jail 
and tried to re-establish his turf where he was selling drugs.  In this exchange she describes his 
murder: 
C:  This was after Katrina.  He end up getting shot over drugs.  He was selling drugs and 
end up, he was in jail for a while and came out and went back to the same place.  People 
killed him.   
 
 K:  Why did they kill him? 
 
C:  Over territory, he was going, I guess selling, trying to sell on the same block he was 
selling at and other people had already took over when he was gone.  So he came back 
and then now you’re trying to get your spot back and these totally new people, probably 
moved in the neighborhood, you know? 
 
Individual turf extends to women as well.  Langston related his understanding of this turf rule:   
 
Like, if you like girls now, people being shot over females, like if you talk to someone 
girl now.  A guy actually got shot in front of a girl from talkin’ about a guy girlfriend.  
Like he was, she was talkin’ to him, and the guy was like tryin’ to get her number, but 
she did not tell him that she had a boyfriend.  Like the guy just walked up to him, like 
pulled a gun on him for no reason.”  
 
Violations of turf, whether they be ward boundaries, drug sales territory, or women were 
considered to be personal affronts and thus were to be met with violence to re-establish honor. 
 A final rule expressed in the data regarded race: don’t mess with white people.  This rule, 
perhaps more than the others, helped explain why most homicide in New Orleans was black-on-
black in nature.  Residents perceived whites to have formal control on their side which meant the 
consequences for perpetrating interracial violence would be met with greater sanctions.  Charles 
reflected on this disparity as he discussed the roots of the rule, “they still have that mentality the 
White man that’s who, you don’t back talk ‘em, you do what they say do and if you go along 
with them you have a better life.  You don’t buck the system.”  He saw whites as sources of jobs 
and money and thus as untouchable.  The result, according to one of the community leaders, was 
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the understanding that “if I go messing with white folks I’m going to be in trouble, I’m going to 
get caught.  They feel like they can shoot somebody on the corner and they have it on video and I 
might get away with this, though.”  This rule limited violence to the boundaries of the 
neighborhood.  This finding was consistent with Anderson’s (1999) who wrote: 
In the inner-city community there is a generalized belief that the police simply do not 
care about black people, that when a crime is committed in the black community, little 
notice will be taken.  If a black man shoots another black man, the incident will not be 
thoroughly investigated.  A double standard of justice is thought to exist: on for black 
people, and one for whites.  This distrust is fueled by the lawlessness that is observed on 
the local streets of the community, most notably in the prevalence of functional crack 
houses.  Residents often note that such people and places would not be allowed to operate 
in the white community.  Such observations reinforce people’s belief that they are on 
their own, and this attitude has crucial implications for the code of the street” (p. 321). 
 
The knowledge that laws were enforced in ways biased toward whites had strong implications 
for understanding lethal violence in Hollygrove.  The prohibition against killing whites played a 
strong role in limiting murder to the neighborhood. 
 
Being a Hood Star: Status in the Keeping It Real Subculture 
As with mainstream society, there were strata within the Keeping It Real subculture.  At 
one end of the spectrum were those who gave grudging respect to the rules of the subculture for 
the sake of survival on the streets.  The opposite pole consisted of what Martin termed “Ultra-
vultures” those he described as “hard core exterior, don’t have no heart.”  Ultra-vultures were 
those who garnered the respect of others in the subculture through exhibitions of strength and 
violence, what Anderson (1999) termed ‘juice’.  In the following exchange the 20-something 
males described the importance of status to those deeply embedded in the Keeping It Real 
subculture: 




M2: Oh I just put on, I just put on Instagram, I just put on Instagram, oh, I forgot how I 
 worded it. 
 
M3:  Becoming a Hood Star. 
 
K: Hood Star? 
 
M2: Hood Star.  Meaning you a star in the neighborhood. 
 
M1: Man you like a basketball player round here. 
 
M2: Basically when you a hood star it’s not just being popular, you like Lil Wayne   
 back here, everybody love you and know you. 
 
The Hood Star was the epitome of popularity something they compared with superstardom akin 
to Lil Wayne, the nationally-recognized, platinum recording artist from Hollygrove.  One of the 
20-somethings described the pathway to becoming a Hood Star, “they want to be killers and they 
want to be gangsters and that, they want to be that because they know they can’t be nothing else.  
And the only way to get status and to be real popular in this city is to do that.”   Langston, also in 
his 20s, thought that a reputation for being a Hood Star must be earned through violence, “The 
reputation of being dangerous is like I’m tryin’ to get my reps up.  They tryin’ to get they reps 
up, they’re trying to be the big dog in the neighborhood.”  Daneta connected the violence to 
power and respect, “once they have that power, the neighborhood gonna respect them.”  Being a 
Hood Star, therefore, required garnering power and respect via a reputation for being dangerous. 
 Rewards were associated with being a Hood Star.  The first was a sense of pride, as stated 
by Kobe who connected personal worth to the ability to survive violence, “the people that I’ve 
like, that I’ve known that have been shot all, like, I don’t know, for to me it seems like they got, 
they gain a sense of pride after being shot.”  One of the 20-something focus group members 
connected popularity with women to being a Hood Star, “they [women] only want to mess with 
the dudes known in the city from killing and robbing people.”  Others saw financial rewards 
connected to neighborhood stardom, as one of the 20-somethings explained the perspective to 
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me: “I want to get all the money so I could let people know I’m the only one with money and I 
got that status.”  Arianne echoed their words, “they trying to hustle and sell drugs and come up 
and be millionaires.”   
 Becoming a Hood Star, in rare exceptions, could occur without violence. Ernest told me 
“I was one of the only heads of the hood that wasn’t a drug dealer or gangster.”  He earned his 
status in the neighborhood by working with the emerging rap artists and their record labels, 
printing shirts and selling them at their concerts. 
Hood Star status was conflicted; some in the community did not recognize it while others 
competed for it.  The power that came from being a Hood Star was not universally accepted as 
being positive as expressed by Dr. T who told me it is a “false sense of authority.”  It also came 
with a cost, an increased likelihood that one would experience lethal violence; Martin noted that 
such popularity meant their names “will ring a bell, why, because I’m such a hot topic I mean, 
and I didn’t have to say it.  Somebody might kill me behind something like that.”  Many of the 
elders of the neighborhood thought the power and popularity of Hood Stars was illegitimate, 
while the younger residents were able to see the limitations of this popularity. 
 Bourgois (2010), describing the struggle for personal respect of crack dealers in New 
York, contended they “have not passively accepted their structural victimization.  On the 
contrary, by embroiling themselves in the underground economy and proudly embracing street 
culture, they are seeking an alternative to their social marginalization” (p. 143).  Those limited 
structurally from advancing in society, whose lives were restricted to the boundaries of 
Hollygrove, translated their marginality into respect via a reputation for violence.  The reputation 
carried both rewards, women, money, power and status, and concomitant consequences, the 
increased likelihood that one might lose their live as others strived to replace them.  Respect, 
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therefore, in Hollygrove’s Keeping It Real subculture was both a powerful motivating force for 
those stuck in the neighborhood but also a cause of lethality in the neighborhood.   
 
You Don’t Have No Other Way: Succumbing to the Keeping It Real Subculture 
 The Keeping It Real subculture could be alluring, especially for those with limited 
options outside of the neighborhood.  The push of structural limitations outside of the 
neighborhood and the pull of the subculture’s status within combined to draw those who were 
marginalized into a position of choosing street versus conventional values.  The data addressed 
three factors leading one to prioritize Keeping It Real over prosocial values: limited options 
elsewhere, a sympathetic view by those in the neighborhood, and the lack of prosocial mentors 
who could potentially facilitate other choices. 
 A former police commander commented upon the options for those in the neighborhood, 
“I’m 19 years old and I look out in front of me and I don’t see a whole lot and when the options 
come for me to make something hard and fast, I’m gonna do it.”  This could be intensified by 
limitations of cultural capital outside the neighborhood, as explained by an official in the 
Mayor’s office: 
Networks only extend so far, so if in a high poverty area you’re also less likely to have 
access to personal transportation, more reliant on public, then most of your life is 
probably lived in a small geographic area.  That said, your network and the individuals 
with whom you might have conflict probably also going to be in that neighborhood so 
now it’s largely, it’s self-perpetuating characteristics of the neighborhood that keep the 
conflicts. 
 
Limited options and constricted networks were further enhanced by personal fears such as this 
one as expressed by Daneta, “they feel like, I guess, being successful and opening their minds to 
other things, they’re scared of that, you know?”  The neighborhood became a zone of comfort in 
the face of perceived hostility elsewhere.  William noted “once you’re in your comfort zone and 
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you’re not getting caught, you’re not going to jail but you’re having this money so you buy these 
tennis shoes and impress your friends or your cousins or whoever, I mean you’re bound to stick 
with that code.”  Bound by limitations and personal fear, some residents found comfort in the 
street life where the rules were clearer and paths to success were more legible and easily 
understood. 
 Many Hollygrove residents understood these realities and expressed sympathy for those 
entrapped.  The 20-something males, conflicted themselves about which set of values to follow, 
felt a certain kinship with the members of the subculture, suggesting “you from that 
neighborhood, you can’t judge them,” and “I grew up with you, like I don’t look at you as a bad 
person.”  This sympathy extended beyond the youth; Angela, a senior citizen, had a son who was 
caught in the subculture and explained her understanding of his dilemma this way, “Of course 
you cared about your family for the most part and your friends cause if one of your friends got 
something happened, you were there to help fight the battle,” a recognition of the alluring 
camaraderie that existed between those who chose the Keeping It Real subculture.  Dr. T also 
expressed a compassionate understanding of this solidarity as he stated “it’s love, it’s trust, it’s 
that comradery that they have with their fellow brothers or gang members or whatever.”    
The fellowship experienced was enticing for those experiencing societal marginalization.  
Langston shared his desire to be part of the in-group during his adolescence, “So as I was 
growin’ up, that’s what—all I wanted to do was to hang out with the older guys—the big, tough, 
bad guys that was selling drugs.”  Although Kobe had largely escaped entanglement in the street 
subculture by leaving the neighborhood to attend a university in Mississippi, he also expressed 
an understanding of the desire to belong, “they like to look up to the drug dealers or the 
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gangsters or whoever is around the neighborhood, so if you want to be looked at as cool in their 
eyes then you gotta, you know, you gotta do the things they do.”   
Despite the compassionate understanding of those who chose the lifestyle, however, there 
was still recognition that violence accompanied it, something William acknowledged, “Selling 
drugs, hanging out, you know [they] wanna be, you know, a part of what’s going on.  I mean, 
that’s the real reasons, you know, violence takes place.”  Most people in the neighborhood were 
bound by the same limitations, resulting in an empathy for those who opt for the Keeping It Real 
lifestyle.  As was seen in the values chapter, however, that understanding did not extend to 
condoning the accompanying behavioral choices, especially the violence. 
 William’s previous comment led to a third factor pushing some to succumb to the 
subculture, a dearth of prosocial mentors.  Eldridge contrasted the impact of his parents upon his 
choices with those who lacked positive influences by saying “these young guys, they don’t have 
any guidance.”  He noted: 
People like always talk about male role models but that really is like a big problem.  I 
mean, you might not think about it, you know, if you had male role models in your life, 
but if you haven’t and you look at those people some of those people their lives are 
changed because of that.  They gonna look up to the next person who happens to be male 
who might be doing negative things out there.  They might be, they might not sell drugs 
in their face, but you know you might see them pass by in a nice car, they might act a 
certain way, you know, they might have a certain demeanor about them and then the kids 
who don’t have that in their life they might emulate that and the next thing you know 
they on the road to doing what that person does and that person might be a drug dealer or 
a murder or you know anything. 
 
Langston connected the lack of parental guidance with the choice to commit violence: 
Like their dad not in their lives to teach them how to, you know, fist fight or, you know, 
get along with someone.  So now, it’s since my dad’s not here for me, you not gonna be 
here on this earth because all I know is guns now.  So if I’ve never been taught how to 
respect someone, now all I know about is guns ‘cause that’s what I’ve been growin’ up 




To Dr. T the lack of prosocial mentors caused the subcultural worldview to become normative, at 
which point street values were “just kind of ingrained into them like, well this is just how we, 
just how we supposed to grow up.”   
 Faced with limited options outside the neighborhood, a sympathetic community that 
understands the realities faced by those in the subculture, and the lack of mentors to create 
bridges to resources outside of the community, the choice to succumb was understandable.  As 
one’s network became increasingly constricted to the neighborhood the draw to the lifestyle of 
the streets became stronger and one’s choices increasingly reflected the available mentors, 
despite personal views of the primacy of prosocial values.  In spite of this attraction, some 
actively resisted the pull.  Such resistance comprises the next section of this chapter. 
 
If You Got Beef, Put It on the Grill: Resisting the Keeping It Real Subculture 
  Those who resisted the subculture had sources of social capital both within and beyond 
the neighborhood.  Kobe provided an excellent example.  Although his family was deeply 
immersed in the subculture, he refused to succumb, choosing sports, religious life and academia 
as substitutes.  Because of his social skills he was able to use available resources, like his 
connection to the local community center, to enhance his resistance.  In his interview Kobe 
contrasted the 1960s and 1970s Afrocentric power movement to the Keeping It Real subculture: 
Now that’s not even the case anymore, it’s like, “Alright, if I don’t like this person then 
I’m gonna shoot him.”  If I have a problem with you because of something you said to 
me, because of something you did, I’m gonna take your life.  That’s like the worst thing 
you could possibly do to be a black man. I don’t know somewhere down the line 
someone received the wrong information because now it’s like no more like a Black 
Power thing, to stand up together, united, like Dr. King, Million Man March and all that.  
It’s like, “I’ll shoot you and kill you,” you know?  You don’t see him as your brother 
anymore, you see him as someone who’s opposed to you. It’s so corrupt and negative 




Kobe was able to take a resistive stance, observing the subculture through outside cultural lenses 
rooted in his enhanced social capital.  This allowed him to situate it in light of broader social 
movements.  Others in the neighborhood expressed resistance in three ways: an appreciation for 
life and prosocial values instilled by family, a future-orientation, and via an understanding of 
collective efficacy. 
 Dr. T, a physician, had opportunities to practice medicine within the prison system.  His 
value for life emanated from two sources, his allegiance to the Hippocratic Oath and from his 
religious training as he pursued a Ph.D. in Theology.  He expressed it thus, “you have one life to 
live, it’s an important life, it’s the only one you’re going to get.”  Martin, the 20-something 
rapper, situated his appreciation for life in a family context, “I don’t want my mother to bury me 
and she be in that front pew, shot and killed by a gunshot wound.  I want to live.”  He exhibited 
ambivalence for the subculture because he had one foot in each world, even making an 
appearance in the aforementioned music video celebrating the subculture.  His ability to express 
resistance came from his family’s influence, something that many felt was an underlying source 
of strength for resistance.   
Charles indicated that resisters needed “someone in their home that would instill in them 
the belief that you can be anything you wanna be if you excel and push yourself.”  One way 
parents did this is by restricting their children’s ability to roam the streets of Hollygrove.  A 
community leader noted “they literally keep their kids in the house all day long,” and Kobe, 
reminiscing of his own upbringing, said of his mother, “she doesn’t like me walking around the 
neighborhood doing anything.”  Others sought ways to remove their kids from the neighborhood 
entirely, hoping for a safer place to raise them elsewhere.  Daneta, a single mother told me, “I 
don’t want to feel like they running us away with this gang violence, but then again it makes you 
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wanna run away when you have little infants and kids to raise, knowing that they can grow up 
and, you know, be the way that they are and that’s the main reason why I’d rather get my kids 
out of the neighborhood.”  Most allowed their children to be active in the community while 
watching them closely, like one community leader who related his fear for his young, adolescent 
son: 
I’m concerned about like kids I don’t know, like Jerome (name has been changed) is 
getting to an age where you know he wants to walk up to CVS now and he wants to walk 
over here to the center and I don’t, I let him do it but I tell you it’s one of my biggest 
fears.  I mean I know a lot of kids in the neighborhood but I see a lot of kids in the 
neighborhood that I just don’t know.  I always see a group of boys that I just never seen 
before and I’m like what’s going to happen to my son walking up, you know, and it could 
be that wrong group of boys.  So I fear it but I still let him go. 
 
Parents who instilled prosocial values were only half of the equation; their children must 
also decide which code to follow.  Eldridge noted, “if we have more people that value a home 
life, as opposed to a street life, eventually one is gonna outnumber the other.”  Interviews data 
demonstrated that parents were actively trying to instill resistance to the subculture in their 
children through a variety of means, while hoping their children internalized their worldview and 
appreciation for life. 
Many recognized a conflict between the live-for-the moment view of those in the 
subculture and the ability to envision a positive future.  Kobe expressed it this way: 
So initially a lot of kids is going in the wrong direction just because they want to fit in 
and the other ones, there might be one or two that you might see around the 
neighborhood, they’re uh, just strong, mentally strong, they can understand that, all right 
if I don’t do this something good might happen in the future, so that’s how I was, you 
know?  I never wanted to do drugs because I was like, I might not be looked at as like the 
popular kid or that cool kid in the neighborhood but I could make up for it by whatever 
comes next. 
 
He chalked up his resistance to mental strength and a willingness to sacrifice short-term status 
for long-term success.  One of the 20-somethings, struggling to emerge from the street 
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subculture, shared Kobe’s view, noting resistance meant “you gotta tell yourself I don’t want to 
be a product of my neighborhood.”  Martin’s future-orientation stemmed from his understanding 
of the consequences for those who choose the Keeping It Real subculture: 
I actually want a career, I don’t want to be one of these people out on the street because 
everybody want to claim, “Oh, I’m a real member or, I’m a real blank this, I’m a real 
blank that,” like I told you yesterday, man, everybody wants to be this or that, be yourself 
it gets you farther in the long run.  Real niggers, excuse my language once again, don’t 
get that far.  Name one real one of them who’s either alive right now, they either dead, 
they either in jail or they dead. 
 
Even those within the subculture, according to two 20-somethings, desired a way out as seen in 
this interchange: 
M1: and I guarantee, if you would sit out and talk to some of those dudes, I guarantee 
they want to put their gun down, they just can’t. 
 
M2: Oh, and Mr. Kevin, you really want perspective on violence, go talk to one of those 
crazy, ignorant dudes who ain’t got no hope, ain’t got no future, like they’ll tell you… 
 
The first of these two voices proposed that even those deeply embedded in the subculture had a 
desire to leave it while the second voice in the exchange expressed why it is so difficult to 
choose to resist, the lack of a future-orientation.  Given limited prospects outside of the 
boundaries of the neighborhood, those in the subculture found it difficult to envision a hopeful 
future, choosing instead to live for the moment. 
 A third focus of those who resisted was a faith in collective efficacy.  As suggested by 
Kobe’s monologue about the unity of the black power movements, some resisters understood the 
importance of neighborhood unity in light of positive racial consciousness, working together to 
project a positive view of a black neighborhood.  Charles also evoked the black consciousness 
movements of the past when he stated “this new generation they don’t wanna do nothing.  I mean 
they just don’t.  Martin Luther King must be turning over in his grave, man.”  These voices noted 
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the gains made by African Americans which they felt were being undone by the Keeping It Real 
subculture.  Ernest viewed efficacy through an ecological lens, noting: 
I look at Hollygrove as being stagnated, almost to a point, you know what I’m saying, so 
to where there’s literally dying, even though you see progress.  I think Hollygrove should 
have, the Hollygrove that I’ve seen when I was a kid, should be a greater place than what 
it is now.  So in order for it to happen like that, somewhere stagnation need to come in 
there and nothing just grew and nothing, the community is a living environment so it’s 
either got to be growing or dying. 
 
His solution to stagnation was a series of events in the community where people are taught to 
“say no to that culture,” via the transmission of prosocial values by community leaders.  Martin 
viewed efficacy through the lens of the “street beef,” a more grassroots perspective adding 
“we’re all the same hood, we should be united as one and all this beef this, beef that, if you got 
beef put it on the grill, you know, because life is too short.”  The collective efficacy view of 
resistance had garnered support as the community experienced an upsurge in social capital in 
recent years.   John, a neighborhood senior active in neighborhood improvement efforts, noted, 
“misconceptions are only corrected if you put the truth on ‘em.  So it’s gonna take a while, but as 
long as we maintain the commitment of the neighborhood, ‘cause it took a neighborhood 
commitment to get this thing done.”   From this perspective resistance could be facilitated when 
those who desired a safer community worked together for the well-being of the community, 




 Duneier (1994) wrote “human beings desire to participate in a world that validates their 
own images of self-worth” (p. 109).  In a society that invalidates those on the economic and 
social margins, alternate pathways to self-worth must be created.  The “Keeping It Real” 
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subculture was one of those pathways.  Within its rules those who experienced what Wacquant 
(2008) termed advanced marginality, which resulted from sociospatial isolation and exclusion 
endemic to advanced capitalism, could climb a social hierarchy to become a Hood Star.  The 
empathic feelings of the community expressed for those in the subculture implied that many 
were able to understand this reality, even while eschewing the violence and disorganization that 
accompanied it.   
 Even those embedded in the Keeping It Real subculture often privately embraced the 
supremacy of prosocial values.  Given the opportunity for economic and social advancement via 
conventional means, they would choose it.  Those who could both learn and exercise the 
“cultural capital” of Bourgois (2010) or to “code-switch” between prosocial and street values 
(Anderson, 1999) may be able to appropriate these opportunities, as have Kobe and Tamesha.  
Those who could not became stuck in the subculture, “outchere,” with few options for 
advancement but through the pathway of the Keeping It Real subculture, may find themselves 
alienated from others within and without the community who structure their lives around 
prosocial values. 
 The conflict within the community between the Keeping It Real subculture and the 
prosocial values of the old-timers had created a new dialectic in the years since Katrina. 
Advanced marginality gave rise to a subculture oppositional to prosocial values and provided an 
alluring alternative for some who experienced exclusion by a dominant society perceived to 
enforce these values.  Yet this subculture was also threatening to those in the community 
espousing prosocial values, as both its defiance of prosocial values and its practices further 
isolated Hollygrove, undoing gains made during the Black power movements of the 1960s and 
1970s.  During the post-Katrina years the community experienced enhanced political and social 
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capital as resident efforts to rebuild the community embraced the help offered by outsiders: 
organizations both inside and outside Hollygrove, the City Councilperson, and agents of formal 
control such as the New Orleans Police Department.  The result was a power shift away from the 
subcultural codes and toward the prosocial values expressed by those opposed to them.   This 
shift signaled newfound collective efficacy.  The resulting empowerment served to reduce legal 
cynicism and allowed those espousing prosocial values to challenge to the more destructive 
elements of the subculture. One of the key battlefronts was the violence and disorder associated 


















Chapter 8: Findings 
What Prompts People to Kill is Drugs: The Connections between Violence and Drugs 
 
Hollygrove’s Keeping It Real subculture and its accompanying violence was considered 
by many in the study to be closely related to the illicit, underground economy.  A major theme 
running through the interviews with Hollygrove residents was the perception that the use and 
sale of illegal substances was the major cause of neighborhood violence, especially homicide.  
Although there were other parts of the underground economy that were not violent, such as lawn 
care, unlicensed day care providers, and shade tree mechanics, these were not mentioned by 
residents as causes for neighborhood violence. 
At the same time many recognized that the inability to participate in the formal economy 
drove some into the illicit marketplace.  Tameka, an African American homeowner in her mid-
40’s, expressed these twin sentiments as she considered the cause of neighborhood homicide:  
I think what prompts people to kill is drugs.  Poverty, along with that goes 
unemployment.  Sometimes it’s just people trying to feed their families, you know, “I 
gotta rob because I need to feed my kids.  I don’t have any money, I don’t have a job.” 
Sometimes it’s a guy on drugs that’s trying to get jobs and he doesn’t have any money 
and he doesn’t have a job.  He can’t hold a job ‘cause he’s on drugs.  So he’s robbing 
somebody and in the process he might kill the person because the person either fought 
back or just happenstance. 
 
Her statement reflected the empathy felt by a middle-class neighbor for those that were 
‘outchere’ struggling against limitations and exercising desperate choices.  A dearth of jobs 
coupled with role models who have achieved success in the illicit economy presented an 
alternative pathway to financial accomplishment.  Despite personal values that proscribed drug-
dealing, some saw little alternative to participation in this marketplace.   
Wilson (1997) described the urban conditions that pushed some Hollygrove residents into 
the illicit economy:  
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Neighborhoods that offer few legitimate employment opportunities, inadequate job 
information networks, and poor schools lead to the disappearance of work.  That is, 
where jobs are scarce, where people rarely, if ever, have the opportunity to help their 
friends and neighbors find jobs, and where there is a disruptive or degraded school life 
purporting to prepare youngsters for eventual participation in the workforce, many people 
eventually lose their feeling of connectedness to work in the formal economy; they no 
longer expect work to be a regular, and regulating, force in their lives.  In the case of 
young people, they may grow up in an environment that lacks the idea of work as a 
central experience of adult life—they have little or no labor-force attachment.  These 
circumstances also increase the likelihood that the residents will rely on illegitimate 
sources of income, thereby further weakening their attachment to the legitimate labor 
market (pp. 52-53).  
 
Neighborhoods like Hollygrove developed underground economies to survive when residents 
lacked skills required to gain and maintain employment in a complex formal economy.  
Venkatesh (2006), chronicling the economic life of an inner-city Chicago neighborhood, 
concluded: “The demands of the ghetto require an economy utterly different from what most of 
America can imagine” (p. 4).  The informal economy that he described was a shadow of the 
formal marketplace with rules and controls that would be largely unrecognizable to those who 
did not live in neighborhoods like Hollygrove.  Those that do harbored mixed feelings toward it, 
empathy for those that participated and discomfort from the violence that resulted.  
 Four key themes emerged from the data regarding the interplay of drugs and violence.  
The first of these delineated the community’s understanding of the connections between drugs 
and violence.  The second addressed hotspots for violence which many understood to be 
alcoholic beverage outlets (ABOs) including bars and corner grocery stores.  A third theme 
tackled the economics of violence and included resident recognition of the necessity of the 
underground economy and the perceived allure of easy money.  The final section concerned 
participants’ views of formal and informal controls in the efforts to reclaim the neighborhood 




It All Started with Drugs: Drug-Related Violence in Hollygrove 
 On July 30, 2015 a shooting occurred in Hollygrove.  Three days later I would interview 
Robert who described his interaction with the shooter before it occurred: 
I turned onto Forshey Street and I looked at the dude that did the shooting.  I seen him.  I 
haven’t seen him in years because he been in New York.  He’s a longshore seaman in 
New York.  He make good money.  He’s just down here visiting.  I jump out the car.  I 
go, “What’s happening?  Holler at him, blah, blah, blah.  Later on that day or that night, 
well the next morning, I’m sorry, I see the news.  Said there was a shooting on Forshey 
Street like right where I was at.  And I’m looking on Facebook, the dude wanted for it is 
the dude I jumped out the car and went and hollered at.  And they said it was behind 
$5.00. 
 
Robert would later tell me that, like many of the shootings in the neighborhood, it was drug-
related.  The relatively minor debt of $5.00 that led to the shooting was shocking even to Robert, 
a veteran of Hollygrove’s underground drug economy. 
 Drug-related violence has been a pervasive feature of life in Hollygrove.  Every 
interviewee, whether they were public officials, senior citizens or younger males, made this 
connection.  Most understood it to be the primary cause of homicide in the community. 
Furthermore, the violence was not limited to those directly involved in the drug deals.  Three 
respondents made comments similar to Caroline who said “a bullet ain’t got no name on it,” 
noting that unintended victims can die when shootings occur. To understand homicide in 
Hollygrove one must recognize the role of the illicit economy in neighborhood violence.  
 A former high-ranking police official, explaining the connection between homicide and 
drugs, summed it up this way: 
You can think about it one of three ways.  If I’m buying or selling narcotics, I have to 
protect my business, which can result in violence.  If I’m using narcotics, I usually make 
a lot of poor choices on a lot of levels that can also lead to violence.  And if I’m not using 
it and I want to break in, if I’m not the main guy and I want to break in, then I’m willing 




Expanding upon this understanding a current district commander echoed the words of Wilson 
quoted earlier in the chapter to explain why young black men murder other young black men: 
I think it’s if you are a young, a young black man now, and you don’t have the job skills, 
if you’ve come out of a school system…and if you see that you get involved in this 
narcotics trade, and that’s the easiest way to get money and if you don’t have the 
education, if you’re not going to college, if you don’t have a trade, if you don’t have 
either one of those things, what kind of job are you gonna do?  You gonna be a 
dishwasher, you gonna be in a minimum-wage job?  You gonna be working, you know, 
some kind of really—those jobs are tough, you know?  And you’re gonna be working 
nights, you’re gonna be working weekends.  I think a lot of times people gravitate away 
from those jobs and they go for the fast life of narcotic trafficking, and that narcotics 
trafficking breeds violence. 
 
The absence of livable-wage jobs available to those with limited skills created the necessity for 
new economic pathways.  As both Tameka and the commander noted, the current economic 
climate was anathema to those without proper education or training, forcing the choice to be 
destitute or pursue alternative means of income.  This gave rise to an informal economy, a 
marketplace regulated by the Keeping It Real subculture and its accompanying violence. 
 Drug-related activity in the neighborhood was cited by most as the main cause of 
Hollygrove’s reputation as a violent community.  Neighborhood seniors, those who lived in the 
community before drug-related violence became common, had a perspective on the 
neighborhood that predated Hollygrove’s violent reputation. During a focus group one 
respondent connected drug sales to outsiders entering the community from public housing: 
It all stems back to the problem with drugs.  It all started with drugs.  Now the 
homeowners, most homeowners back here are senior citizens, but when like I said, broke 
up the projects they moved the crime on us.  They brought their criminal ways to the 
neighborhood with them.  They recruit the young people in the neighborhood.  And then 
when you can’t come up with my money and I got to pay back Mr. So and So’s money, 
that’s where the problems started.  That’s where the crime started… 
 
At the other end of the age spectrum the 20-something males traced Hollygrove’s violence to the 
1980s and the introduction of crack cocaine to the neighborhood. In this interchange two of them 
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attempted to explain their understanding of how crack-related violence changed the 
neighborhood dynamic: 
 M1: That’s the beginning of it, they explained to you… 
 
M2:  (interrupting) Once they took crack, once crack cocaine came, it had messed up a 
lot of black communities. 
 
M1:  The dude explained to you like before this we was doing this and doing that, they 
was this fighting, then once this got into the neighborhood they started fighting to 
rob you and that’s when people started robbing, started robbing with guns. 
 
M2: Yeah, you’re talking about the crackheads, like, when habits changed, at first 
when they wanted the drug they might… 
 
M1: (interrupting) Like in the late 80s, early 90s, that little 10-, 12-year era was when 
everything just sunk into this… 
 
M2: If you go up to any black man who’s really conscious of the problems that’s going 
on in cities across the world, he’s going to name crack cocaine as one of the main 
reasons. 
 
Highly addictive and relatively inexpensive, crack cocaine played a role in neighborhood 
violence, creating a highly lucrative market.  Bourgois (2003) addressed the 1980’s advent of the 
urban crack epidemic by concluding the drug “tapped directly into the entrepreneurial urge that 
is such an integral facet of the American Dream” (p. 75).  Neighborhoods like Hollygrove, he 
noted, were economically and socially marginalized due to “the restructuring of the world 
economy by multinational corporations, finance capital, and digital electronic technology, as 
well as the exhaustion of social democratic models for public sector intervention on behalf of the 
poor” (p. 319) which served to escalate inequality.  In this context, concluded Anderson (1999), 
“crack has become a seemingly permanent fixture of life, and dealing is a way to earn a living—
even, for a few, to become rich” (p. 121). 
  To Eldridge, crack was but a symptom of this neighborhood reality.  He noted, “it’s not 
just that it is crack but it’s so many other things, illegal money coming through the neighborhood 
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and with illegal money comes guns ‘cause you have to have guns in order to protect your 
money.”   His comment pointed to an important insight, when formal controls do not support the 
neighborhood economy other regulating mechanisms will.   
 Several of the interviewees had participated in this unregulated marketplace and 
possessed insider knowledge important to understanding it.  Charles was involved both as an 
addict and as a dealer.  He described Hollygrove’s violence from both perspectives: 
Well gun violence, it devastates wherever it is.  But here in Hollygrove the gun violence 
is just destroying this neighborhood because of the drugs.  They know, if you selling 
drugs nine out of ten you got a gun and if you get caught up in the wrong thing the 
person, the drug person will shoot you.  Or the person that’s trying to get drugs, if they 
got a gun, they gonna try to rob you.  If you don’t give them what they want, they gonna 
shoot you.  So the gun violence is, is, it’s out of control because it adds to the 
deterioration of the neighborhood.  Because the people are worried, either way it goes, if 
you’re selling drugs you’re gonna have a gun because you’re gonna try and protect 
yourself, protect your little neighborhood, protect your income.  And if you’re using 
drugs you’re going to use a gun and go and rob someone to get money to get drugs. 
 
Participation in the sale of drugs, whether as a consumer or as a provider, brought the possibility 
of lethal violence.  Those selling experienced an even greater likelihood of violence because of 
competition.  When asked what motivated homicides in the neighborhood Martin responded 
from his perspective as a dealer: 
You selling $20 grams and you making money.  Off an ounce of, off an ounce of good 
weed, like purple, could make you like 5-something.  So you booming off that.  They see 
you steadily got clientele coming and you showing the love and they like, “This dude got 
such and such and such and such.  He doing this, that and a third,” you know, “Let’s go 
get him.”  And what you really isn’t learning, you might find two ounces of weed, some 
mags and maybe eight or nine ounces in a stack, a stack is a thousand.  Other than that 
you done killed somebody right behind something petty, you know, and at the end of the 
day is it worth it? 
 
Those who experience extraordinary success in the marketplace became Hood Stars and faced 
greater scrutiny by others competing to replace them.  Martin’s comments argued that what 
appears to be success could be illusory, part of the image portrayed by those working to rise in 
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the social strata of the Keeping It Real subculture.  Even the illusion of success invited potential 
lethal violence. Anderson (1999) referred to this type of subcultural social capital as ‘juice’ and 
proposed that it was enhanced when one was “capable of violence” (p. 72) which was 
communicated via “facial expressions, gait and direct talk” (p. 73) and required “constant 
vigilance…against giving even the impression that transgressions will not be tolerated” (p. 75). 
 This violence had spillover effects for community members who chose not to participate.  
Violence served to impair the neighborhood’s collective efficacy in two ways: first as neighbors 
retrenched from community life and later as individuals and businesses abandoned the 
community.  Retrenchment accompanied fear that the street violence may extend to oneself upon 
violating the Keeping It Real rule of minding one’s business.  Arianne, in the following 
exchange, described this fear: 
A: the police used to come around all the time and give them fines and citations not 
to hang on that porch and they’re still there.  The porch gone, now they just stand 
on the corner. 
 
K: Chasing people away, but that didn’t really work.  What other ideas do you have? 
 
A: That’s about it, maybe we could get the police to stand out there all day and run 
‘em. 
 
K: Constant police presence.  Beside the police, other things that could be done?  
Things that average people could do. 
 




A:   They might shoot you. 
 
Her remarks reflected the feeling of many in the study who thought that only formal controls 
were sufficiently powerful to curtail drug-related violence as informal exercises of control may 
invite lethal retaliation.  In an atmosphere of legal cynicism, however, the police were not trusted 
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and residents were left to fend for themselves.  In this scenario the choices were few: retreat from 
public spaces or abandon the neighborhood altogether.  Such retrenchment may have 
emboldened those in the underground economy.   
Some decided to abandon the community altogether, seeking a less-violent neighborhood.  
Charles recalled a time when the neighborhood was ethnically mixed and explained the white-
flight phenomenon through the lens of drugs and violence: 
It used to be pretty much mixed.  But now it’s predominately black.  They used to have 
black and white people back here but it got so bad with the drugs and the, the dog-eat-dog 
mentality that people moved away.  ‘Cause I guess they didn’t want to be in that type of 
environment ‘cause that tends to put you in the frame of mind that you always on the 
defense, you know, you always watching yourself.  
 
This statement managed to capture both the retrenchment, “on the defense” and “always 
watching,” and the subsequent neighborhood abandonment by whites.  Others moved after a 
member of their family became involved in the illicit economy inviting potential for retaliation, 
as did Caroline who said “I have a family member that’s in the neighborhood that actually does 
some things, he does crime or drugs, so I prefer not to be in the neighborhood because of that.”  
When asked to clarify what she meant, Caroline elaborated, “if they want to go after this person 
that’s doing all this crime or whatever, they want to go after the family members also.”  The fear 
she experienced was not the generalized fear of the whites who left, but fear based upon serious 
potential for lethal violence individually directed toward her. Angela’s family did experience 
such retaliation; their neighborhood business, an ABO, was firebombed and burned to the 
ground.  She connected the arson to a neighborhood drug dealer who thought her mother, the 
owner of the ABO, had informed the police about their activity: 
And they got upset with Mama, ‘cause Mama would always come out, I guess sometimes 
during their busier period, and of course she’d make comments under her breath.  Well it 
ended up with them believing Mama was gonna call the police on them, and they got 
tired of what they called “that old…” and they had closed up the bar, they had gone in the 
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thing, and they threw a bottle.  Mama heard a crack of a bottle and inside the thing but 
nothing exploded.  And then, maybe an hour later, she started smelling smoke, she and 
Ricky, and they got up and went outside and saw smoke coming out of the garage.  And it 
ended up with the whole, everything burning down, you know? 
 
Her mother would later decide not to rebuild, thus abandoning her business.    
 Mirroring the retrenchment and abandonment just described, there was a sentiment by 
many that the city itself had abandoned the community too, leaving it to fend for itself.  From her 
office in City Hall one government official described Hollygrove’s abandonment from a birds-
eye perspective: 
But what it looks like to me is that poor communities have fewer services, less support, 
fewer options—I mean, in terms of even trying, if you live in one of these communities 
and you are low-income and you don’t have a vehicle, your options for jobs are 
incredibly limited because of the lack of good transportation.  And so all of that I think 
leads to, you get less service from the city, and there’s less opportunity and more 
opportunity to, I mean more, you know, criminal behavior becomes more of an options 
because it will give you money. 
 
One resident, a senior homeowner who lived in the neighborhood for 45 years, described this in 
similar fashion: 
But it was the idea of the thing that how can someone that’s over these things let, you 
know, this happen by not workin’ on it?  You know what I’m sayin’?  So it’s like 
something’s wrong with this picture, and again it goes back to bein’ unfair because in this 
neighborhood that should not be happenin’.  This should not be happenin’.  So when you 
really look back on life, in a lotta different ways it’s like why certain areas are being 
flooded?  Why are certain areas not bein’ taken care of in a lot of different ways?  With 
the crime and the drugs and all of this stuff, you know?  And I feel that it’s drivin’ the 
people out.  They wanna drive the people out. 
 
Her comments reflected the deep mistrust that many in the community experienced with regard 
to the city.  Some saw their abandonment as conspiracies directed against the neighborhood.  
These included: drugs being intentionally foisted upon the community to profit wealthy residents 
of other neighborhoods, guns being imported by profiteers while agents of formal control turned 
a blind eye, and poor police response to neighborhood violence which was thought to be a 
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strategy to limit it to the neighborhood and keep it away from others.  The mistrust they 
expressed resulted from their long history of structural marginalization and abandonment. 
Both inside and outside the community Hollygrove’s reputation for drug-related violence 
had impacted the perceptions of the community.  The rise of Hollygrove’s illicit economy was 
widely thought to account for most of the lethal violence in the neighborhood, even by drug 
dealers.  The fear of this violence led to retrenchment and abandonment by individuals, 
businesses and the city.  The subsequent void produced an environment in which the illicit 
marketplace could flourish.  Venkatesh (2006) wrote “the underground enables poor 
communities to survive but can lead to their alienation from the wider world.  For groups and 
organizations, as well as individuals, surviving in the ghetto via shady means can result in their 
overall remove from the city.  It is a pernicious cycle” (p. 385).  These words aptly described the 
vicious cycle experienced by those in the study, and formed the basis of the neighborhood’s 
understanding of “why” violent crime occurred.  Equally important, however, was “where” it 
happened, at specific crime hotspots in Hollygrove. 
 
Only When the Store is Open: ABOs and Violent Crime in Hollygrove 
 Although Hollygrove had the reputation as a dangerous neighborhood to those inside and 
outside the community, residents recognized that most violent crime was limited to 
microlocations within the community.  In a 2009 survey conducted by the Policy & Research 
Group and commissioned by AARP, residents were asked to identify corners they would avoid 
because they felt safe or unsafe.  The five worst corners were all associated with alcoholic 
beverage outlets (ABOs). In the words of the 20-something males, “every corner where’s there’s 
a corner store is nine times out of ten dangerous.”  The location considered unsafe by most 
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residents was a two-block section in the middle of the community where both a bar, Big Time 
Tips, and a corner store, the Olive Superette, were located.   
 St. Jean’s (2007) research addressed a limitation of macrosociological studies that 
compared dangerous neighborhoods.  He noted that crime was differentially distributed 
throughout these neighborhoods, some locations inside the community experienced higher crime 
than others.  His study found that “both street drug dealers and robbers in the research site are 
primarily attracted to locations with businesses such as liquor stores, grocery stores, check-
cashing outlets, and fast food restaurants” (p. 5) located near prominent intersections.  Those 
living in Hollygrove understood corner stores and bars to be the most dangerous places in the 
community. 
 The Olive Superette was a corner store located at the corner of Olive and General Ogden 
Streets.  Two blocks away, at the corner of Eagle and Edinburgh Streets, sat Big Time Tips until 
its closure.  Two other ABOs were once located on these blocks as well, Morris Lounge which 
was torched by a drug dealer in retaliation for calling attention to his activities, and the 
Edinburgh Market which wasn’t re-opened after Katrina.  These were spaces understood to 
belong to neighborhood drug dealers.  One of the seniors provided this historical perspective: 
The corner store right there on Edinburgh and General Ogden, that’s where they young 
people, when I first moved back here in ’94, the winos used to sit across the store and 
they could drink their wine and have conversations, ‘cause I was inside the house and I 
could hear them going around the world and back every day, every day.  Well then the 
young people started so I didn’t see them anymore.  So A&P was still in the shopping 
center, so when I went there I saw them sitting on the car, I said, “Y’all don’t be on the 
corner anymore?”  He said, “No, ma’am, no ma’am, we winos, we ain’t no drug dealers 
and we ain’t no drug users, we can’t handle young people so we just moved on out and 
let them have it.”  And that’s when a lot of the disruption started coming into focus. 
 
The two-block section was identified in both this study and the Livable Communities Survey as 
the most dangerous in the community.   
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 Arianne, Robert and Charles lived on those blocks and experienced violence they 
connected to this specific location.  Arianne described the flow of people between the two 
ABOs, “Everybody that hung in the store, like on the corner, when the store closed they would 
go to Big Time Tips.”  She describes a shooting in Big Time Tips the day of her cousin’s funeral, 
a killing which had taken place in Hollygrove: 
I was eighteen I think, it was the day of my cousin’s funeral, he had got killed by the 
duplex and we was around there celebrating for him and two boys had, I guess they had 
been fussing earlier that day or whatever and one of those boys came in there and he 
pointed the gun in there and started shooting.  And he would, the person he was shooting 
at was like in the back by the pool table.  And he came outside and shooting at him and 
they was running back and forth in the barroom shooting at each other.  And the one that 
was already in there, he had got killed and they dragged him from the back of the bar to 
the front of the bar. 
 
Robert lived across the street from Tips.  A former drug dealer, he would spend his days at the 
corner stores selling drugs and then continue into the evening inside the bar, “The bar was closed 
during the daytime so everyone hung on the corner.  When the store closed and Snake came open 
up, everybody moved from this store or this store around the corner and go to the bar.”  He 
recalled the history of the ABO across several owners until its closure: 
In the beginning it was bad, when Big Time Tips used to be called Ghost Town.  The 
guy, well he passed away not, Eli used to own it.  It was called Ghost Town and Ghost 
used to be throwing a lot of concerts down there and it was, that’s when it started to get 
shaky back there, you know what I’m saying?  Just shootings and all that shit right there 
by the bar and it closed down for a minute.  Then this guy, a little guy bought the bar, Bo 
Lee.  He bought it and opened it up and called it Big Time Tips.  And he had a little 
hookup with Q93 (a primarily African American radio station), so every Wednesday 
night Q93 be out there and then everybody just shooting, went and started it again.  Bo 
Lee got incarcerated.  Then Snake bought it and that’s when it just got horrible cut, you 
know, Snake was a good man, you heard?  Snake used to look out for people in the 
neighborhood.  If you needed money, he was a loan shark.  He’d loan you some money, 
just make sure you bring him his money.  He was a good dude, but around that time these 
little youngsters, like I said, they just want to hang in front the bar and they get mad when 
Snake call the police.  People getting shot all under the house next door, you know what 
I’m saying?  Man I can’t count how many people got killed inside that bar, while I was in 




Charles, also a former drug dealer, lived across from the now-closed Edinburgh corner store and 
one block from Big Time Tips.  About 20 years older than Arianne and Robert, he considered the 
closure of Tips and the corner store to be catalytic in ending some of the drug-related violence in 
Hollygrove: 
Well, now Hollygrove is kinda like, like it has cleaned up since the hurricane.  Since the 
hurricane a lot of riff raff and the druggin’ and the drug suppliers, they’re not here now.  
Hollygrove was a hub, they would come from across the river, they would come from all 
over and they would come to Hollygrove and get drugs but since the hurricane that has 
slowed down a whole lot.  Slowed down quite a lot.  The homeowners is kinda getting 
back in control thanks to you and Joe Sherman and the other activists in the 
neighborhood that got sick and tired of this stuff.  They been sick and tired of it but, 
excuse me, didn’t do anything about it.  I‘m so glad that store across the street is closed.  
I am glad, Kevin, I’m so glad that place down there, Big Time Tips is closed.  That 
stopped a whole lotta stuff man, just those two spots stopped a whole lot of chaos in the 
neighborhood.  Right now up on that corner where the grocery store is, that, for some 
reason, and I never saw this in California, but for some reason these neighborhood 
grocery stores they attract the wrong type of people. They attract people that are just non-
productive, they are maybe down on their luck, drugs, you know that’s where, once you 
see a grocery store and they hang out, you know that’s where you can come and get 
drugs, at least find out where to get drugs.  So if they close Henry [Olive Superette], 
‘cause Henry was complaining to me this morning said he’s sick of back here.  If they 
close Henry down the neighborhood is gonna improve greatly ‘cause there’s not gonna be 
a centralized location for you to come buy drugs. 
 
These three respondents echoed the findings of St. Jean that violence was located primarily at 
sites where people gathered and was not evenly distributed throughout the community.  Drug-
related activity occurred at all hours, during the day at the corner stores and during the night at 
the bars.   
On two occasions neighborhood residents were able to temporarily pressure the New 
Orleans Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to rescind the liquor license of Big Time Tips only to 
see it re-open after making changes.  After Katrina the residents worked with the City 
Councilperson and the New Orleans Police Department to permanently close the bar, restricting 
a prominent location for drug-related activity and substantially reducing the drug-related 
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violence described by Arianne, Robert, and Charles.  A high-ranking police officer provided an 
outside perspective on the closure: 
The violence was already really slipping down already, and I really credit the violence 
slipping with the great network in the neighborhood of really, you know, drivin’ some of 
that stuff out.  And then we came back with the icing on the cake of getting rid of Big 
Time Tips, which was kinda like the last anchor spot back there.  You know, you have to 
get rid of anchor spots.  So we knocked off the anchor spot, which was our plan, and then 
we came back in with that organized-crime Rico investigation, swept the last major gang 
problem out of the area.  And now what you have left is just some residual hanger-ons 
that may be not even anchored there but come back there ‘cause that’s the historical base.  
Then we try to attack them as they come in.  But I don’t even, you know, police love to 
take credit for things when they go right, and when they go wrong we love to blame other 
people, you know.  But what I would say—and I’ve said this publicly—is that I attribute 
at least half of the success we’ve had in Hollygrove, not to us, but to the great work of the 
community. 
 
These ABOs were microlocations within Hollygrove, or what the police official termed 
anchors, and served as gathering places in the neighborhood.  Such locations were attractive to 
drug dealers because they drew a specific clientele (St. Jean, 2007).  The closure of Big Time 
Tips, accompanied by the loss of Morris Lounge and the Edinburgh corner store, left only the 
Olive Superette as a gathering place, decreasing the appeal of the location as a crime hotspot.  
The result was a drop in violent crime in this location and a greater perceived sense of safety by 
residents.   
Violent crime was rooted in specific places; in Hollygrove these were places where 
alcoholic beverages were sold.  Not all places within the neighborhood were equally dangerous. 
Because macro-perspectives consider neighborhoods safe or dangerous based upon gross violent 
crime statistics, they had limited power to explain violence at specific locations inside the 
neighborhood.   
Location alone was not sufficient to explain lethal violence in the community, however.  
Equally important to the understanding of the phenomenon were the economic considerations 
153 
 
that undergirded the illicit economy and made it a viable alternative to participation in the formal 
economy.  This is the subject of the next section. 
 
Their Only Funds Was to Sell Drugs: Economic Consideration of Drug-Related Violence 
 Hollygrove’s drug-related violence was rooted in places but it was also rooted in a larger 
structural context.  Wilson (1997) connected it to a neighborhood’s internal organization, 
concluding “The presence of high levels of drug activity in a neighborhood is indicative of 
problems of social organization.  High rates of joblessness triggered other problems in the 
neighborhood that adversely affected social organization, including drug trafficking, crime, and 
gang violence” (p. 59).  Structural limitations faced by Hollygrove residents were similar to 
many African American neighborhoods in New Orleans, noted one city official, including “an 
unemployment rate that is like twice the city’s average, a level of high school attainment that is 
half the city’s average and average incomes that are like 40% lower than the city’s average.”  
These factors were understood to drive the impoverishment of neighborhoods like Hollygrove 
and gave rise to the participation in the illicit economy and its accompanying violence.  In words 
similar to Wilson’s the official concluded “concentrated poverty begets other issues…their 
access to numerous things is different, their access to education, their access to transportation, 
their access to jobs is different, and that has an adverse effect.”  Charles summarized it this way 
‘they were economically impoverished so their only funds was to sell drugs.”  In a neighborhood 
structured by poverty the underground economy may become a viable source of income for those 
limited from participation in the formal economy. 
 Those participating in the study had two views regarding the sale of drugs in the 
community, sometimes expressed simultaneously.  Most understood drug dealing to be an 
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economic necessity for those unable to earn a livable wage in the formal economy.  At the same 
time there was a strong sense that their participation in this part of the illicit economy was 
destructive to those involved and to the community as a whole.   
As noted earlier, most in Hollygrove personally subscribed to prosocial values, even 
those who participated in the sale of drugs.  Unable to find livable-wage jobs in the formal 
economy many succumbed to selling drugs in the neighborhood even though this violated their 
personal values.  Martin described this phenomenon from his perspective: “Like, like, alright I 
done changed my life around so many times but I can’t lie, the Devil keeps sucking me back in 
sometimes and I don’t want to go.  I hate, I hate, like I said yesterday, I hate the person I become 
because I’m not that person.”  Martin’s involvement in the drug-related economy caused 
dissonance, he both hated his choice to sell drugs but felt he had no other viable options.  One of 
the 20-something males described this dilemma: 
It’s like man, I want to be a painter but I don’t know nobody who paint.  Nobody come 
up to me and say, hey that’s cool like.  Where everybody around here selling drugs, 
though, that’s cool, let me go sell some drugs.  And that might be one of the reasons, 
another reason might be that every day you walk out your house, you ain’t got no money 
in your pocket, but that guy do.  He got a car and a house.  And he not even a bad person, 
he’s just selling drugs to take care of his family, so you start to look at it from that 
perspective, like.  You’re not looking at it like, oh I’m messing somebody’s life up and I 
could possibly go to jail, all you thinking about is providing for your family, making sure 
you survive every day.   
 
While recognizing that there are personal and societal ramifications that follow the choice to deal 
drugs, he saw few legitimate options.  Given the lack of viable opportunity in the legal job 
market he resolved the dissonance by separating an action he considered to be immoral, dealing 
drugs, from the quality of the person, “selling drugs to take care of his family.”  The indignity of 
not being able to find good work was resolved by the dignity of caring for one’s family despite 
the clash of values that accompanied it. 
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 A former police official described well the desperate situation faced by many in the 
community, “they’re poor, disorganized families for the most part.  Lots of young men going 
nowhere fast, unfortunately for a lot of reasons: didn’t get an education, they got arrested early 
and often in their life and kind of left them fewer options.”  The options that were available were 
often fast food or service-sector jobs which did not compare to the money that could be made in 
the illicit economy.  This was undignified and demeaning work, contended one of the 20-
something males and was not worth the effort compared to the alternative: 
Nine times out of ten you bout to quit that job because you not making enough money.  
You go stand on the corner you could make a week’s pay, that one day standing out 
there.  Once you see that you like, shit, I ain’t going back to work.  I ain’t worried about 
nobody else hiring me.  If I could, if I sit out here for a week I could probably make like 
$1,000.  I sit out here for another week I could make $2,000, like, it’s just that simple. 
 
Participation in the illicit economy also brought the very real possibility of arrest and felony 
conviction, requiring the potential job applicant to admit to a prior conviction, further lessening 
the chances of finding legitimate employment.  Kobe noted “the drug dealers or the people who 
have been in jail multiple times on different offenses and stuff, they can’t really get a good job 
because of the way things are set up.”  His comment reflected a core tenet of Institutional 
Anomie Theory; barring legitimate means to success attainment people will turn to illegitimate 
means. 
 Despite the potential consequences, participation in the sale of drugs was thought to be 
driven by economic necessity, and thus became a viable pathway to economic attainment in the 
face of structural limitation.  One official in the Mayor’s office noted: 
I suspect that the violence that often accompanies other criminal activity would be 
lessened if people were not engaging in the criminal activity that was largely then driven 
by economics; so if you’re not selling drugs then there’s less chance of you being 
involved in much of the violence that comes along with it.  And the selling of drugs really 




Hollygrove was ringed by fast food outlets, the main source of jobs for those without skills, 
training or adequate transportation, but these were low-wage jobs with minimal benefits.  In 
addition to low wages, fast food and service sector work was associated with low status.  The 20-
something males thought that participation in the underground economy brought both higher pay 
and improved status.  In the following interchange the 20-something males described their 
perceptions of higher pay and social status made possible by selling drugs on the street: 
M1: Why get a job if I know this dude don’t want to hire me?  Gonna put me in the 
back to wash dishes for $7.50. 
 
 M2: Yeah, why break my back for this much money, make this much illegally? 
 
M1: You could work six hours probably, nine times out of ten you work in a fast food 
restaurant.  Start out with probably eight hours, after a couple of months you be 
down to six or five, you broke after that. 
 
M3: Racial profiling is at your job. 
 
M1: You ‘bout to quit. 
 
M2: They give you all these rewards just to keep you there for a while.  Sucks you in, 
it’s like they set up on you so that you can’t leave. 
 
M3: This is truthful stuff, like. 
 
M2: This is a real subject. 
 
M1: Nine times out of ten you ‘bout to quit that job because you not making enough 
money.  Gou go stand on the corner you could make a week’s pay, that one day, 
standing out there. 
 
M3: Couple of hours. 
 
M1: Once you see that 
 
M2: You hooked. 
 
M1: You like, shit, I ain’t going back to work, I ain’t worried about nobody else 
hiring me.  If I could, if I sit out here for a week I could probably make like 





M3: Son, and then, once you really get up there, you could make $1,000 a day, that’s 
when you really don’t want to leave. 
 
M1: Now those dudes knowing they… 
 
M2: They done spoiled themselves to it… 
 
M1: …literally, really making more money than that guy that didn’t want to hire him. 
 
M2: And after that they’re not looking back, a job is nothing to them now. 
 
M3: A job is obsolete to them. 
 
Their perceptions of available options were key to understanding the realities faced by many in 
Hollygrove’s underclass.  Available jobs in the legal economy were perceived to be accompanied 
by low wages, hard work, insufficient hours, racism and lack of control over one’s situation.  In 
contrast the illicit economy afforded higher pay, easier working conditions and the dignity of 
knowing they could make more than the boss who dictated the poor working conditions in the 
formal marketplace.  While prosocial values eschewed the illicit economy, those observing the 
challenges that many in Hollygrove faced could understand its value for those without options in 
the formal economy and thus perceived it to have legitimacy. 
 At the same time there was a strong sentiment widely shared by most in the study that 
this alternative economy was destructive to individuals involved and to the community as a 
whole.  Most in Hollygrove ascribed to the value of hard work and delayed gratification.  The 
fast and easy money that accompanied the drug-market were thought to be an illegitimate 
substitute for a longer-term perspective which prioritized success via sanctioned pathways.  
Charles summed these understandings: 
I was raised to have a different mindset from the people that I see back here now.  The 
older people that were here 30, 40, 50 years ago, they were raised to get up and got to 
work, and if you don’t go to work, go to school, and if you don’t go to school, go into the 
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military.  They were raised to be productive with their life, do something with their life, 
don’t just lay around. 
 
He highlighted three pathways for deferred accomplishment: jobs, education, and the military.  
The increasing complexity of the job market often requires an education beyond high school.  A 
career in the military required one to complete high school.  Thus education, at least to high 
school graduation, was key to success in the formal marketplace.  Louisiana’s public schools 
ranked 44th in the nation (Editorial Projects in Education, 2015) and Orleans Parish Schools 
underperformed 62.5% of them (Sims & Rossmeier, 2015).  The educational pathways leading to 
jobs in the formal economy or the military were difficult for students attending schools ranked 
among the worst in the nation. 
Some observed that the impact of poor quality schools began early in one’s academic 
career and then continued to negatively influence opportunity throughout the lifespan.  One 
governmental official raised in the community thought this realization began as early as junior 
high: 
But there aren’t that many opportunities out there.  Why?  Because you need to be able to 
read and write.  And guess what?  Tom and Jane don’t want to read and write because 
Tom and Jane decided that when they got to junior high school they did better selling 
crack on the corner than going to school.  So now all the time and all Jane knows is to 
either sell crack or sell themselves.  And so now they in that spiral of crime and that’s 
what happens. 
 
The choice of more immediate rewards of the underground economy, thought to emerge at an 
early age, then had repercussions throughout one’s life.  Arianne addressed her perception of the 
long-term consequences of this decision, stating “they be starting young, like 17 or 16 selling 
drugs and they’ll do it like till they’re 40 or 50 and don’t have no money and still living in 
Hollygrove, they ain’t got no car, they be riding around on the bike.”  In additions to the 
impaired long-term prospects that she highlighted, others recognized the negative impacts of the 
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illicit economy on Hollygrove’s reputation, as expressed by William, “I guess they figured 
selling drugs is the way out, but selling drugs is not good for the community.”   
 While the illicit economy appeared to be a viable path to economic security, it had a 
significant downside.  On one side of the ledger was the myth that drug sales were lucrative.  
Bourgois (2010) found that while “dealers tend to brag to outsiders and to themselves about how 
much money they make each night…their income is almost never as consistently high as they 
report it to be” (p. 91).  According to his calculations drug dealers made “slightly less than 
double the minimum wage” (p. 92).  On the other side of the ledger were the costs of 
participation.  As Arianne and Wilson both noted, the long-term prospects were grim.  For 
Wilson the choice brought increasing marginality as job-related prospects were diminished via 
loss of skills and connections to the workforce, while for Arianne it limited one to economic 
marginality and relegation to a peripheral existence in the neighborhood.  The possibility of 
lethal violence was also enhanced, especially as one progressed through the hierarchy toward 
Hood Star status.  Finally, the illegal nature of the marketplace carried with it the possibility that 
dealers would come to the attention of both formal and informal controls, the subject of this 
chapter’s final section. 
 
More like an Occupying Force: Formal and Informal Controls in Hollygrove 
 Hollygrove residents expressed mixed feelings toward the police.  At the time of Brandon 
Aggison’s death there was widespread distrust of the NOPD.  The police exhibited disdain for 
the community.  Moore (2010) noted that “the NOPD had a distinct institutional culture that 
emphasized an ‘us versus them’ attitude toward the communities in which they served,” one 
“infused with obvious anti-black attitudes and feelings” (p.7). The environment of mutual 
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hostility and distrust fostered an environment in which both the subculture and the underground 
economy could thrive.  Moore (2010) wrote “although black residents wanted the drugs out of 
their community, they wanted the police out as well” (p. 209).  In their marginalized condition 
residents had to choose between the worst of two ills affecting their neighborhood. 
After Katrina, Hollygrove’s attitudes toward the police appeared to change.  In May of 
2007, AARP selected Hollygrove as a pilot neighborhood for their Livable Communities project.  
An initial phase of the project was an eight-week leadership training course during which 
residents began to identify key issues of concern to the community.  One of the four areas these 
leaders desired to address was violent crime.  Deeply impacted by Katrina in August, 2005, these 
leaders were primarily homeowners with deep ties in the community that led them to return from 
evacuation earlier than others.  Many of them were elderly, which was a key selling point for 
AARP.  All of them were in some phase of rebuilding their homes and lives, and were united in a 
desire to see the community rebuilt better, safer than before the storm.  The training proved to be 
a major turning point in the community’s differentiation between crime prevention and law 
enforcement. 
 Prior to the training, the community was heavily focused on police response times, the 
need for a police substation, why the police had not addressed the pre-Katrina practice of open 
drug sales on street corners, and the issue of racial profiling.  A deeply frustrated community 
experienced the police force as their adversaries and felt vulnerable in a community that had 
become notorious for violent crime. The Second District of the New Orleans Police Department 
(NOPD) was frequently stonewalled in their attempts to solve the crimes by a community deeply 
distrustful of them.  A police official described the relationship at the time, “we were probably 
more perceived as an occupying army than people back there trying to help.” 
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 As the community’s view of crime shifted from police-centered and reactionary, to 
community-centered and preventative, a simultaneous shift in their view of the police began to 
occur.  The police became community partners, willing to work cooperatively in a variety of 
ways, even to the point of having their ideas of effective crime prevention challenged upon 
occasion and to provide a representative at the community crime meetings.  This change marked 
a turning point from attitudes of mistrust and cynicism toward formal control agents, to 
cooperation and empowerment.  It also marked a dramatic change of attitude for those that 
previously considered themselves victims of Hollygrove’s drug wars. 
 Alexander (2012) contended that the War on Drugs in America had been differentially 
waged in African American neighborhoods like Hollygrove.   
From the outset, the drug war could have been waged primarily in 
overwhelmingly white suburbs or on college campuses.  SWAT teams could have 
rappelled from helicopters in gate suburban communities and raided the homes of high 
school lacrosse players known for hosting coke and ecstasy parties after their games.  The 
police could have seized televisions, furniture, and cash from fraternity houses based on 
an anonymous tip that a few joints or a stash of cocaine could be found hidden in 
someone’s dresser drawer.  Suburban homemakers could have been placed under 
surveillance and subjected to undercover operations designed to catch them violating 
laws regulating the use and sale of prescription “uppers.”  All of this could have 
happened as a matter of routine in white communities, but it did not. 
Instead, when police go looking for drugs, they look in the ‘hood.  Tactics that 
would be political suicide in an upscale white suburb are not even newsworthy in poor 
black and brown communities.  So long as mass drug arrests are concentrated in 
impoverished urban areas, police chiefs have little reason to fear a political backlash, no 
matter how aggressive and warlike the efforts may be (p. 124). 
 
While those engaged in the sale of drugs recognized this as a negative side-effect of their career 
pathway, law-abiding residents were also victims.  Innocent residents were caught in what a 
former police chief termed “dragnet mode,” where a community pastor was pulled over for an 
inoperative turn signal, one of the 20-somethings was searched for wearing a white t-shirt and 
having dreadlocks, and this researcher was patted down for talking to a neighborhood friend.  
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The result was that residents did not view agents of formal control as allies but rather as an 
occupying force. 
 One of the neighborhood seniors active in the Livable Communities Project, recalled a 
time before the alliance with the NOPD as a period when “our police department wasn’t worth 
shit ‘cause they had a whole bunch of crooks in the police department.  They had a whole bunch 
of rednecks in the police department.”  Some, like Daneta, thought the NOPD had misplaced 
priorities, “I mean they’re out giving tickets every day, but where y’all really need to be is where 
people getting hurt.”  Others, like Kobe, cast the police assigned to the neighborhood in a 
nefarious light, “Hollygrove doesn’t have, I guess you would say, cops who, who would uh, who 
pretty much aren’t corrupt I would say, who aren’t just randomly stopping people or some of the 
cops might even be in drug gangs or you know, stuff like that.”  Innocent bystanders caught up in 
the dragnet mode became angry and oppositional, as did one of the 20-somethings who said, 
“they don’t care about me, f them too.”  In this climate formal control agents were seen as the 
enemy, rather than allies seeking to enhance public safety.  Mistrust of the police stymied efforts 
to interdict participants in the illicit economy with the result of enhancing the likelihood that the 
sale of drugs and its accompanying violence could flourish. 
 In recent years the NOPD recognized this dynamic and made efforts to engage the 
community.  A former police chief commented on this change: 
If you tie yourself closely to what a community is, they’ll tell you what their quality of 
life problems are.  And if you’re willing to turn that decision over to the neighborhood, 
which is essentially community policing at some level, then whatever it is you choose to 
enforce with the neighborhood support, you’re never gonna run into a problem.  You’re 
not going to run into the neighborhood turning against you.  You won’t be perceived as 
an occupying force. 
 
Starting in 2009, when the Hollygrove Livable Communities Project was introduced, the NOPD 
began engaging the community in a purposeful way: attending community meetings, 
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implementing an anonymous crime-reporting hot sheet, and developing relationships with 
community leaders.  John, the senior community activist who called policemen crooks and 
rednecks, changed his perspective in response.  When asked how to make the neighborhood safe 
he remarked: 
Well, you identify who’s causin’ the problems in the neighborhood.  That’s who we deal 
with, the guy who’s doing’ all the killin’.  And that really disrupted.  Then you get the 
authorities to work with you.  And you can make a big difference in what’ going on. 
 
His comments reflected a neighborhood change in strategy. Rather than being victims of both the 
drug dealers and the NOPD, residents began to engage the police as allies in efforts to curtail 
drug-related violence, via a strategy of prevention as opposed to response.  This strategy led to 
the closure of Big Time Tips, one of the neighborhood’s violent crime hot spots, resulting in a 
reduction in neighborhood violence. 
 Related to this was a newfound understanding of the role of residents as the frontline of 
violence prevention.  When asked for her perspective about why shootings occurred, Zora 
remarked “People allow them to do stuff, and things are allowed to happen,” a comment on the 
neighborhood’s lack of collective efficacy.  Asked to elaborate, she responded: 
K: You said the phrase “people allow them to.”  Talk more about that.   
 
Z: Yeah, the person that own the store.  Or the person or people that live in that area, 
you know, because they’re afraid to say anything.  So it’s allowin’ things to 
happen.  We complain, but we still allow. 
 
She later remarked, “I’d rather stand up for something good and lose my life behind it than sit by 
and, you know, let everything happen.  You’re gonna lose your life to the violence anyway at 
some point, you know.”  Her comments reflected how informal neighborhood controls could the 
leading edge of efforts to curtail drug-related violence in Hollygrove.  An elected official, who 
took office after the Hollygrove Livable Community’s project was implemented, stated: 
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I believe that neighbors banding together, whether it’s, you know, called Neighborhood 
Watch, whether it’s called, whether it’s Soul Steppers [a program where Hollygrove 
seniors walked for exercise through violent crime hot spots].  There was a significant 
drop in crime when they were walking regularly.  You know, I believe that neighbors 
banding together and being watchful and reporting criminal activity, that lets the police 
know that, you know, people are watching them and people care about the neighborhood, 
people are watching them and so they need to perform.   
 
These voices reflected change that occurred as the neighborhood shifted from dependence upon 
the police as the sole agents of crime prevention to a recognition that prevention began at the 
neighborhood level.   
Exercising collective efficacy required political capital.  Standing up to drug dealers was 
not easy, especially when residents feared that an agencies of formal control would not protect 
them from retaliatory violence.  AARP’s participation in the Hollygrove Livable Communities 
Project brought influence, helping residents to engage city agencies in a way that previously was 
lacking.  The result of this enhanced political capital was an empowered citizenry willing to take 
risks to intervene, recognizing the police as allies rather than adversaries.  The subsequent 
reduction in drug-related homicides served to validate these efforts, thus bolstering the 
perception that informal controls could be an effective component of neighborhood to combat 
the violence that accompanied Hollygrove’s illicit economy. 
 
Summary 
 Perceptions of the drug-related economy in Hollygrove were mixed.  Most in Hollygrove 
recognized that an increasingly complex job market, combined with poor educational 
preparation, racism, underdeveloped soft skills, limited transportation options, lack of social 
capital and a dearth of mentors had created an environment with limited options for livable wage 
jobs.  In this context, many both understood why the illicit economy existed and empathized with 
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those who chose this economic pathway.  This empathy had limits, however, as residents blamed 
it for the bulk of neighborhood violence while understanding that other options were available to 
those engaged in the sale of illegal substances.  Even those with a history of drug dealing 
recognized their role in the violence that tarnished the neighborhood’s reputation and eroded the 
positive social networks that marked Hollygrove’s past. 
 Venkatesh (2006) concluded his study of Chicago’s underground economy by noting that 
structure and agency are interwoven in a complex tangle.  Bourgois (2010) ended his study of 
New York City crack dealers by noting that violence which would be more appropriately 
directed “against their structural oppressors” (p. 326) was enacted interpersonally and locally.  
Residents of Hollygrove also had difficulty disentangling structure and agency.  They recognized 
the structural elements that produced the conditions giving rise to the illicit economy and the 
accompanying marginalization, and some even concluded that drugs and violence were 
intentionally foisted upon their community.  The proscription against violence toward whites was 
an important structural element as well, one that largely maintained violence within Hollygrove’s 
boundaries.  At the same time residents recognized the personal and corporate toll the drug 
economy exacted in the community and experienced anger toward these agents of community 
destruction.  The tension between structure and agency found in the work of Venkatesh and 
Bourgois was one reflected in the voices of the community. Bourgois contended that the violence 
was misplaced, directed into the neighborhood rather than toward the structures that maintain it 
there.  If, as Bourgois concluded, the violence was to be appropriately directed toward those in 




 Two factors prevented this from occurring.  First, neighborhood perceptions that drug-
related crime was largely limited to hot spots within the neighborhood allowed those living away 
from them to distance themselves from it.  Most considered their street and their neighbors to be 
safe and violent crime to be occurring at gathering places where alcohol was sold and drugs were 
distributed.  While violence impacted the entire neighborhood, this impact may seem indirect 
when it is bounded and site-specific.  Just as more powerful neighborhoods view Hollygrove as a 
dangerous neighborhood to be contained and avoided, residents of Hollygrove perceived drug-
related violence to be a phenomenon situated elsewhere, albeit in their own neighborhood.  
Second, residents still maintained their fundamental confidence in the primacy of the formal 
marketplace and the sanctioned pathways to participation in it.  This was true even for those 
interviewed with experience in the illicit economy.  This confidence may have been bolstered by 
a recent upsurge in political capital brought about by collective action.  The neighborhood had a 
new public school, a new community center, new homes, an improved park, and numerous 
innovative neighborhood-improvement projects while simultaneously experiencing deepening 
relationships with political decision-makers like the City Councilperson, the NOPD Second 
District Commander, and even the mayor.  These changes appeared to have lessened cynicism 
while improving trust in the efficacy of participation in mainstream, sanctioned routes to success. 
 In addition to perceiving violence as occurring elsewhere, Hollygrove residents used 
another distancing strategy: projection.  They perceived that much of the violence was imported 
by others coming to the neighborhood who did not share their values.  This led them to distrust 
outsiders who were widely considered to be the source of many of the social ills they 




Chapter 9: Findings 
Strangers in the Neighborhood: Hollygrove’s Views of Outsiders 
 
 Hollygrove’s long history of abandonment by the power structures of the city created a 
climate in which residents concluded they must fend for themselves.  The cynicism they 
experienced led to a perceived need to differentiate between those who were “from” the 
neighborhood and those who were not.  This became an important facet of maintaining 
neighborhood order and safety.  On one hand the ability to distinguish between insiders and 
outsiders allowed the neighborhood to more readily differentiate between safe people and 
troublemakers.  On the other it constricted opportunities for an influx of new people and ideas 
that could facilitate opportunity.  The boundaries were most rigid when the neighborhood 
experienced high levels of marginalization; they became more diffuse as the community 
experienced an increase in social capital.  Residents expressed tension between the need to 
protect their neighborhood against invaders with bad intentions and the need for those who could 
bring much-needed resources to help them emerge from their marginalized condition.  
 Wacquant (2008) defined the struggle Hollygrove residents faced, “it is the collapse of 
public institutions, resulting from state policies of urban abandonment and leading to the punitive 
containment of the black (sub-)proletariat, that emerges as the most potent and most distinctive 
cause of the entrenched marginality in the American metropolis” (pp. 3-4).  As described earlier, 
Hollygrove residents had developed an “us versus them” mentality regarding formal power 
structures such as the police and city government.  Although improvements had occurred in 
recent years, distrust of outsiders lingered.  Two NOPD officials described law enforcement’s 
relationship with the community as an “occupying force.”  One white city government leader, 
describing a potential rebuilding project in the neighborhood, tearfully recognized “the pain for 
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the first time of black people who have lived a life of being lied to, to the point that they would 
insist on leaving an unusable community center in place, you know, because they thought the 
dollars to replace it would be stolen from them.”  The mistrust had deep historical roots and was 
based upon cynicism developed in the face of structural and institutional neglect. 
 The distrust was not limited to formal institutions; it extended to those entering the 
neighborhood who did not share residents’ concern for the community. Residents perceived a 
need to defend themselves against individuals who did not care for their property or who caused 
violence.  This became especially pronounced in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
The widespread devastation of the community’s housing stock led to significant abandonment by 
those who were evacuated and decided not to return.  Tameka, a longstanding resident and 
middle-class homeowner, told me that “a lot of people from before didn’t return but a lot of new 
families, new people are coming to the neighborhood.”   This influx of new residents brought 
those who, according to Dr. T “don’t seem as concerned for the community as the older senior 
citizens do.”  There was a sense, expressed by most, that these newcomers cared less about the 
safety and well-being of the neighborhood and thus were not to be trusted.  
 There were two sub-themes that emerged from the data.  The first was concern about 
“invaders” and a need to defend the community from those that did not share a positive interest 
in Hollygrove’s well-being.  The second was mistrust directed at outsiders who brought new 
ideas for neighborhood improvement.  While invaders were universally perceived as negative, 
changers received a mixed review, especially in light of positive developments that occurred in 





People from Outside the Neighborhood: Resident Negative Perceptions of Invaders 
 Hollygrove residents categorized the tension between insiders and outsiders in two ways. 
The first was between stable homeowners and newer, more transient renters. The second was 
between long-term residents and those they considered to have come to the neighborhood to 
cause harm.   Tameka was a 40-something homeowner and noted that danger was connected to 
renters who were not acclimated to the neighborhood’s mores: 
I would have to say that the areas that are more dangerous probably are the people who 
are renters.  The few people that you have back here that own their home, I’m thinking 
they’re the safer areas, like closer to Carrollton and closer to Earhart.  I probably would 
have to say that those people are renters, haven’t lived in the neighborhood that long like 
some of us have.  And you know, it goes back to the same thing, the parents start out on 
Section 8 or whatever and the children kinda follow in their footsteps because they think 
that that’s okay and that’s the way it should be. 
 
Other homeowners, especially those with longevity in the neighborhood, also expressed 
concern about an influx of new renters in the community, many coming from the public housing 
complexes that were closed, razed and rebuilt after Katrina.  Gardner, Irwin and Peterson (2009) 
found the federal government’s HOPE VI program had begun to enact “highly punitive policies 
to ‘manage’ people who remained in public housing, including a community service requirement 
and a ‘one strike and you’re out’ policy that set stern rules on residents’ behavior” (p. 104). 
Some Hollygrove residents attributed the influx of new renters to these policies which displaced 
those who didn’t meet the behavioral requirements to neighborhoods like Hollygrove.  In the 
following exchange of seniors from a focus group the members expressed this sentiment: 
S1:  Single parents and I don’t know what all, but these are places that they brought 
people from other areas and put them back there, there are times when they have 
parties and um, and they have all this loud music, oh 10 or 11 o’clock at night and 
all like that and my neighbors say, “Oh this is not a project, this is my home,” and 
she called and reported and I haven’t heard that noise since then.  So it’s the 





S2:  My cousin live in Hollygrove and my 7-year-old, have a party for my 7-year-old 
by my cousin house, so all the rest of the kids they know my (indistinguishable) 
and they having a party here because they can’t have it where they live in… 
 
 S3: (interrupting) in those new projects. 
 
S2: (resuming) in the new projects, they cannot have it.  So if your cousin live in 
Hollygrove but she say, “Oh, you can come and have a party in the yard.”  So 
people migrate to the party.  And when they have a children party it’s an adult 
party anyway.  So they goes to 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning, although the 
children are asleep somewhere.  Next time it might be downtown, somebody’s 
daughter having a birthday party but they can’t have it in the project ‘cause they 
knew they’d get put out. 
 
Hollygrove residents understood these residents to have different standards of behavior, 
something homeowners considered disruptive to the quality-of-life in Hollygrove and a precursor 
to trouble.  Eldridge, a 20-something homeowner, attributed the danger in certain areas of 
Hollygrove to transient renters:  
Well, a lot of that has to do with, it’s just a certain types of people that live in those areas.  
A lot of people rent properties and stuff like that and it’s a lot of people that move in and 
out, in and out.  Like in this neighborhood (noting the section where he lives) it’s not too 
many people that move in and out.  I think the only person that moved in is on that, I 
think a duplex on the corner and they’ve been there a few years.  I think when you 
constantly have different people you don’t know what kind of element you adding into 
that community and I think it’s like lower income people that’s poor and they’ll be more 
likely if there’s so many people living in one household it’s a higher chance of the wrong 
person, the wrong type of person.  You know you got some people have like 10, 15 
people living in one house. 
 
Renters with a longer history in the neighborhood expressed similar opinions.  Caroline, a long-
time renter in the community, shared the homeowners’ perceptions connecting danger to newer 
residents.  Despite Hollygrove’s reduction in violent crime, she said “it feels more dangerous 
because the people that is doing the crime, I don’t know the people,” adding “so I don’t want to 
stay anywhere where the neighborhood has a lot of new people.  I know the elderly people that 
stay back here but they got a lot of new people that I don’t know and that’s what I’m afraid of 
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and why I wouldn’t stay back here.”  While she continued to work at a Hollygrove community 
center, her fear of outsiders led her to live outside the neighborhood.   
 Renters, however, were not the sole cause of danger in the minds of Hollygrove residents.  
Many thought outsiders intentionally came to the neighborhood to cause problems.  Residents 
mentioned three problematic things that outsiders were thought to bring into into the 
neighborhood: guns, drugs, and visitors to neighborhood ABOs.   
 Several interviewees presumed the guns in the community were being imported by 
outsiders.  Claude, a senior homeowner who lived in Hollygrove most of his life asked, “Where 
the hell they getting all these goddamn guns from?”  One of the community leaders, a 40-
something director of a nonprofit agency, lamented the widespread availability of guns, 
especially in the hands of younger people: 
I cannot understand for the life of me where are all the guns and ammunition coming 
from?  If we’re talking about 14 to 18 year olds, where are they getting these weapons?  
How are there so many weapons on the street, and then, not to just have the weapons but 
to continually get ammunition for em?  Where is this stuff coming from?  I, that’s not, 
how you just get that?  Constantly.  And we poor.  So, bullets are not cheap, where, 
where I don’t get it. 
 
In 1998 a former Mayor of New Orleans, Marc Morial, lost a high profile lawsuit against 
gun manufacturers for making guns too easily available.  One of the seniors recalled that effort, 
explaining that the loss had long-term implications for the safety of communities like 
Hollygrove: 
So you gotta remember, you’ve had drug addicts in the community forever, however in 
more recent years not only did the drugs come in but guns came in.  As poor black people 
we have not the means for getting in the guns and drugs.  So somebody is financing the 
guns coming into our neighborhood and the drugs and it’s not us.  And they’ve got our 
children with the guns and the drugs, with the violence, you see.  And Marc Morial tried 
to see if he could have some legislation about not having the guns or going after the gun 
manufacturers.  Well as you know there’s a very strong gun lobby that prevents this.  And 
not only do we have this here but you can go around to all the urban areas in this country 
and you have this violence, this shooting of people on a regular basis.  I don’t know why 
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you’d ever let 30 people a day get killed by gun violence and that’s a big upcry when we 
have an unfortunate police officer because someone didn’t frisk somebody properly.  You 
had this poor girl that was shot, she wasn’t the intended victim but a bullet doesn’t know 
who’s the intended victim and who isn’t, you see.  So part of it goes to the gun 
manufacturers and the gun lobby and of course they say the second amendment right, the 
right to bear arms. 
 
The 20-something males knew how and where to buy a gun as well as the purchase price, 
$100 for someone familiar to the seller and $250 for a stranger.  Purchased legally the cost of a 
firearm was twice that amount.  Since there were no gun shops in Hollygrove residents thought 
that guns were imported to the neighborhood by outsiders who profit from their sales.  One 
community leader thought that little was being done to trace the source of these guns, implying 
that gun violence in Hollygrove was of little concern to agents of formal control:  
we make guns, we gotta track em, you know?  It’s just crazy.  Ammunition is tracked, it 
has tracking numbers on them and all that stuff.  So, how do we get it?  Fourteen year 
olds carrying guns, really?  Had to come from somewhere.   
 
  Law enforcement officials and residents both stated that neighborhood gun violence was 
linked to outsiders entering the community to both purchase and sell drugs. One senior, 
commenting on this, stated “I think it’s the people who don’t live in this neighborhood who 
come and conduct their business in this neighborhood and when it goes wrong they’re not 
interconnected with over the river because it happened over here.  You go back over the river 
and the, someplace else.”  These words reflected an understanding that outsiders brought guns 
and drugs in the neighborhood, benefitted from the profits but escaped culpability for the violent 
neighborhood results.  
In addition to the widespread availability of guns as a source of violence, residents also 
connected violence to outsiders who came to the neighborhood to purchase drugs.  One senior 
described drug deals happening across the street from her home, “when I was living in the front 
of my house, my kitchen was right there on Gen. Ogden, you would be surprised at how many 
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white people come back here, make their transaction and go back to their office.”  A former 
neighborhood drug dealer described this from the perspective of the seller: 
They got a bunch of drug dealers out here hanging.  He has his own clientele.  And 
everybody be dealing with different people from different neighborhoods.  I don’t sell to 
just people in my neighborhood, I sell to people outside the neighborhood, so when you 
call me, well whatcha need?  Where you at?  I’m on Forshey Street.  So they got people 
from other neighborhoods coming back to come score so they know, where it’s at.  So if 
they want to come in there and do you something, they know where you at.  
 
Even law enforcement officials acknowledged this as one police officer state, “You have some 
great people back there, a lot of great people, but you also have some really violent people that 
are still either anchored back there or, ‘cause of whatever reason, have left the neighborhood and 
they no longer live there but historically have done their violence there, they have trafficked in 
narcotics there, and they still come back to that area to commit those crimes.”  Many attributed 
the supply, sales and purchase of drugs to outsiders.  When violence erupted it differentially 
impacted the residents; the outsiders could leave while the residents remained to absorb both the 
impact of the violence and the enduring reputation of the neighborhood as a dangerous place.    
 Residents stated that violence related to guns and drugs was more prevalent at 
neighborhood ABOs.  The flashpoint for much of the neighbors’ concern was a two block stretch 
of the neighborhood where most of the drugs were sold and where a significant amount of gun 
violence occurred.  Several singled out Big Time Tips, a bar located in that area, as an especially 
dangerous place where outsiders would gather.  Tips had a long history in the neighborhood as a 
family-owned gathering place but in recent years it changed ownership and was managed by 
outsiders who were not thought to share the community’s concern for the neighborhood.  Charles 
lived on the same block as the bar and was impacted by the escalating violence that took place 
there.  He recounted its demise: 
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These new people come back here, you don’t even know ‘em.  Before the hurricane, it 
was really bad.  They done got completely out of hand. They always had drugs back here 
but it wasn’t centralized, it wasn’t rampant.  But it got to the point where they had Big 
Time Tips, before that used to be Margie’s Bar, on that corner, on the corner of Eagle and 
Olive, Eagle and Edinburgh, that was Ms. Margie’s Bar.  Harry Valley was the name, that 
was way back, every now and then you’d have a couple of skirmishes but you didn’t have 
all that killing and all that dope.  Everything was OK, was low profile.  You really didn’t 
hear too much about it.  But when Eli, they called him Ghost and that’s how they came 
up with the name Ghost Town.  Eli, when he got the place, they started letting all the 
young people come back here, they’d come from all over, everywhere. 
 
His explanation for violence was the presence of youth from other neighborhoods.  Angela lived 
on the same block, across the street from Tips.  She stated that the recent reduction of violence 
occurred when the bar was shuttered by neighborhood activists: 
When the bar shut down, there was that congregation of people weren’t coming there. 
You didn’t have an influx from all the different areas ‘cause it was a very popular bar 
‘cause you can be there and participate in all kinds of activity and you weren’t being shut 
down from it.  You had an inside scoop and there was always somebody from outside, 
“Hey man, here comes the police” and informs somebody.  And things would cool down, 
calm down, flush down, whatever, you know?  So you didn’t have people just coming in 
the neighborhood any more like that, certainly not that time of night.  So that 
automatically changed the area. 
 
In her recollection, the bar had become a staging area for drug sales by and to outsiders.  The 
closure of the ABO meant that outsiders were no longer coming into the neighborhood at that 
location to participate in the illicit economy which she surmised was organized specifically 
around Tips.   
 These respondents considered outsiders, rather than Hollygrove residents, to be as 
important as location in their understanding of neighborhood violence.  While drug use and sales 
had a long history in Hollygrove, residents understood violence to occur when people from 
outside the neighborhood became involved.  This hinted at collective efficacy, as neighbors saw 
those with a stake in the neighborhood, even when involved in the illicit economy, as less likely 
to engage in violence inside the community.  Outsiders, on the other hand, were not thought to 
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have a stake in the neighborhood, bringing guns, drugs and violence, then escaping to other 
places and avoiding the ill effects their actions were perceived to cause.   
 The view of outsiders as primary agents of neighborhood violence was interesting.  
Several of the participants in the study acknowledged participating in violence so it was apparent 
that outsiders were not the sole cause of it.  There appeared to be two reasons for this.  First, 
residents differentiated between the motivations of those engaged in the subculture and violence 
of the underground economy, attributing insider involvement to economic necessity and outsider 
involvement to predatory motives.  Second, resident desire to defend their neighborhood required 
an ability to define who belonged and who didn’t.  When formal controls did not serve the 
neighborhood adequately, neighborhood boundaries became more rigid and residents saw 
outsiders as the primary threat to community safety. 
 
We’re Gonna Fight That: Outsiders as Agents of Change.   
The distrust of outsiders was not limited to those engaged in the illicit economy but 
included those who wanted to impose new ideas for neighborhood change.  Hollygrove residents 
resisted change, mistrusting outside interventions that could lessen their tenuous hold on control 
of their own neighborhood.  One example of this was mentioned earlier in the comments of a 
government leader citing the seniors’ fear of razing a long-neglected community center due to 
concern that the money would be stolen and the building project abandoned.  Others thought that 
neighborhood violence was related to outsiders who profited from their misfortune.  One resident 
even suspected that a plot was underway to devalue property values in an effort to reclaim 
valuable land strategically located in the center of the city: 
I think, I think people are awake at night when we’re sleepin’ and tryin’ to think about 
OK, what can we do to change the construction or whatever you would call it within an 
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area.  And Earhart, when I was in Booker Washington in 1965-66, that Earhart 
Expressway was thought about, and it was many years ago.  I’ve been out of school 50 
years and that Earhart Expressway was thought about back then.  There were, blueprints, 
on that bein’ done.  The connection was supposed to be Earhart to the Interstate, so they 
need this land.  And now we’re still talkin’ about the railroad comin’ from Metairie here.  
It’s all in the plan.  And we don’t know when the plan gonna go through, but it’s gonna 
go through or it planned to go through, but we’re gonna fight that. 
 
Resistance to change in Hollygrove reflected the historical lack of political capital and the 
accompanying powerlessness that residents experienced.  Residents regarded change agents with 
mistrust in light of years of community neglect by those in positions of power.  Thus outsiders 
with ideas for neighborhood improvement were met with resistance and suspicion.  At the same 
time change was needed for neighborhood improvement, especially changes that led to violence 
reduction. 
 Since Hurricane Katrina many outsiders relocated to the community.  Some brought ideas 
for community improvement but thought their ideas were being resisted.  One community leader 
from the focus group, an African American woman in her 60s who purchased a home in 
Hollygrove and has been active in the community, expressed a sense of frustration with this 
dynamic: 
When, post-Katrina, when we sat around downstairs and talked about the history and how 
many years you’ve lived here, it was a real sense of I didn’t belong here because, for, at 
the time I didn’t even live in Hollygrove.  I represented somebody from the outside.  I 
guess more prominent for white folks, but it’s not just white folks, it’s other people and 
that represents change and when you talk, when we do, used to do surveys and so forth, 
people could see no, what’s the point?  There’s no sense of need for growth, I don’t want 
to say there’s no sense of need, but there’s no urgent feeling for we need to get better, do 
things differently, things are fine just the way they are.   
 
  
Despite having worked in the neighborhood for 15 years, she experienced resistance and 
attributed this to her status as an outsider.  She reflected upon her experience of the cynicism of 
the community toward change efforts, noting that residents resist based upon their perceptions 
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that such efforts in the past have not resulted in substantive improvement.  Residents were both 
weary and wary of novelty.   
 The resistance toward outside agents of change appeared to be lessening, however.  The 
same community leader would later reflect on new developments in the neighborhood imported 
by outsiders that were effective in improving the community and brought an element of hope: 
I think post-Katrina so many positive things happened.  Not everybody in the 
neighborhood got involved in change, making things better but I think almost everybody 
was impacted by the people that were involved.  What we did with the AARP and even 
the Hollygrove Market and all of that, the seniors, all of those things were small and 
somewhat connected and involved a handful of people, it did not involve the whole 
neighborhood.  But you can’t say how directly they were influenced except that it 
changed the atmosphere in the neighborhood.  I think the threat, that fear of outsiders 
coming in, began to dissipate and the resistance to change lessened, I think everybody 
actually did, many people, the majority of people really did have concern about crime. 
And we did that thing, we’re going to reduce crime and it, for the first time people said, 
“Yeah, you know, something could happen.”   
 
A police official also noticed the changes brought by outsiders: 
The farmer’s market back there is great, which is bringing different people back to the 
community, bringing people from outside.  I’ve even gone there to get eggs before.  So 
you know it brings outside people into the community.  That’s great—you can’t even put 
a price tag on it because it’s a neighborhood that in the ‘90s anybody would have been 
scared to go in.  And now you have people, ‘cause of the farmer’s market, that are not 
from Hollygrove and maybe not even from New Orleans—maybe they’re from Jefferson 
Parish—that traditionally would have been, “I would never go to New Orleans,” scared to 
come into the city.  And the only way they’d even come into New Orleans is if they’re 
drivin’ on the interstate and they just keep goin’, now coming to the farmer’s market on a 
regular basis to buy things.  When I’ve gone there, I’ve seen people from all over the city.  
And I think that’s great because it makes the neighborhood almost like a normal 
neighborhood now.  And somebody who would’ve said before, “I’ll never live back 
there” now would maybe even consider movin’ back in there… 
 
Recent neighborhood changes brought increased political and social capital and an improved 
neighborhood reputation.  This may explain some of the reduced resistance toward outside 
influences.  Dr. T explained the change in attitude by opining, “As more and more people come 
in and not only move into the community, embrace the community, and care for the community, 
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change can happen.”  Positive developments in the neighborhood occurred when outsiders were 
allowed to collaborate with the community.  As the neighborhood’s boundaries became less rigid 
and defended it allowed the neighborhood to experience more political and social capital, thus 
helping the neighborhood to reduce its marginalization.   
 
Summary 
 Hollygrove was a neighborhood that had experienced what Wacquant (2008) termed 
advanced marginality defined by sociospatial isolation, the retrenchment of the labor market, the 
intrusion of the formal police controls, and the recoiling of the welfare system.  In the context of 
political and social abandonment Hollygrove residents developed a siege mentality fostered by 
both the strong need for self-preservation and a deep mistrust for those from outside the 
community whose motives may be detrimental to its well-being.  Outsiders were branded as 
invaders and defenses were erected to protect against their advances.  The police were seen as an 
occupying force.  Politicians were widely considered to be biased against neighborhood interests.  
The economic interests of the city were thought to be profiting at the expense of local residents.  
The resulting resistance, even against those outsiders who could potentially facilitate change, 
brought further isolation and marginality. 
 Given the longstanding neglect and marginalization of the neighborhood, such resistance 
was understandable. And yet, in the years since Katrina, residents appeared to be more 
comfortable with some outsiders.  Sampson (2012) credited post-Katrina rebuilding efforts for 
triggering collective efficacy and collective action, concluding that “despite poverty, racial 
segregation and other challenges exacerbated by the truly top-down force of mother nature, 
community-based organizations provided an opening to enhance collective efficacy and 
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collective civic action” (p. 372).  The widespread devastation of Hollygrove provided 
opportunity for the community to rethink previous attitudes toward outsiders.  As residents 
returned to the community in desperate need of help, outsiders were allowed a unique window 
through which they brought novel ideas for innovation.  Outside ideas alone did not build 
collective efficacy, however, the difference was the collaborative relationship between residents 
and outsiders, where local visions for a better neighborhood were coupled with resources they 
could not have secured on their own.  The result was an empowered citizenry with enhanced 
social and political capital.   
 At the same time residents still experienced mistrust of other outsiders.  These included 
new residents who didn’t share their values, renters who were perceived to cause disruption, 
importers of guns, drug purchasers and visitors to neighborhood ABOs.  Many perceived these 
outsiders to be a significant source of neighborhood lethal violence. 
The difference was one of definition; residents appeared to more ably delineate between 
those who would harm the neighborhood and those who would help.  Two realities made this 
possible.  The first was an increase in political capital as outside actors helped residents to gain a 
voice and sufficient power to attract the attention of the city.  The second was an influx of new 
residents who did not share the longstanding mistrust of outsiders.  This combination led Dr. T to 
note “as the numbers of safe people and the trustworthy people go up and the people that were 
once on the outside, doing the violent acts and being the aggressors come into this safe place, 
then the number of the dangerous people are gonna go down and this ratio of safety to dangerous 
is gonna go down to the point where there is no more danger, there is no more violence.” While 
this may prove to be an overly optimistic view, his perspective did serve to capture the 
burgeoning awareness that not all outsiders brought danger to the community. 
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The post-Katrina rebuilding experiences of Hollygrove residents were unique.  They were 
not simply rebuilding homes, they were attempting to rebuild a better, safer community.  During 
many community meetings conducted during those years residents exhibited an ability to 
innovate and creatively enact solutions resulting in a neighborhood better than the one they 
evacuated.  Extending this creativity to the problem of neighborhood rates of homicide, the next 




















Chapter 10: Findings 
The Difference is Me: Grassroots Solutions to the Problem of Lethal Violence 
 
 
 Early in his interview Robert, the former drug dealer with multiple felony convictions, 
shared a revelation he had in the courtroom.  He remarked upon the changes in his life that 
prompted him to choose the occupation of auto mechanic, a job for which he was trained in the 
penitentiary, over drug dealing.  We were discussing his life in Hollygrove’s subculture and his 
transition back to the neighborhood.  I wanted to understand what factors led to the change of 
occupation.  In the following exchange he explained his reasoning: 
The difference is me.  The difference is me right now, like I said, I’m not about to put 
myself in a position where, I’ve been home over a year now, a little over a year now.  
Judge White told me I have five felony convictions.  Judge White told me, she said 
“Robert, you have no room for error right now.  You mess up one more time, I promise 
you, you never come back home again.”  And I believe her.  I got too much to lose right 
now.  I got a wife.  I got kids.  And like I said, I’m not about to go spend the rest of my 
life just sitting in a prison with a bunch of, you know what I’m saying?   
 
After years of participating in the Keeping It Real subculture, something changed.  The prospect 
of the rest of his life in prison brought Robert to the realization that his future was one he could 
control; he was the difference-maker.  He was not alone.  Hollygrove’s change is recent years 
was the result of many deciding that they were the difference, that the solution to Hollygrove’s 
violence rested in the neighborhood’s control. 
Gregory (1998) wrote “the concept of an ‘inner city’ isolated from the American 
‘mainstream’ and plagued with escalating rates of welfare dependency, crime, and teen 
pregnancy has served as a dominant trope for representing urban black experience in the post-
civil rights era, conflating, in the minds of many, black identity, urbanism, and the ‘tangle of 
pathology’ of the poor” (p. 5).  He chronicled the struggle of African Americans in a 
dispossessed community for political power, neighborhood services, and environmental justice, 
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while combatting the prevailing attitudes that conflated race, poverty and social pathology.  
Tamesha was a college sophomore raised in Hollygrove by a single mother with limited 
intellectual skills.  She fought hard to graduate from the city’s flagship public school, receiving a 
full ride to an elite college in the northeast.  Tamesha described Hollygrove in a similar fashion 
to Gregory’s: 
I mean, just look.  This is a black neighborhood.  And in this neighborhood, in the South I 
feel like at least in Louisiana, black is equated with like poor.  It has to do with 
segregation, it has to do with—I don’t know if you’ve ever noticed, and I’ve always 
brought this up, literally you cross Earhart, or you go down this way, it’s like sectioned 
off.  It’s like you go from the slums, no trees, all concrete, to like trees and palms.  And it 
has to do with the structure of the city back in the day.  And I feel like violence, gun 
violence in black communities, is something that has been structured.  It has almost been 
formulated.  You have an oppressive system sayin’, oh, you can’t, if you want financial 
assistance you can’t have a husband basically.  You have a system that makes you as a 
person livin’ in, you have a system that makes you feel like, I have to take matters into 
my own hands to protect myself…Anybody can call the police, but does everybody feel 
secure?  Does the police make everybody feel secure?   
 
In a city where structural forces limited the help that black neighborhoods received, an ethic of 
self-help became paramount.  In Hollygrove the residents had to fend for themselves for so long 
that distrust of formal systems emerged.   
 In the years since Katrina, however, neighbors long marginalized as residents of a 
dangerous, poor, African American, inner-city community began to create a new narrative.  
Community residents worked to engage politicians and agents of formal control, to rebuild long-
neglected community infrastructure, and to address systemic injustices, shifting from passive 
victims to active participants.  Cowen (2014) concluded that the “rebirth of the ‘neighborhood 
effect’” (p. 114) in Hollygrove was brought about by two factors: collaborative partnerships and 
shared community vision.  Wooten (2012) chronicled the neighborhood’s efforts to improve its 
reputation after the storm and pointed out that the efforts occurred despite local government’s 
inattention to their work.  Rich and Benson (2012) situated one post-Katrina resident project, the 
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Hollygrove Market and Farm, among the nation’s best-practices in food security.  This external 
praise was mirrored by residents who expressed a growing sense of pride and optimism as 
neighborhood improvements, coupled with a significant reduction in violent crime, led to 
revitalized collective efficacy. 
 Most macrosociological studies of neighborhood homicide concluded with sweeping 
policy suggestions that proposed top-down solutions.  Many academics and politicians created 
programmatic interventions to combat neighborhood violence with minimal input from those 
who daily lived in the milieu.  There was a paternalism in this approach, one that reified the 
prevailing mainstream judgments of a helpless population in need of outside intervention.   In 
Hollygrove, however, residents drove grassroots efforts that marked their post-Katrina 
rebuilding.  Building upon those successes at neighborhood change, recognizing that Hollygrove 
residents possessed untapped knowledge, part of this study was devoted to understanding 
whether this knowledge might be extended to novel solutions for neighborhood homicide.  
 This supposition proved correct, Hollygrove’s residents advanced 120 separate solutions 
for reducing homicide in the community.  These were analyzed into five categories: community 
strategies, educational strategies, formal control strategies, quality-of-life strategies and 
economic strategies. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to sharing the best of these ideas. 
 
Community-based Strategies 
 Most of the strategies for the amelioration of community violence were community-
based.  Many residents referred to the importance of meetings, specifically highlighting three 
types: organizing meetings where residents could strategize ways to improve collective efficacy, 
parties to solidify community unity through relationship-building, and special service-related 
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events.  William, a 30-something renter, proposed two types “meetings on how they can make 
things safe around here” and meetings where “white and black come together and fight against 
it.”  He considered neighborhood unity to be an important component of violence reduction and 
noted that community efforts would be enhanced if the greater New Orleans community, 
especially the dominant white power bloc, would choose to exercise their power on behalf of the 
neighborhood.  In a similar vein a member of the community leaders focus group recommended 
that the neighborhood needed to “continue what we were doing, having vacant houses that are 
troublesome torn down and doing community action against it, having community meetings, 
talking about problems and coming up with solutions, that’s been, that has been the big change.” 
This comment reflected recent successes at violence reduction that occurred after implementing a 
crime prevention expert’s strategy of fixing neighborhood physical disorder.   
 The community residents also recommended that some of the meetings be fun and 
focused upon relationship-building. Angela remembered a time in Hollygrove when: 
We used to, every Easter, we’d have a big party.  Everybody on the block would be 
barbecuing, you know, or boiling seafood.  And we’d be dancing in this yard or this yard, 
you know, or whatever, laughing, just everybody having a good time.  I would love to go 
back to that.  I mean people used to cook, send somebody something, you know?  I used 
to love to bake my bread.  I can’t remember my recipe to save my life.  But I used to love 
to do that and send it to my neighbors, you know?  Just having camaraderie with others, 
not staying in your house. 
 
Zora, the day care provider, had a similar view: 
 
Again, we have to get together and do more stuff, like more fun stuff.  Just more fun stuff 
for kids and adults to participate in where they gonna say, “You know what, I can help in 
doin’ that, I can help in doin’ this.”  And talkin’ to them.  That’s how you get to talk to 
people, by doin’ things, you know? 
 
The work of community building can be taxing.  Residents thought that celebrating hard work 
marked important milestones and built relationships.  These residents asserted that periodic 
celebratory meetings might be interspersed with working meetings as components of violence 
185 
 
reduction. They desired a milieu that enhanced relationship-building and community collective 
efficacy. 
 A third type of community meeting were service-related.  Robert, formerly involved in 
the neighborhood violence shared this solution: 
Yeah, like I said, just get more involved in the neighborhood.  I be going to different 
neighborhoods when I used to be just getting around, they be havin’ a lot of shit 
everywhere else.  People just out there.  They neighborhood, they got shit going on at the 
park.  They might have the Indians at the park, free food giveaway, another park, they got 
a basketball tournament goin’ on out there.  Go over here they got a flag football game.  
You know what I’m sayin’?  People in general like to feel like they a part of something.  
You know what I’m sayin’?  They just want to feel like a part of something.  So get out 
there and do something about it. 
 
Neighborhood service was an effective part of the neighborhood’s self-improvement strategy.  
The neighborhood association wrote and received a grant to purchase lawnmowers to cut 
overgrown vacant lots.  Residents planted trees.  Neighbors planned and conducted an annual 
Night Out Against Crime in conjunction with the city.  The seniors conducted their own 
community programs for ten years while awaiting the rebuilding of the neighborhood senior 
center.  Several seniors began the Hollygrove Soul Steppers that walked for exercise past crime 
hotspots to maintain vigilance and send the message that the community was watching.  These 
resident efforts were innovative ways of organizing the community around improvement.  As 
residents realized their power to reshape the community, they built collective efficacy. 
 Residents also mentioned church attendance as a way to both transmit positive values and 
redirect bad actors to a more constructive path.  This suggestion came from a wide age range, 
from the oldest member of the study to the youngest.  Claude, the oldest member of the study 
was a lifelong church attender who thought the answer was “education and the churches,” adding 
“get these children into Sunday School, get ‘em active in the church to keep them doin’ 
something.”  Langston, in his early 20s, thought that “prayer walking and, you know, goin’ 
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around getting along with people, like inviting people to church” was the solution.  Dr. T 
concurred, noting “in praying for situations to cut down on violence, God will show us how to 
interact with these people, how to engage these people.”  Kobe who, in his late teens was the 
youngest member of the study, gave an expanded explanation of his solution to Hollygrove’s 
murder rate, beginning and ending with a spiritual emphasis: 
I think the only way you could ever change something like that is through education and 
the church.  I think that’s the only way you could turn it, ‘cause some of the people are 
already too late in their life to like affect in big ways versus the drug dealers or the people 
who have been in jail multiple times on different offenses and stuff.  They can’t really get 
a good job because of the way things are set up.  That’s always gonna be in they head, 
that’s always gonna bug them.  But then you got kids who aren’t at that point where 
they’re going to start getting into some serious trouble and you could still affect [them].  I 
think if you could affect kids you could stop that cycle of senseless murders or robbery 
and drug use.  If you could somehow affect those kids you could affect the ones that 
come up after them because the ones that come up after them are going to look up to 
them and they’re going to see, alright these kids aren’t doing drugs, they aren’t shooting 
and killing people and that’s how you start up a new cycle, a better one.  But as for the 
older ones, it’d be cool if they could somehow set up some kind of job for ‘em, some 
kind of way of having work and earning a fair [wage], without having to do anything bad.  
And also church because I think a lot of people haven’t found Jesus and it’s like they 
pretty much don’t know why they living.  You know they just out there, “I gotta get some 
money so I can eat,” get drugs or whatever.  And if a lot of them actually turned to God I 
think it might change their lives for the better.  And, in fact, that could triangulate to the 
younger kids.  
 
Kobe’s solution was especially poignant as his mother and siblings were all immersed in the 
drug subculture and had been to prison, while he had never used drugs, had been involved in 
church and was the only one in his family to attend university.  His perspective was based both 
upon his personal experiences and his recognition of the limiting impact of drugs and mass 
incarceration upon the life chances of those like his mother and siblings. 
 Several in the study mentioned mentoring as a solution for neighborhood homicide.  The 
young men in the 20-something focus group bemoaned the neighborhood’s lack of mentors: 
 M1: They don’t have mentors, they need mentors. 
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 M2: Daddies don’t want to take care of them. 
M3: Mentors, like [name deleted] said, there’s no opportunity.  Like, OK, let’s say I’m 
13 years old and I’m thinking to myself, “I’m good, Mr. Kevin got this program 
he going to help me get in.  Play basketball when I’m this age, and I’m going to 
school here when I’m this age,” they don’t have that, and if they had it they don’t 
know where to find it.  
 
All the young men in the focus group were raised without fathers.  They experienced a need for 
positive role-models who could help them map their future, get them involved in sports, and act 
in their absent fathers’ stead.  One of the seniors offered an intriguing type of mentorship, using 
unemployed and retired men experiencing joblessness or retirement to act as job mentors for the 
community’s young men: 
We got a lot of men that’s sitting around doing nothing when they could be teaching 
these young men how to be men, because a lot of these young boys don’t have men in 
their homes; they mother, they mother is the whole source of everything, but they have 
men in the neighborhood that’s sitting around all day doing nothing, might have been a 
carpenter, might have been a mechanic, might have been, you know?  They could teach 
these kids how to do painting, do, paint the houses there, whatever. 
 
This proposal had three implications.  First, the years immediately following retirement could 
become extremely productive for men willing to pass their knowledge to younger men.  Second, 
those who are unemployed were thought to have valuable skills which could be transmitted to 
mentees, providing worth for men devalued by the job market.  Finally, this idea presented a 
ready source of mentors within the community, men who had existing ties to the community and 
understood the realities faced by the youth of Hollygrove.  Rather than bringing outside mentors 
into the community, this solution had potential to bring meaning to both Hollygrove’s youth and 
to those who were unemployed or retired. 
 Several mentioned recreational opportunities for Hollygrove’s youth as potential 
solutions.  One senior pointed to the fact that seniors had a place to go, “we come here, we meet, 
we try to support each other, but young people have nowhere to gather and nothing to do.”  She 
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pointed to the need “to do something that will entice and help our young people on the good 
side.”  The solution she forwarded was “something in every neighborhood for these children to 
do.”  Other ideas included accessible and inviting parks, neighborhood basketball tournaments 
and a community pool.  Because youth crime peaks during unstructured, non-school hours 
structured activities for neighborhood youth was thought to serve two purposes: prosocial values 
transmission and positive diversion from the allure of the subculture. 
 Residents thought community centers might help reduce violence.  Several mentioned 
Trinity Christian Community, a faith-based community center located in Hollygrove that offered 
programs but had also been key to advocacy and community redevelopment efforts in the 
neighborhood.  A former resident, now in city government, mentioned an innovative solution of 
intergenerational programs that could take place at the senior center that was undergoing re-
construction in the neighborhood, “You also might see a change once the center is opening again 
and we can get the seniors back there to start instilling [values] and to get the people to buy into 
generational programs where the seniors can help the young people to give them some basic 
skills and help them with their education and see if we can change this around.”  As the new 
senior center was one block from the newly constructed community school, this idea had merit.  
Seniors had a lifetime of experience that could be beneficial to the youth of the community.  He 
was suggesting that both values transmission and educational and job-related skills could be 
tapped in an effort to enhance the lives of both youth and the seniors themselves. 
 The literature notes that mentoring does have a positive impact on at-risk youth.  Tolan, 
Henry, Schoeny, Lovegrove and Nichols (2013) used meta-analysis of 46 studies published 
between 1970-2011 to find that mentoring at-risk youth had a significant and positive effect on 
delinquency, aggression, drug use and academic functioning, issues that residents reported to be 
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important in their understanding of neighborhood violence.   DuBois, Holloway, Valentine and 
Cooper (2002) in a meta-analysis of 55 studies found only modest effectiveness overall but noted 
that mentoring’s impact is significantly improved under two conditions: when empirically-based 
best practices are used and when strong relationships are formed between mentors and youth.  
Community-based volunteers exposed to many of the challenges faced by Hollygrove’s youth 
may understand them better and thus had an enhanced ability to relate to their unique 
neighborhood context.   
 Two other community-based strategies mentioned by participants included 
homeownership and community rain gardens.  Eldridge was a young homeowner in his late 20s 
who stated “I’d like to see a lot more homeowners around.  I’d like to see a lot of these 
abandoned houses that nobody reclaimed since Katrina either torn down or remodeled.”  Angela 
submitted that Section 8 renters could be converted into homeowners: 
I think it’s so foolish, this Section 8 thing.  You gonna pay the landlord this much money 
where the people who are living in the house that you’re paying for, if you just gave them 
a little help they could be buying a property instead of you just helping the people who 
have something already get more, and these people are not feeling good about 
themselves.  Renters don’t really have to worry.  But if it was their property, you know, 
they would be taking care of it ‘cause they’d have pride of ownership.  They’d have pride 
in themselves.  They’d be feeling good.  Why the government is so foolish—I’m on my 
soapbox. 
 
Hollygrove’s abandoned houses provided a unique opportunity for homeownership and could 
provide locations for experimentation with innovative homeownership funding strategies such as 
the one expressed by Angela.  Kane and Cronin (2009) connected residential instability to a lack 
of neighborhood social controls and social disorganization leading to neighborhood violence.  
Residents thought that increased homeownership would lead to neighborhood stability and 
reduced neighborhood violence and thus this solution was consistent with one of social 
disorganization theory’s explanations of violence. 
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Another community problem was street flooding.  Much of New Orleans was below sea 
level and prone to flooding after torrential rains when the city’s pumps became overwhelmed.  
Caroline referenced the rain gardens, a collaborative project of the Tulane City Center, the 
Carrollton Hollygrove Community Development Corporation and Trinity Christian Community 
to construct water-retention gardens in resident yards thereby keeping the water from entering 
the city’s drainage system and potentially preventing street flooding.  Flooding was a sign of 
neighborhood infrastructure disorder, a condition that Skogan (1990) connected to higher rates of 
crime.  Caroline saw this connection and proposed the expansion of an innovative solution to 
flooding with potential impact upon neighborhood violence. 
Sampson (2012) found that altruistic communities, those that pair shared expectations for 
action with behavioral action, had significantly lower homicide rates.  Saville (2009) noted that 
communities who were trained to “create and regulate their own safety in collaboration with 
service providers” (p. 309) were able to effectively reduce neighborhood crime.  St. Jean (2007) 
showed that “neighborhood collection action resulted in displacement or elimination of criminal 
activities” (p. 247).  Existing research established that communities willing to take action and to 
act altruistically on their own behalf could curtail violent crime.  Furthermore, Skogan’s (1990) 
finding that a community’s physical disorder was positively associated with neighborhood crime 
indicated that Hollygrove resident’s concerns about disorder was well-founded. 
Hollygrove’s community-based strategy solutions had potential to significantly reduce 
violence in the neighborhood by both enhancing neighborhood control and drawing attention to a 
marginalized community.  Internally the strategies drew neighbors together and provided 
ownership and pride of place, a key to neighborhood collective efficacy.  These strategies had 
also captured the imagination of outsiders who observed, studied and wrote about how the 
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community’s efforts helped to increase the neighborhood’s social capital.  The net effect was 
empowerment, a sense that residents could do for themselves something that externally-imposed 
strategies had failed to accomplish.   
 
Educational Strategies 
 Hollygrove residents in this study valued education and considered it to be a key in the 
struggle to reduce neighborhood violence.  There were two sets of strategies suggested by 
respondents regarding education: those that involved the formal educational system and 
strategies that involved informal educational opportunities.  Through the duration of this study, 
the local public school was under construction.  During the ten years between Katrina and the 
current study residents had fought diligently with the school board to have Paul L. Dunbar 
School rebuilt.  As construction commenced residents fought another battle to ensure control 
over which charter school entity would operate the school.  The concern was that an outside 
operator would not value the desires of the community and might cater to a student population 
bused into the neighborhood while neglecting the needs of the local community’s children.   
 Angela, who was educated at Dunbar Elementary as were her children, captured well the 
sentiment of many in the study toward formal educational strategies: 
You gotta start at the very bottom of the ladder.  You have to give everyone, or as many 
as you possibly can which should be everyone, an education.  You need dedicated 
teachers, you need dedicated parents, and you need students to be informed almost 
continuously that you are important, you can do this if you truly want to have a good life.  
You have to inform them that selling drugs on the street is not the life you want.  You 
want to, everything isn’t about sports or being a rapper, you gotta want more out of your 
life besides cash.  You want to feel proud of yourself.  You want pride in your area and of 
your children.  You have to realize that what you’re doing now is going to be passed on 
to your children.  And the parents got to realize it and they gotta get their children—they 
gotta do their durndest to—not to say that they’re gonna listen, but you gotta fight for 
them.  So I think everything has to start with a good education.  And there are a lot of 




Schools, according to Angela, were more than purveyors of academics but should be places that 
helped their students embrace a vision for their futures.  Along the way schools must involve 
parents in the process of education, embracing them as partners in the process.  Parental 
involvement was also mentioned by John, who told me that “the parents have to get involved, or 
the parent, really needs to understand, you know, the consequences of what’s going on.”  Prior to 
Katrina the Parent-Teacher Organization at Dunbar was sparsely attended.  John’s assertion 
intimated that quality schools required active parental participation once the new school was 
completed.   
Caroline thought that schools needed to provide enhanced opportunities for students.  Her 
ideal school “would give ‘em, I guess a lot of opportunities, they got schools that have, you 
know, the French, they have French in school, you know, so a nice school having the materials, 
materials they could use, computers and stuff, you know?”  Quality schools were thought to be 
well-resourced with broad curricula including foreign languages and access to technology.  This 
was no idle speculation; during Caroline’s years at Dunbar her guardians had to provide toilet 
paper as part of her school supplies.  Tameka thought that schools should: 
teach financial literacy to children, start out when they are young, make that part of the 
curriculum in school.  Teach them about investing, teach them about what’s a Roth IRA 
or a 401k, so when they are older and they have two dollars to save, they can put those 
two dollars into a Roth IRA or a mutual fund or whatever, you know, instead of putting 
them in the freezer like my grandmother did or putting them under the mattress.  Teach 
them about those things so when they get older they’ll know what to do and how to do.  
When you get that good training and that good job, make some money and be able to 
invest and do other things that you want to do. 
 
For Tameka life skills training, such as financial literacy, were thought to provide opportunities 
for participation in the formal economy and could become an alternate pathway out of the 
structural impediments that marginalized residents and gave rise to the informal economy.  
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 Out-of-school time was important to residents as well.  The Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (2014) stated that juvenile violence peaks in the afterschool hours, 
between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m., on school days and between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. on non-school days.  
This fact led one former resident to advocate “a stronger educational system where not only are 
you able to teach the child during that normal classroom days, classroom time, but also be able to 
have them come in after class for additional activities and then activities in the neighborhood that 
keeps people’s minds on the right direction instead of the wrong direction.”  The 20-something 
young men also thought that out-of-school time programs such as the ones provided by a local 
community center, could reduce neighborhood violence.  In the following exchange they shared 
their views about this: 
  
M1: like the center, you got all those activities going on for all them children and stuff.   
When they get out of school they not going on the corner and go fraternize with 
all these other… 
 
 M2: they got the opportunity to go to the Center. 
 
M3: I’m going to the center, ‘cause when I go to the Center, I know I’m going to have 
this, that and the other, I know I’m going to be able to do this and it will help with 
life.  People look forward to that type of stuff, you got people helping you. 
 
Educational opportunities, according to these residents, need not be limited to formal academic 
institutions but could continue after the school day concluded.  The schedule of working parents 
did not conform to school hours, leaving youth with unstructured and unsupervised time between 
the conclusion of the school day and the time a parent returns from work.  Providing alternative 
activities during these hours was thought to impact neighborhood violent crime. 
 Parenting assistance was another educational strategy forwarded by informants.  Charles’ 
idea was to bring parents to a community center and offer parenting assistance: 
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I would tell them to, to have a meeting, have a community meeting at the school, or at a 
neighborhood center, shelter, and have the parents of these kids come there and you’d 
have to talk to their parents, have to talk to the parents of these younger kids.  Because 
these kids, they’re not gonna be conducive to upholding the good standards of the 
community if they don’t have the right direction…so they would have to sit down and 
talk to these parents, they have to sit down and talk to these parents, say “Look, you guys 
have to buck up, tighten up on your kids.”  You have to give them notice.  “You have to 
tighten up with your kids.  If you need help, let us know because they’ve got counselors 
out there.”   
 
He proposed these meetings take place once or twice a month.  One feature of this idea was the 
approach to parents; instead of mandating that parents attend such trainings, a coercive strategy, 
Charles’ idea would forge a partnership between parents and what he referred to as “civic 
leaders.”  Zora’s position as day care provider in the neighborhood brought her into contact with 
many parents.  She observed deficits in the skills of her ward’s parents and wanted to “bring in 
more people that can help the parents with literature and knowin’ what it is that they’re supposed 
to do.”  Known to many as “The Baby Whisperer,” Zora had tremendous rapport with children 
and valuable skills that could be tapped to help struggling parents overcome personal parenting 
deficits.  One senior pointed to a gap in thinking about parenting training, noting “a lot of 
children have parents that’s in prisons, a lot of ‘em parents are dead because of the shootings and 
they have grandparents and relatives taking care of these kids and a lot of ‘em is not doing what 
they’s supposed to be doing with these kids and these kids is acting up” implying that parenting 
training might be extended to caretakers thrust into a parenting role due to the neighborhood 
violence and high incarceration rate.   
Another idea for parenting training was noted by Caroline.  The City’s Health 
Department created the Hollygrove Best Babies Zone, based upon the Harlem Children’s Zone.  
Caroline told me the program “helps young moms, you know, with children under the age of 
two.  You know they help them probably, help them with GED, help just give ‘em information 
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about how to raise a child.”  Its location inside the neighborhood improved the likelihood that 
young mothers would participate in wraparound services designed to enhance the lives of their 
young children, including parenting training.  Providing assistance to guardians was thought not 
only to provide valuable information to guardians struggling to raise children but also to alleviate 
stress experienced by overburdened caretakers.  This was seen as a preventative solution to 
neighborhood violence. 
 One final educational strategy was proposed by Ernest, a neighborhood entrepreneur.  His 
solution to neighborhood violence was to “push it out with education.”  He envisioned a 
neighborhood education strategy designed to help people resist the allure of the street culture: 
Like that guy that was putting out those signs, “Enough is Enough?”  I think if they was 
to flood the area, it would resonate.  Sometime you got to lay a seed…you might not get 
it instantly, but if it’s fed to them constantly.  And in the park I think if they had screens 
set up where they could have some people come in and explain about that culture, let 
them know what is really going on.  Set up some entertainment, have some cold drinks, 
mingle, and even the police could step in and say, “We’re not here to hurt you, we’re here 
to help, everybody’s going to have to be one society.” 
 
His comment about the “Enough is Enough” signs made reference to an initiative by Pastor John 
Raphael who created signs with the word “Enough” to decry the high homicide rate in New 
Orleans.  Ernest’s two-pronged, anti-homicide strategy would combine a public relations 
campaign of posting signs throughout the neighborhood like those of Pastor Raphael to be 
followed by a conscious-raising event at Conrad Playground where the struggle between 
prosocial and street values would be explicated and where the police department would seek to 
better ally themselves with the community.  Unlike the other educational strategies this was 
specifically envisioned to target neighborhood violence through a grassroots educational 
campaign led by residents in collaboration with the police department.  
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 In sum, educational strategies were proposed to reduce violence in four settings.  First 
were strategies designed to enhance the life chances of neighborhood youth through formal 
educational institutions.  Second were strategies to educate students during the non-school hours 
when violent youth crime was at its peak.  A third set of educational strategies were conceived to 
assist caretakers in a parental role with the challenging task of raising children.  The final 
strategy was a grassroots program conceived to intervene directly in the neighborhood violence 
via a public relations campaign coupled with special events to educate residents about the 
consequences of street violence.    
 The literature supported the four educational strategies advanced by the residents.  
Wilson and Lipsey (2005) performed a meta-analysis of school-based violence prevention 
programs through 2004 and found them to be especially effective with higher risk students who 
lived in “high poverty, disadvantaged neighborhoods” (p. 25).  Webster and Illangasekare (2010) 
reported positive results of the Aban Aya Youth Project in Chicago which combined an in-school 
educational curriculum and community support to significantly reduce incidences of violence, 
provoking behavior, drug use, school delinquency and other risky behaviors.   The After School 
Alliance (2007) reported that out-of-school time programs have proven effective in both 
preventing and reducing neighborhood violent crime.  Programs they cited included the Bayview 
(San Francisco) Save Haven program, the California Juvenile Crime Prevention 12-cities 
Demonstration Project, the Baltimore Police Athletic League, New York City’s Boys and Girls 
Clubs and the Los Angeles BEST program.  Greenwood (2010) found four family educational 
programs that were effective in reducing youth crime and violence.  These included the Nurse 
Family Partnership where registered nurses educate at-risk mothers regarding parenting skills, 
Functional Family Therapy which provides in-home therapists to educate and support parents, 
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Guiding Good Choices which promotes healthy, protective parent-child interactions, and the 
Strengthening Families Program that enhances parenting, family relationships and teaches 
communication skills.  Haggerty, McGlynn-Wright and Klima (2013) found two additional 
programs to be effective in training parents to reduce children’s violence-related behaviors.  
These included The Incredible Years, a 22-week group program for parents of children aged 
three to six, and Staying Connected with Your Teen, a seven-week program for youth aged 12-
17.  Finally, the use of communications and media strategies suggested by Ernest has been 
adopted by several violence reduction initiatives including Boston’s Ceasefire Program, 
Chicago’s Cure Violence Program, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and the Drug Market 
Intervention Program (McGarrell, Hipple, Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013). 
 These strategies represented a multi-faceted approach to prosocial values transmission.  
As seen in an earlier chapter, Hollygrove residents were concerned that positive values were not 
being passed to future generations.  Each of the four proposed approaches attacked this concern 
from different vantage points: in-school, after-school, in the home, and community-wide.  In 
essence these were battlefronts in the war of values taking place in Hollygrove and were a 
comprehensive set of tactics to assure that prosocial values were passed to the next generation. 
  
Formal Control Strategies 
 The third most commonly mentioned solution to Hollygrove’s violence were strategies 
that involved agents of formal control.  Many residents expressed distrust of the New Orleans 
Police Department, while police officials thought they were seen as more like an occupying force 
than as partners in the effort to reduce crime.   Several respondents expressed novel ideas as to 
how this could be changed.  While some residents did mention a desire for more agents of formal 
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control, some suggested that these should not be NOPD officers.  Others mentioned strategies 
related to the police department that could improve the community’s relationship with the 
NOPD. 
 Hollygrove residents had mixed feelings about formal controls.  Silver and Miller (2006) 
found that residents with strong attachment to the community and who were satisfied with the 
police had lower levels of legal cynicism and were more likely to exercise informal social 
controls.  Kirk and Papachristos (2011) noted that residents who did not trust agents of formal 
control, viewing them as illegitimate, unresponsive and uncaring, were more likely to engage in 
behaviors that ran counter to dominant norms.  Hollygrove residents’ long experience of 
structural neglect resulted in a spectrum of cynicism ranging from complete mistrust to a 
willingness to work cooperatively with agents of law enforcement.  This spectrum was reflected 
in the variety of formal control strategies proffered by residents.  
 William, a security guard at a local hospital, recommended the neighborhood “hire a 
security guard company to ride around at night ‘cause everybody don’t have a car…so some 
people have to catch the bus and walk home at night.”  This was a reference to self-taxation 
programs available to communities in New Orleans for such purposes.  Daneta advocated for 
“getting more state troopers or something, or the military men,” referencing a recent effort by the 
city to supplement flagging numbers of police officers by bringing the Louisiana State Police 
into the city.  There was precedent for this idea; in the years after Katrina the military did patrol 
the streets setting up checkpoints throughout the city to maintain public safety while Louisiana 
State Troopers had been deployed in New Orleans’ French Quarter to supplement NOPD patrols.  
 Recognizing the disconnection between the police department and Hollygrove’s 
residents, she advocated hiring officers from the neighborhood: 
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You want cops, but you want them to be focused on the right thing.  You don’t want them 
to be spendin’ their time frisking you when the guy is jumpin’ out the window.  They are 
comin’ from outside.  They don’t know who is who.  I mean there’s a disconnection 
there.  We have a very disconnected legal system ‘cause they don’t know [the 
neighborhood].  I mean you don’t wanna be so biased, but I do think it has to come from 
within.  People try to do that with different things, like Neighborhood Watch teams and 
all that stuff.  Is that really the best we can do here?  Would it be too extreme to say the 
only cops that can serve this neighborhood are cops from this neighborhood?  Like what 
kind of system is that!  And the only cops who can serve this neighborhood are cops that 
live in this neighborhood, cops that actually have to live here and don’t have a place to go 
back to. 
 
Bratton and Kelling’s (2006) Broken Windows law enforcement strategy called for rapid and 
strong reaction to minor offenses in an effort to prevent major offenses from occurring later.  The 
challenge with this type of policing strategy, according to one high-ranking police official was 
“we put people in jail for any little thing we could.”  Tamesha’s solution would forge greater 
connections between the police and community residents by placing officers with a vested 
interest in the community strategically in the communities where they live.  Rather than being 
seen as an occupying force of outsiders these officers would know and care for the community 
and thus act as allies in the work of community improvement.     
 Three additional strategies fit with the theme of formal control: a mentoring alliance with 
the police department, enforcement of loitering laws and the expanded use of crime cameras.  
Charles’ personal brush with youth violence in San Francisco led his mother to enroll him in the 
Police Activities League (PAL), where his mentor was assigned to “keep you in control,” “keep 
you on the straight and narrow,” “report on you,” and “keep you in line.”  The San Francisco 
PAL provides “civilian and police volunteer coaches and mentors” who serve youth through “a 
variety of sports and leadership activities” in an effort to “develop personal character and foster 
positive relationships among police officers, youth and dedicated volunteers” (San Francisco 
Police Athletic League, n.d.).  This program fit with an NOPD official’s solution of “enlisting 
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kids as allies not enemies of the police.”  A program like the San Francisco PAL combines the 
community’s solution of mentorship and the improvement of relationships with the police 
department.  
 Arianne proposed improved enforcement of loitering laws as a solution, saying “they 
could stop all those people from hanging on the corner.”  She described a good neighborhood as 
“a quiet neighborhood, not a lot of people hanging around.  Sure not a neighborhood with a 
corner store, just because they have a lot of people be hanging out like, around good kids that’s 
trying to do good and not be outside terrorizing the neighborhood.”  Arianne lived most of her 
life within a half block of the Olive Superette, a hot spot for lethal violence.  As a high school 
student she observed the shooting of Brandon Aggison, a former classmate there.  She currently 
lived in another house that is also a half block from the store, this time with her young son.  Her 
reflection on loitering stemmed from her lived experience there, one that had associated the 
corner store with both loitering and lethal violence.  This would help explain her assumption that 
enforcement of existing loitering laws would help to reduce violence. 
 Crime cameras were also mentioned as a formal control solution.  John stated, “crime 
cameras I think are one of the best ones.”  He had been a part of a program to situate crime 
cameras in front of private homes, a joint project of the neighborhood’s city councilmember, 
ProjectNOLA, Trinity Christian Community, the Carrollton Hollygrove Community 
Development Corporation, and the Electrician’s Union.  These cameras were connected in real-
time via the Internet to ProjectNOLA’s recording equipment and allowed the NOPD to observe 
the aftermath of a crime committed in view of the camera. Some Hollygrove residents thought 
the cameras served to deter violent crime. 
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 These resident solutions were thought to change the polarity of the neighborhood’s 
relationship to formal control agencies.  In the years prior to the study the power arrangement 
between the NOPD and Hollygrove residents was unequally balanced, where the police 
controlled the playing field.  They were viewed as unresponsive and unable to ensure 
Hollygrove’s safety, conditions which Kirk and Papachristos (2011) concluded breed legal 
cynicism and adherence to oppositional subcultural values.  Hollygrove’s solutions sought to 
rearrange that balance by allowing residents to collaborate with policing strategies affecting the 
neighborhood.  This was consistent with Saville’s (2009) SafeGrowth model where community 
safety was enhanced as agents of formal control cooperated with residents to enact a conjoint 
planning process that prioritized neighborhood concerns.  As the balance of power shifts back to 
the community, concluded Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), residents were more likely 
to exert greater collective efficacy, to attract more police participation, and to reduce murders.  
This had important implications for law enforcement officers as well; as agents of formal control 
engaged residents, distrust was lessened, resident cooperation was enhanced, and neighborhood 
violence was reduced. 
Hollygrove’s City Councilperson stated, “when the people take responsibility for their 
neighborhood and let the police know that they are going to hold them responsible to do their 
jobs in the neighborhood, then the police are much more likely to step up to the plate.”  This 
comment reflected her growing realization that the power arrangement had begun to shift from 
the police as an “occupying force” to one where the police served and were accountable to the 
community residents.  Until the agents of formal control were willing to act in partnership with 
the community, serving them instead of exercising control, the legal cynicism would continue 
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and the relationship between Hollygrove residents and the NOPD would be hostile.  Residents in 
this study desired an equitable working relationship as reflected by these strategies. 
 
Quality of Life Strategies 
 A fourth theme found in neighborhood-driven solutions to violence revolved around the 
quality of life issues in the community.  One former resident now in city government remarked, 
“if you start to see an improvement in the quality of life, then you’ll start to see an improvement 
in the overall life of an individual that lives back in Hollygrove.”  Skogan’s (1990) work on 
neighborhood disorder was reflected in a training offered by one of Hollygrove’s crime 
consultants during the Livable Communities Program where leaders were taught techniques of 
Second Generation Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Saville, 2009).  In this 
model residents and NOPD officers were first taught about the connection between visible 
disorder and crime and then jointly took a walking tour of a section of Hollygrove to connect 
visible disorder to several crime hot spots.  This marked a turning point in the neighborhood’s 
understanding that prevention of crime and enforcement of laws were separate concepts, not 
always related.  These strategies reflected resident’s opinions on the importance of quality of life 
issues as a solution to neighborhood violence. 
 Several respondents asserted that part of Hollygrove’s violence reduction strategy must 
address the abundance of vacant, blighted and abandoned homes and lots that proliferate 
throughout the neighborhood, marking it as a place where owners did not care about the 
community.  Caroline noted “they got a lot of abandoned houses, a lot of empty lots.  Getting 
people to build houses, build more property, houses on their property would kind of make it 
safer, having some people coming, some nice, decent people coming to the neighborhood, to 
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kind of keep the neighborhood up to par.”  Eldridge wanted to see “abandoned houses that 
nobody reclaimed since Katrina either torn down or remodeled.”  The number of blighted houses 
increased after Katrina as some residents and landlords chose not to rebuild because the flooding 
and subsequent mold infestation made repairs cost prohibitive.  One of the seniors thought that: 
somebody, the city, somebody in the government should be taking care of this so that you 
could either board it up or allow somebody to buy it at a cheap price because it’s not 
doing anything but sitting.  It’s drawing not only the kids with the bad habits, birds, 
animals, different things.  And what is that doing to the neighborhood?  People want to 
have good and [instead] have too much of that.”  Another senior added, “they’re fixing 
all the downtown houses, they’re not fixing anything back here.  
 
The City Councilmember wanted to “get those properties that are blighted and abandoned back 
on the market,” believing that if “the houses were fixed up the neighborhood would be healed.”  
Besides bringing disorder to the community, vacant, blighted and abandoned houses sometimes 
served as staging areas for crime.  The district police commander noted that the neighborhood 
blight “creates havens for any type of illegal activity” and “by knocking that stuff out it’s really 
helping us reduce crime.  The residents, politician and police agreed that blight eradication must 
be a part of the neighborhood’s crime reduction strategy. 
 Two respondents noted the poor quality of Hollygrove’s streets and suggested street 
repairs would serve to reduce neighborhood violence.  When asked what she would do with 
unlimited funds to fix the community Caroline answered “the streets are really bad, streets are 
bad, fix the streets up.”  The City Councilmember addressed this as well, pointing to “blight 
reduction and fixing the streets” as elements critical to the neighborhood’s well-being.  Unlike 
wealthier neighborhoods, the streets of Hollygrove were in disrepair.  There were few curbs, 
many cracks and potholes, and in places the street grade was higher than the adjacent yards 
which caused flooding during heavy rains.   
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 Two other quality of life issues mentioned by respondents were trash collection and the 
state of neighborhood parks.  As we sat on Bert’s porch overlooking Olive Street, across from 
the Olive Superette, he stated:  
It’s just like the garbage people, they make the community look bad, look on the street, 
they don’t even want to pick this up.  So they make our community look bad because 
they leave it on the, they leave it out here and won’t even try to pick it up…you can look 
at every time people put their stuff [trash] out, you don’t even try to pick it up.  They 
don’t send nobody to pick it up.  That makes the community look bad also.  You know if 
they’d clean that up, it would be pretty decent.  Lot of people going to look at a house, 
you don’t look at a house like with that stuff out there like that. 
 
He was referring to several piles of trash on the curb in front of houses abutting Olive Street.  
The city’s Sanitation Department would often delay collecting trash that was not in city-
approved trash receptacles.  This marred the neighborhood, sending messages about the 
community’s lack of political and social capital, adding to the perception that Hollygrove 
residents did not care about their community.   
 Neighborhood parks served as gathering places for community residents and thus had 
great potential to benefit a community.  At the same time parks in a state of disrepair, like poor 
streets and blighted houses, sent messages about the ability of the community to exercise 
collective efficacy and disorder, thus impacting neighborhood violence.  Eldridge mentioned 
parks as a way of making Hollygrove safer: 
I think they could have more parks.  I mean like really well-maintained parks.  You know 
stuff that people come in and keep and maintained and keep a high quality.  I mean every 
time you see a park they got like spray paint all over the walls and the water fountains are 
broken and stuff like that.  People don’t value anything like that.  They need to have 
something where people can value.  You know, a lot of lights at night time and that kind 
of thing, that kind of helps. 
 




 The way interviewees thought about neighborhood disorder was consistent with Skogan’s 
(1990) finding that physical disorder connected to social disorder and created an environment in 
which criminals were free to act.  Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) connected disorder and 
violent crime but found that physical disorder’s destabilizing effect was an artifact of 
institutional abandonment of inner city neighborhoods and the lack of resident collective 
efficacy.  The proposed quality of life solutions reflected the understanding that a community’s 
visible disrepair mirrors a less visible reality, their lack of social capital relative to better 
resourced neighborhoods.  Because a well-maintained neighborhood signals a neighborhood’s 
political and social capital, it sends messages about its ability to control those who would harm 
it.  Caroline stated this fact clearly; when asked why she thought quality of life improvements 
would deter violence, she concluded “the people that’s doing the crime will see that the 
community, that the people love the community and will speak out.”  These voices recognize the 
need for more community empowerment in maintaining Hollygrove’s infrastructure. 
 
Economic Strategies 
 The final set of solutions considered economic strategies thought to be an important 
component of violence reduction.  Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997) is 
predicated upon the concept that institutional structures preventing economic goal attainment in 
the formal economy gave rise to anomie.  To resolve this condition an informal economy 
emerged, with the concomitant increase in violent crime.  The 20-something males stated clearly 
their perceptions that poverty was linked to violent crime.  In this exchange they make this 
connection explicit: 




K:   Talk about that. 
 
M1:   Meaning, it’s poverty, like, we uh, all of us broke, all of us got problems, we sit 
around and talk about our problems all day and we only know a few ways to solve 
‘em.  Selling drugs, either getting a job, a bad paying job, ‘cause the people don’t 
want to hire no black people.   
 
M2:   Robbing someone 
 
M1:   or we go rob. 
 
M3:   it’s the only way some people… 
 
M1:   so that’s where the killing and stuff come from, ‘cause poverty is the underlying 
cause. 
 
The preceding exchange with the focus group members implied agreement with this theory.   
 Residents stated that economic opportunities were lacking in Hollygrove.  This led 
several residents to note that ameliorating this condition might be an important solution to the 
neighborhood’s violent crime.  Tameka’s solution was employment:  
Jobs that pay a decent wage where men are able to take care of their families.  Jobs that 
pay enough where they can be a homeowner.  Just basic, not extravagant things.  Own a 
home, buy a car to get back and forth to work, to provide a good education for your 
children…And those jobs need to have a living wage, benefits, disability insurance, 
health insurance, all those things are important. 
 
While many thought that jobs were available to Hollygrove’s residents, these jobs were thought 
to be insufficient with regard to pay and benefits.   
 Others pointed to the need for economic drivers of jobs, employers capable of providing 
livable wage jobs with benefits.  One former resident stated “we have to provide some more type 
of economic opportunity [like] Costco’s and the other org (sic), the other companies that have 
come to Carrollton over the years and provided some employment.”  Caroline added, “Costco, 
got this new grocery store, Costco.  Well I think it changed a whole lot, you know?  Um, I not 
sure, they probably gave some of the people in the neighborhood jobs, you know more 
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employment in the neighborhood.”  Costco Wholesale chose a strip mall, abandoned since 
Katrina, for their first Louisiana location.  This proved to be a significant development in three 
ways: it replaced a blighted structure, it provided an economic engine, and it offered jobs to 
neighborhood residents.  During a series of pre-construction meetings with the community, 
Costco executives told residents that their warehouses drove further economic development in 
many communities where they were located.  This development provided a much-needed boost 
to neighborhood morale and, if the executives’ narrative proves correct, had potential to drive 
future economic improvements. 
 Another source of economic opportunity mentioned by residents was legal 
entrepreneurship.  The community’s informal economy pointed to the reality that a neighborhood 
entrepreneurial spirit existed and could be redirected into legitimate business ventures.  Zora, a 
neighborhood day care provider and seamstress said: 
Everyone is born with some type of creativity—everyone, it’s just a thought process and 
not bein’ lazy.  We have a lot of bright people in this world, but we just need to get up off 
our butts and do what we need to do, you know?  What I’m doin’ didn’t come from goin’ 
to school or somebody tellin’ me what to do.  It came from, as a child, wantin’ at some 
point to be married and have kids that I decided when I was young I was gonna sew.  I 
started makin’ my clothes at 12.  It goes back to not havin’ places to go to learn what we 
need to learn, so you have to be self-taught sometimes.  It goes back to not bein’ lazy.  
You just need to do what you need to do to take care of your family, take care of 
yourself.  I used to sew for my mom, I used to do my mom’s hair.  My mom used to do 
hair for everyone in the neighborhood, so a lot of that is instilled in me.  Things that are 
instilled in you as a child you cannot get rid of.  That’s just the bottom line.  Some of the 
days when everyone’s layin’ around sleepin’, I think I would like to do that one day.  
And then I get up off my butt and say, I would not want to do that because that’s sleeping 
time away.  We have enough hours in the night to sleep and do what you have to do and 
get up in the morning then do what you have to do, and [so] you go to bed early at night.  
Of course, that didn’t happen for me. I still get up early in the mornings and do what I 
have to do because you have more time in the mornings than you do in the evenings. 
 
There were entrepreneurs in the neighborhood.  Some like Zora, who was a seamstress and 
daycare provider, and Ernest, who silk-screened t-shirts, earned a decent income by providing 
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valuable products and services to the community via the formal economy.  Others, like the 
neighborhood drug dealers, created and maintained a marketplace in the underground economy.  
Zora recognized the inherent creativity of many in the community, a dormant resource that, if 
translated into entrepreneurial participation in the formal economy, could become economic 
engines that bridge the gap for those currently limited from the formal marketplace. 
 Institutional Anomie Theory is predicated upon the tenet that economic lack drives 
anomie and crime.  Hollygrove residents recognized this and provided three economic solutions: 
jobs, economic engines, and entrepreneurship.  There had been some hopeful developments in 
Hollygrove on the economic front with the arrival of Costco and the development of the 
Hollygrove Market and Farm.  Furthermore, as the examples of Zora and Ernest showed, the 




 While many solutions to neighborhood violence were modeled upon the best practices in 
other places, residents in Hollygrove provided solutions based on the strengths of their 
neighborhood.  Many of the solutions they proposed were innovative and, when combined, could 
comprise a comprehensive solution to neighborhood violence.  One city official, in the Mayor’s 
office, noted “we can’t create a generic solution to murder.  We have to create a solution that is 
appropriate for the individuals that are being most affected and too, in specific neighborhoods.”  
Hollygrove resident solutions mirrored this conclusion, they were neighborhood-based and 
envisioned to target the specific problems that residents perceived to undergird homicide in the 
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community, and thus merited consideration as a vital part of efforts to eradicate neighborhood-
level violence.   
 There was a common thread to the solutions; they stemmed from the neighborhood’s 
recognition of their marginalized status and reflected their desire to reorganize the community in 
ways that resituated power and control.   The community strategies were based upon the need to 
regain control of their community.  Each of the proposed community-based solutions provided 
opportunities for residents to “own” their community, shaping its values, future direction and 
infrastructure.  The educational solutions were values-driven.  Residents recognized that the 
emerging subculture was accompanied by values that ran counter to the mainstream and thus 
their strategies were designed to both remedy the lack of prosocial values transmission and to 
enhance residents’ opportunities to increase their social capital.  The formal control solutions 
were conflict-oriented and emerged from recognition that existing policing strategies had failed 
to eradicate crime and adequately protect Hollygrove’s residents.  These strategies demanded 
that formal controls reshape their agenda to reflect long-neglected priorities of the community 
and forge cooperative and collaborative relationships with agents of formal control.  The quality 
of life proposals addressed systemic and institutional neglect.  By calling for infrastructure repair 
and an equal share of city resources, residents expressed a desire for remediation of their 
marginalization relative to better resourced neighborhoods.  The final set of resident-driven 
solutions recognized that economic disadvantage had given rise to an illicit economy which 
limited the life chances of vulnerable residents.  Their desire for economic opportunity stemmed 
from the harsh reality that Hollygrove’s median household income of $32,695 was only 43% of 
the citywide average of $74,596 (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center).  Barring 
change of this circumstance some residents had few prosocial choices for economic survival and 
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therefore residents worried that the confluence of drugs and violence would continue to plague 
their community.  
 The conflation of race and social pathology (Gregory, 1998) had become a dominant 
trope used to justify marginalization was not lost on residents of Hollygrove.  As evidenced by 
the wealth of solutions they advanced, there was a willingness to combat their marginalized 
status.  Bourgois (2003) wrote “complex cultural and social dimensions that extend far beyond 
material and logistical requirements have to be addressed by poverty policies if the socially 
marginal in the United States are ever going to be able to demand, and earn, the respect that 
mainstream society needs to share with them for its own good” (p. 324).  Hollygrove’s solutions, 
no matter how beneficial and efficacious they were, could not be implemented until institutional 
structures that had marginalized the community recognized their merit and ceded a measure of 
autonomy and power to those who sought their own well-being.   
   Race and poverty cannot be conflated with a lack of resourcefulness.  Communities like 
Hollygrove have the potential to generate myriad solutions to long-entrenched social problems.  
The deficit they experienced was not one of ideas or will, it was social capital and power.  
Empowering them to generate and implement innovative homicide reduction solutions had 
potential to build collective efficacy, reduce legal cynicism and open a new front in the battle to 














 Current American discourses that conflate blackness with poverty and danger brand inner 
city communities such as Hollygrove with malignant labels that do not adequately address the 
complexities of life there.  Dominant societal tropes serve to marginalize such communities 
ignoring the strength of the people and their talent for coping with inequity.  Rather than 
addressing the situational structures that give rise to Hollygrove and other neighborhoods, it is 
simpler to construct explanations focused upon individual pathology.  Lee (1977) called this the 
fundamental attribution error, where internal psychological traits of others are used to explain 
their choices rather than external, structural conditions.  Applying Lee’s reasoning to a 
neighborhood context helps to clarify why pathology lenses rather than situational ones are 
employed to brand inner-city dwellers as bad actors rather than victims of structural neglect.  
Such explanations limit the ability of residents to act in their own best interests while justifying 
interventions that disempower and render them helpless, creating further marginality.   
 Meanwhile there were significant assets in the community, an untapped and 
entrepreneurial wealth of solutions to neighborhood problems, and an uncommon type of 
strength engendered from years of learning to cope with overwhelming obstacles.  McKnight and 
Kretzmann (2002) note “there is rich potential waiting to be identified and contributed by even 
the most marginalized people” (p. 160) but it is often overlooked because of the dominance of 
deficiency-oriented social service models focused upon needs rather than assets.   Far from 
helpless dependents, Hollygrove residents developed innovative strategies to actively overcome 
structural limitations and survive in what appears to them to be a hostile society outside the 
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neighborhood boundaries.  A complex subculture emerged that, while appearing to be 
oppositional and defiant to outsiders, was adaptive.  Residents in the neighborhood possessed a 
unique talent for negotiating between the values of mainstream society and the rules of the 
neighborhood, a bi-cultural ability which is akin to speaking two languages.  Hollygrove has 
much to teach about resilience for those willing to shun paternalistic policies and act as her 
students. 
 This study began with three primary theoretical lenses through which neighborhood-level 
homicide could be understood.  Social Disorganization Theory, especially Sampson’s (2012) 
concept of collective efficacy, attempted to explain the ways communities organize themselves 
to either defend against or allow lethal violence.  Subcultural theories such as Anderson’s (1999) 
street codes helped to elucidate the unique challenges faced by inner city residents who operate 
in two, often divergent milieus.  The Institutional Anomie Theory of Messner and Rosenfeld 
(1997) linked the expectations of economic success in a capitalist economy with participation in 
the informal economy that often marks central city neighborhoods.  While all of these were 
present in the participants’ understanding of neighborhood lethal violence, none was individually 
sufficient to capture the breadth of the experience.  The data found a complex interplay of 
conditions that, when combined, better explicate the factors undergirding homicide in 
communities such as Hollygrove. 
 
Themes that Emerged from the Data 
 The five themes emerging from the data are summarized in Table 3 below.  This chapter 
will attempt to situate these findings in light of existing theories and relevant studies.  One of the 
challenges addressed in this study was the inability of macrosociological research to explain the 
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variations in lethal violence within an individual neighborhood like Hollygrove.  Homicide is 
unevenly distributed throughout structurally disadvantaged communities.  Therefore, a body of 
research exploring intra-neighborhood variations in lethal violence may help to bridge the gap 
between macrosociological explanations and individual explanations.  The intentional focus of 
this study upon an individual neighborhood is one attempt to connect agency-based and social-
structural based understandings of homicide. 
The five themes and related subthemes summarized in Table 3 are interconnected and 
suggest that Hollygrove’s structural marginalization was reflected in the experiences of 
neighborhood residents.  The neighborhood portrayed its marginalization via a values-
orientation, a clash between the values of mainstream society and those that have arisen inside 
the neighborhood, and a boundary-orientation, mistrust or acceptance of outsiders.   Rather than 
being dichotomous, residents experienced the values clash along a continuum with prosocial 
values at one pole and subcultural values at the other.   Homeowners and those who were able to 
participate in the formal economy lay toward the prosocial value-oriented pole, while those who 
participated in the informal economy were oriented toward the other.  At the same time most in 
the neighborhood differentiated between those whose primary identification was with the 
neighborhood, or insiders, and those who did not, the outsiders.  This spectrum of attitudes 
toward insiders and outsiders manifested in either porous boundaries and trust of outsiders or 
rigid boundaries and mistrust of outsiders.  Finally, because residents understood their 
marginalization via these lenses, they were able to consider innovative solutions to lethal 
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 Hollygrove’s historical disadvantage and marginalization was reflected in residents’ 
complex dance with prosocial cultural values, described by Anderson (1999) as street and decent 
codes.  Anderson’s explanation, however, implied that these values are discrete entities, while 
the data emerging from this study indicate that all residents understood and subscribed to the 
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primacy of prosocial values but were forced by the exigencies of life in an urban neighborhood 
to adopt to subcultural values.  Browning, Feinberg and Dietz (2004) used the term “negotiated 
coexistence” to help explain the complex interplay of neighborhood values regarding participants 
in the informal economy.  In their model offenders experience enhanced social capital when 
residents empathize with the structural challenges leading to their participation in the illicit 
economy.  Negotiated coexistence might be extended to explain how, at all points on the 
spectrum of values-orientation, there was an understanding of those whose values were oriented 
differently.  This poses a challenge for outsiders trying to understand communities like 
Hollygrove.   The neighborhood’s internal organization was manifested in strong collective 
efficacy which social disorganization theorists theorized should lead to lower homicide rates 
(Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Morenoff, Sampson & 
Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, 2012). However, the neighborhood was organized differently than 
these authors envisioned, oriented primarily toward prosocial values while also negotiating 
between two value systems that reflected the adaptive response of a marginalized community 
(Venkatesh, 2006, 2008; Bourgois, 2003; Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009).  At times, such as 2012, 
the community experienced both high collective efficacy and high homicide, a situation that St. 
Jean (2007) found was made possible when neighborhood factors other than collective efficacy 
and informal social controls are considered.   
 Hollygrove residents’ values-orientation was one of those factors.  Much like a second 
generation immigrant who simultaneously holds the mores of a culture of origin while adaptively 
donning new mores during encounters with the culture of adoption, Hollygrove residents 
exhibited bi-cultural ability to shift between competing values systems.  A similar dance occurs 
when one marries and must negotiate between the values of a birth family and those of their 
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spouse’s.  Hollygrove residents framed this negotiated coexistence in three ways.  First, they 
differentiated between outsiders and insiders.  Second, they asserted that guns and violence were 
imposed upon them by outsiders.  Finally, they resisted formal controls and political processes 
judged to be acting upon them rather than collaborating with them.  What appeared to be legal 
cynicism (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011) to those looking at the 
neighborhood from outside was actually a very complicated, multicultural response to structural 
limitations imposed on them. 
 While residents subscribed to prosocial values to a greater or lesser extent depending 
upon their involvement in the Keeping It Real subculture and reliance upon the illicit economy 
for income, they were not blind to the fact that these values were defined by an outside society.  
Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) Institutional Anomie Theory posits twin forces underlying 
urban crime: the assimilation of the black community into prosocial values glorifying financial 
success and the alienation of young black men from institutionally sanctioned success pathways.  
Even as residents recognized the primacy of prosocial values for success, they also observed that 
pathways to success, such as livable wage jobs, quality education, economic attainment and non-
economic social institutions, were limited. Baumer and Gustafson (2007) found this condition 
fosters instrumental homicide at the neighborhood level.  At the same time, federal government 
policies have deconstructed many of the social safety net elements that were designed to mitigate 
against such limitations.   Several authors noted that the presence of a social safety net served to 
reduce the likelihood of neighborhood homicide (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000; 
Maume & Lee, 2003) by easing the impact of structural limitations upon the most vulnerable. 
Holding to prosocial values was challenging for residents under these conditions.  Imposed 
marginalization, whether it derives from the formal economy or from federal welfare policy, 
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strained their identification with prosocial societal values and may help explain the continuum of 
values embraced by residents. 
For some financial survival necessitated choices that violated privately held convictions, 
an anguishing condition in which some residents succumb to the rules of Keeping It Real and/or 
the illicit economy while others sympathize, yet resist.  Sampson and Wilson (1995) noted such 
circumstances give rise to an environment where “crime, disorder and drug use are less than 
fervently condemned and hence [are] expected as part of everyday life” (p. 50).  Indeed, 
Hollygrove residents recognized the values of the Keeping It Real subculture were non-
normative and also considered them to be detrimental to both the well-being of the actors and to 
the community.  Even those who were participants maintained convictions that the lifestyle was 
destructive on both the individual and neighborhood levels.  Sampson and Wilson’s conclusion 
implies that residents’ failure to exert informal controls served as tacit approval of the 
subculture. The residents of Hollygrove would disagree, asserting instead that the illicit economy 
is a destructive force imposed upon them by economic realities in a milieu where formal and 
political controls have failed to act collaboratively with the community to combat those forces.  
Their negotiated coexistence with the subculture and the illicit economy reflected their 
awareness of their marginalization. 
In the face of such abandonment residents had little choice but to resign themselves to the 
negotiated coexistence of life with an illicit economy where the incentives for participation 
outweighed those in the formal economy (Bourgois, 2003).  It is in this context that the 
subcultural rules of the street begin to organize life in the community (Anderson, 1999).  An 
oppositional status hierarchy emerged in Hollygrove where violence was portrayed as a vehicle 
for establishing social identity, respect and social control (Kubrin, 2005) as aggrandized in the 
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0017th video The Zoo.  The Hood Star became the pinnacle of success inside the neighborhood, 
where strength and street credibility required retaliatory violence to establish dominance but also 
subjected those at the top to increased risk of lethality (Berg, Stewart, Schreck & Simons, 2012).  
Legal cynicism, the “cultural orientation in which the law and agents of its enforcement are 
viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to ensure public safety” (Kirk & 
Papachristos, 2011, p.1191) became a more prominent feature of the neighborhood as 
Hollygrove shifted toward broader adoption of street codes.  This further diminished the 
neighborhood’s willingness to cooperate with the second district of the NOPD (Kirk & Matsuda, 
2011), leading two police officials to assert that they were seen as an occupying force rather than 
cooperative participants in the fight against lethal neighborhood violence.  In Hollygrove violent 
behavior had become an instrumental tool for developing street credibility and enhancing one’s 
reputation among peers (Wilkinson, 2003).  Thus studies that connect lethality with subcultural 
theories were helpful in explaining the high murder rate in the neighborhood. 
After Hurricane Katrina residents reported a reduction of legal cynicism as the 
demographics of the neighborhood changed.  The first residents to return were primarily older 
homeowners with a financial stake in the community.  Unlike families with children, they were 
not required to enroll their children in schools located in the communities to which they had 
evacuated.  This freed them to return with the first wave of evacuees.  The data from this study 
indicated that homeowners and senior citizens were more oriented toward prosocial values and 
were more likely to be engaged in community betterment projects, both conditions in which 
collective efficacy or “social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” 
(Samson, 2012, p. 27) could flourish. 
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In this context a unique window of opportunity emerged in which community residents 
experienced a willingness to work collaboratively to rebuild their neighborhood and to allow 
outside resources access to the community.  Many of these early returners were trained by the 
neighborhood community development corporation to serve as block captains who were able to 
direct subsequent waves of returning evacuees to resources critical for rebuilding.  A 
neighborhood planning charrette was conducted during which residents were allowed to envision 
an improved neighborhood, under the guidance of an architect, two city planners and a newly-
minted community development corporation.  The preponderance of senior citizens facilitated 
the adoption of the Hollygrove by AARP as a laboratory for the Livable Communities Pilot 
Project.  The project trained them in leadership skills, identified their neighborhood priorities, 
and secured financial and physical resources to implement them.  One of the identified priorities 
was a reduction in lethal violence, a goal that AARP helped resource by identifying crime hot 
spots and securing much-needed training in crime prevention.  The collective efforts of involved 
residents led to the closure of Big Time Tips, the identified epicenter of neighborhood violence, 
and a subsequent reduction in neighborhood lethal violence. 
Braga, Welsh & Schnell (2015) found that community problem-solving approaches 
resulted in a neighborhood’s ability to work cohesively to reduce crime, while Saville (2009) 
proposed that when residents “create and regulate their own safety in collaboration with service 
providers such as planners and police” (p. 390) an environment emerges in which crime 
prevention can occur.  Collective efficacy is hindered in an environment where concentrated 
disadvantage coexists with large scale marginalization.  In such an atmosphere, distrust and 
cynicism is directed toward outsiders while internally residents realize neither social cohesion 
nor shared expectations for social control.  On the other hand, when outside agents work 
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collaboratively with a community, cynicism is reduced and residents are freed to exercise 
informal control.  When agents of formal control, the NOPD and the city councilperson 
recognized Hollygrove residents as equal participants in their own betterment, ceding a measure 
of autonomy to engaged residents, collective efficacy was allowed to flourish and lethal violence 
was effectively reduced. 
St. Jean (2007) noted that it is possible for conditions of low crime and low collective 
efficacy to coexist.  This occurs because neighborhood-level violence is differentially 
concentrated at corner stores, bars and gathering places rather than being dispersed evenly 
throughout the community.  Hollygrove residents understood this and were able, with the help of 
the Livable Communities Project, to both pinpoint the location of these hotspots and bring them 
to the attention of formal control agents.  Their training in 2nd Generation CPTED, which was 
also attended by police officers, empowered them to recognize the difference between crime 
prevention and law enforcement.  Prevention is organic and is a product of neighborhood 
collective efforts to ameliorate conditions which give rise to violence, before it occurs.  
Enforcement reacts to crimes that have already occurred.  This distinction helped both 
Hollygrove residents and the police officers attending the training understand the power of 
collective efficacy and collective action, especially when combined with collaboration by agents 
of formal control.  Neighborhood residents who once found refuge in the blocks without 
violence, a condition of low crime and low collective efficacy, were equipped to act in ways that 
reduced violence in neighborhood crime hotspots beyond their block.   
Structural marginalization hampers neighborhood collective efficacy by limiting access 
to social capital and formal power.  Without adequate resources community actors have limited 
ability to exert informal controls in ways that prevent violence from occurring.  Residents who 
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subscribe predominately to prosocial values cannot combat armed subcultural actors willing to 
enforce their alternative values and street codes with lethal violence.  Collective efficacy is 
limited, therefore, without the cooperation of formal structures.   Macrosociological attempts to 
explain neighborhood violence via a lack of informal social controls and collective efficacy have 
difficulty addressing these subtle neighborhood dynamics. 
Hollygrove’s violence cannot be understood through a single theoretical lens. The 
structures that maintained neighborhood violence were complex and multi-faceted.  While Social 
Disorganization theory can help to explain the interconnections between a lack of collective 
efficacy and violence it fails to account for conditions where low crime and low collective 
efficacy coexist.  Institutional Anomie theory is helpful for understanding how economic 
realities give rise to conditions where an illicit economy and accompanying lethal violence co-
occur but fails to adequately address the neighborhood dynamics that both maintain it and fail to 
combat it.  Subcultural theories are adept at describing both the conflicting values held by those 
whose lived reality forces them to shift between codes and the milieu in which they live but fails 
to adequately address how a neighborhood might change its course and shift its values-
orientation.  Elements of each are explanatory and conjointly they do much to explain violence in 
Hollygrove and offer avenues for intervention. 
Neighborhood empowerment need not be preceded by widespread devastation which 
requires completely rebuilding a neighborhood’s physical and social infrastructure.  The lesson 
of Hollygrove is that residents recognized their marginality, saw the devastation wrought by 
well-intentioned policies that maintained it, had solutions for substantive change, but needed 
political and social capital to better equip them to enact those solutions.  To realize collective 
efficacy and change their situation required an uncommon willingness by agents of formal 
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control to collaborate with resident efforts directed toward systemic change.  Their success has 
potential to be a best practice for neighborhood revitalization and lethal violence prevention. 
 
Three Constructs Key to Understanding Homicide in Hollygrove 
In the final analysis three constructs were key to understanding the variable rates of 
homicide in Hollygrove: resident values, social structure, and boundary flexibility (figure 21).  
Each of these was in a constant state of flux and tension, moving in either prosocial or 
oppositional directions.  As the community’s values shifted toward the mainstream, when they 
experienced enhanced social capital, and as the community allowed more input from outsiders, 
homicides decreased.  When the community embraced countercultural values, experienced social 






Figure 21. Neighborhood constructs affecting high and low 
homicide conditions in Hollygrove 
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Although all residents in the study embraced prosocial values, there was constant tension 
with countercultural values. This was consistent with Anderson’s (1999) findings regarding 
street and decent codes that showed how inner-city residents constantly negotiated between 
them.  At any point in the neighborhood’s history one of these value sets were in ascendency.  
When countercultural values dominated, the neighborhood experienced higher homicide rates.  
As those who held primarily to prosocial values garnered more informal control, the homicide 
rates decreased.  This extends Anderson’s theory of individual code shifting to a 
mezzosociological, or intra-neighborhood, perspective.  The code shifting did not occur solely at 
an individual level but also at the neighborhood level. 
At the same time the study’s respondents described structural conditions ranging from 
social marginalization to one of enhanced social capital.  During periods of marginalization 
residents described cynicism toward agents of formal control while the police described their 
relationship with the community as an occupying force.  This coincided with higher homicide 
conditions.  When the city councilmember and the police force began to work cooperatively with 
local residents, cynicism ebbed, the neighborhood’s social capital improved, and the number of 
homicides diminished.  This finding blends the conclusions of Institutional Anomie Theory and 
collective efficacy.  Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) Institutional Anomie Theory concluded that 
social institutions regulating norms and behavior were harmed when structural marginalization 
occurred and individuals in the community resisted institutional controls by engaging in 
countercultural means of financial achievement.  Sampson (2012) noted the connection between 
a neighborhood’s structural features and collective efficacy, proposing that homicides decreased 
as collective efficacy increased and disadvantage decreased.   The same structural conditions that 
gave rise to the Keeping It Real subculture and the illicit economy, the advanced marginality 
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described by Wacquant (2008), were connected to higher homicide.  As structural marginality 
decreased the homicides decreased as well. 
Finally, community residents’ attitudes toward outsiders impacted either rising or falling 
homicide rates.  In an atmosphere of structural marginalization, a siege mentality developed and 
the neighborhood boundaries became more rigid.  Outsiders were met with mistrust and this 
extended both to those perceived to be harmful to the neighborhood and to those who expressed 
a desire to help.  As described earlier, in an atmosphere of cynicism and mistrust it can be 
difficult to differentiate between the two.  The result was generalized mistrust of all outsiders.  
At the other end of this spectrum were the experiences of those involved in collaborative action 
with the police, politicians, and outside agencies that brought critical rebuilding resources.  As 
this occurred the neighborhood boundaries became more porous and residents expressed greater 
acceptance of outsiders.  More porous neighborhood boundaries were associated with lower 
homicide while increasing rigidity was associated with higher homicide rates.  Bourgois (2003), 
Venkatesh (2006, 2008) and Anderson (1999) hinted at this reality as they described how 
neighborhoods became places where residents involved in the subculture and/or the illicit 
economy experience limitations beyond their community’s borders.  Sampson (2012) also 
connected neighborhood boundaries to concentrated disadvantage and geographic isolation.  This 
study extends those findings by submitting that the flexibility of these boundaries is also a factor 
helping to explain variable rates of homicide. 
 
Implications of the Findings 
There are several implications of these findings.  First, high homicide neighborhoods do 
not share a monolithic set of values.  Residents recognized the primacy of prosocial values while 
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simultaneously acknowledging that others exist.  Their ability to negotiate between the two was a 
highly adaptive response akin to new immigrants shifting between the language and customs of 
their country-of-origin and their adopted homeland.  Successful adaptation for an immigrant, as 
for residents of Hollygrove, required being able to successfully negotiate the two.  Hollygrove 
residents, and by implication those in similar neighborhoods, have strategies to negotiate 
successfully between competing value systems.  At the same time, prosocial values were 
considered important for connecting to society beyond Hollygrove’s borders.  Strategies that 
encourage the transmission and adoption of decent, prosocial codes may decrease 
marginalization by fostering greater connection between the neighborhood and the rest of the 
city.  The implication is that prosocial values transmission is one key to reducing neighborhood 
homicide.  
Second, the structural marginalization of neighborhoods like Hollygrove gives rise to 
conditions of higher homicide.  The neighborhood’s alienation from the city resulted in cynicism 
which played out in mistrust of the police and politicians.  In this environment the relationship 
between Hollygrove and the city’s structure became oppositional.  With enhanced cooperation, 
as power structures recognized the validity and efficacy of resident agendas for their community, 
social capital improved and residents were willing to work collaboratively toward community 
improvement.  The unique window provided by Katrina’s devastation showed that collaborative 
efforts were possible, but required agents of formal control to engage local residents.  Top-down 
solutions for homicide, those that are imposed by outside agencies instead of emanating from 
residents, are likely to foster opposition and cynicism.  This points to two important 
considerations.  First, when those in power are willing to cede a measure of autonomy to 
residents, conditions conducive to homicide reduction occur.  Second, solutions that reflect 
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resident agendas and incorporate their innovative ideas as part of any homicide solution, are 
more likely to succeed.  In short, improving the social capital of a marginalized community 
creates conditions conducive to lower homicide rates. 
Third, there was an important interrelationship between Hollygrove’s values and social 
structure that affected the openness of neighborhood boundaries and thus affected homicide.  
Wellman (1971) described urban neighborhood boundaries in terms of push and pull; while 
structural limitations gave rise to inner-city, African American neighborhoods and pushed 
residents into them, there was comfort and meaningful interactions that pulled residents to them 
as well.  These factors served to define and differentiate the neighborhood relative to others in 
the city.  Although some in Wellman’s study achieved sufficient capital to negotiate the world 
beyond the neighborhood, it remained a place of comfort into which they could retreat.  
Hollygrove residents likewise defined the neighborhood as a meaningful place where the rules 
and values were legible even when in conflict.  It made sense to those who lived there.  Outsiders 
disrupted this legibility and were met with distrust.  At the same time rigid boundaries served to 
maintain the status quo, limiting openness to new ideas and agents.  As the boundaries became 
more porous, made possibly by enhanced social capital and subsequent lessening of cynicism, 
residents were able to collaborate with police, politicians and outside agencies and act 
collectively to reduce neighborhood homicide.  Boundaries proved to be an important facet of 
homicide reduction and one promising avenue for future research into neighborhood-level 
homicide. 
In conclusion, Hollygrove teaches that a complex interplay of values, social structure, 
and boundary porosity impact neighborhood homicides.  These served as axes along which the 
neighborhood oriented itself toward either a prosocial or oppositional direction.  As these shifted 
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in prosocial directions, conditions conducive to homicide decreased.  As they moved in 
oppositional directions the converse occurred.  Understanding the relationship between these 
constructs and their polarity helped to explain variable homicide rates in the neighborhood.  
Future studies may wish to explore the impact of these constructs upon collective efficacy and 
homicide, especially the impact of neighborhood boundaries as they move between conditions of 
rigidly defensive and one of fluidity and receptiveness.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
There were sampling, design and scope limitations to this study.  The challenge of 
snowball sampling, as noted by Babbie (2013), is its questionable representativeness.  Research 
employing this technique, as this study did, are designed to be exploratory and therefore caution 
must be used when attempting to replicate the findings beyond the sample population.  The 
sampling method chosen was purposeful as it represented a wide variety of stakeholders 
representing the neighborhood. Creswell (2014) noted the limits of an ethnographic approach 
that is confined to a single, culture-sharing group.  On one hand, the author’s relationships within 
the community, forged over many years as a resident and community activist, created valuable 
inroads that made many of the interviews possible in a neighborhood where trust of outsiders 
was limited.  At the same time, such relationships are based upon insider status, something with 
potential to skew the results and limit their applicability to other, similar communities.  A third 
limitation was the small sample size of one, bounded neighborhood.  Creswell (2014) purported 
that generalizing results of a study involving a single group is problematic and thus application 
of these findings beyond Hollygrove may prove difficult.  Finally, a unique set of circumstance 
in Hollygrove were associated with the neighborhood’s newfound collective efficacy.  Katrina’s 
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complete devastation of the community created a fresh start for a community previously 
immersed in conditions leading to subcultural values orientation, advanced marginality, and 
cynical attitudes to outsiders.  Few similar communities experience opportunity to start fresh as 
they did.  While this provided a unique perspective from which to study a community’s response 
to neighborhood homicide, it significantly constrains the findings. 
Tamesha, the Hollygrove student who received a full scholarship to a prestigious 
northeastern university, described her relationship with Hollygrove this way: 
What would make me, having a family, move back to Hollygrove if I had not been livin’ 
in New Orleans for a little minute?  I think what it would be is because I would want my 
kids to grown up with the closeness that does come from this neighborhood, you know 
what I mean?  Like I could choose to live probably in a suburb somewhere.  But it comes 
with, yeah, it’s safer, but like as far as the social development of your children, like value 
systems, all those different things—I feel like that is fostered by a community. 
 
Even at its worst, Hollygrove was special to many who lived there.  This is an important feature 
of many marginalized communities; there are people living in them who value the kinship, 
camaraderie, and community they foster.  There are sources of strength, important assets and 
valuable ideas in these communities, waiting to be tapped.  Rather than helpless and hopeless 
targets for outside interventions, we could learn much from their residents once their potential is 
unlocked through empowering strategies that harness what they know and implement their 












 Inner city neighborhoods like Hollygrove are capable of exercising collective efficacy if 
provided opportunity and the requisite resources to do so.  Tamesha’s remarks revealed two 
things that described the lived reality of the neighborhood, “the neighborhood is special” and 
“social life is different than in a polite neighborhood.”  Hollygrove was special in several ways: 
residents with deep roots and strong concern for its well-being, an active corps of leaders willing 
to take risks to improve the quality of life, wonderful resources that could be enlisted in efforts 
toward these improvements, and momentum toward that end.  Furthermore, the neighborhood 
has an active social life which was rich and meaningful. 
 Some outsiders view neighborhoods such as Hollygrove through a lens that conflates race 
and criminality.  From this perspective, homicide interventions may become autocratic as 
dominant forces seek either to shape such neighborhoods to reflect the values of other, more 
affluent ones or to control them by raw exercises of power.  Such interventions historically 
served to increase Hollygrove’s cynicism which led to both rigid, closed boundaries and 
oppositional, subcultural values.  Instead, strategies that built upon neighborhood wisdom, 
knowledge, experience, and assets helped to open those boundaries and to empower those who 
shared prosocial values.   
 The ancient philosopher Law Tzu is quoted with saying: 
Go to the people 
Live among them 
Learn from them 
Love them 
Start with what they know 
Build on what they have 
But of the best leaders  
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When their task is done 
The people will remark  
"We have done it ourselves." (Christian Community Development Association, 2012). 
 
Community improvement cannot be something imposed upon a neighborhood; rather it requires 
engaging local residents, building upon their assets and knowledge, and collaborating to create 
change.  Effective community development leads to improved access to power and power 
brokers, both necessary elements of neighborhoods with enhanced social capital.  One of the key 
conditions required for homicide reduction in Hollygrove was emerging from marginalization 
into relationships with politicians, police, and organizations with resources beneficial to the 
community.  Conversely, homicide reduction strategies which do not involve grassroots ideas 
and solutions may lead to further marginalization and community cynicism.  The data from the 
study suggest, therefore, that community-driven solutions, coupled with the social capital to 
enact them, may prove more effective than those imposed upon them by well-intentioned 
technocrats importing ideas that have worked elsewhere.  Enhancing social capital within 
marginalized neighborhoods may prove to be an important homicide reduction strategy.  
 This study began with the question, “What factors at the neighborhood level contribute to 
high homicide in New Orleans?”  Participants answered this question using three constructs to 
explain how neighborhood conditions related to homicide: values, structure, and boundary 
porosity.  Enhanced collective efficacy, a condition of low homicide, required a confluence of 
prosocial values, enhanced social capital, and porous neighborhood boundaries.  Diminished 
collective efficacy was connected to higher homicides and was accompanied by oppositional, 
subcultural values, structural marginalization, and rigid boundaries.  Strategies that improve 
collective efficacy, therefore, may bolster positive values transmission, enhance neighborhood 
social capital, and lead to greater acceptance of outsiders.   
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 A second set of questions asked whether the lived experiences of residents and those who 
have lost loved ones to homicide would reflect the study’s theoretical orientations or advance 
new ones.  The three theories central to the study were Social Disorganization theory, 
Institutional Anomie theory, and subcultural theories.  Each of these were present in resident 
explanations of neighborhood homicide but none was sufficient to explain it.   
Weakest among them was anomie theory, which appeared primarily via resident’s 
empathic responses toward those engaging in the underground economy of drug sales.  Messner 
and Rosenfeld (1997) theorized that crime resulted when prosocial pathways to economic 
success were blocked and unsanctioned ones emerged.  Residents made a strong connection 
between the illicit economy and violence, and did portray structural limitations and economic 
deprivation as a significant reason for participating in the both the Keeping It Real subculture 
and the drug market.  This was a conflicted view, however, as many simultaneously disparaged 
those selling drugs and noted that poor values transmission played a role equal to structural 
limitations.   
Subcultural explanations played a greater role in residents’ explanations for Hollygrove’s 
homicides.  Anderson (1999) concluded that residents of inner city neighborhoods were forced 
daily to choose between prosocial values and practical survival codes and that elderly residents 
anchored such communities by their adherence to prosocial values.  The conflict between 
prosocial and subcultural values appeared throughout the study.  While all participants privately 
espoused the primacy of prosocial values, it was the disaffected younger males who shifted 
between orientations most often.  The younger males were also more likely to be involved in 
lethal altercations either as victims or as aggressors.  Seniors and homeowners were most likely 
to eschew subcultural values in favor of prosocial ones.  There was widespread perception that 
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this clash between the two values orientation was connected to lethal violence.  Residents also 
thought that poor values transmission and outsiders who didn’t espouse prosocial values to be 
sources of community violence. 
Participants most strongly reflected Social Disorganization theory’s construct of 
collective efficacy in their explanations for homicide.  Sampson (2012) defined collective 
efficacy as “social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” (p. 27).  Each 
of the three constructs used by participants to describe conditions leading to, or away from, 
neighborhood homicide were connected to collective efficacy.  In the end, the neighborhood’s 
orientation relative to these three constructs best explained the lived experience of homicide in 
Hollygrove.   
A final research question asked whether concentrated disadvantage and homicide would 
be linked by those in the study.  Residents did make this connection in multiple ways.  
Countercultural values were connected to socioeconomically disadvantaged youth, parents, and 
outsiders coming to the neighborhood from public housing.  The Keeping It Real subculture was 
understood to be a pathway to personal advancement in an environment of economic and social 
marginality.  The underground economy was viewed as an alternative pathway to economic 
viability.  Neighborhood boundaries were thought to be violated by impoverished outsiders 
relocating to the neighborhood from public housing.  Ultimately, residents viewed homicide as a 
condition of their structural marginalization which they understood to be a condition of 
concentrated disadvantage. 
One key finding not widely reflected in the literature was boundary porosity.  Residents 
defined their community in terms of outsiders and insiders, a strategy used to defend themselves 
against those who would harm the neighborhood.  Rigid boundaries, however, limited the ability 
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of outside agents and organizations to help build collective efficacy.  Conversely, porous 
boundaries allowed resources to flow into the neighborhood which led to lower homicide 
conditions.  This appears to be an overlooked feature of neighborhood homicide that might prove 
an avenue for future research. 
Early social disorganization theorists were more comprehensive in their thinking about 
the connection between urban social conditions and crime.  Their view of neighborhoods as 
bounded, ecological social systems led to a holistic view of a community akin to a biological 
system.  This allowed them to integrate multiple sociological vantage points from which to 
explore the connection between disadvantage and neighborhood crime. Wirth (1931) made a 
connection between deviant subcultural values orientation, social class, and crime.  Sellin (1938) 
noted that conflict between the norms of subculture and dominant society was central to 
understanding crime.  Miller (1958) understood subcultures to be exercising a different, rather 
than oppositional, set of values that were simultaneously adaptive in one environment and 
delinquent in another.  Lewis (1966) saw subcultures to be responding to anomie in a milieu of 
social disorganization and marginalization, and connected this to neighborhood crime.  Still 
others described broad ethnographic portraits of marginalized subcultures in an effort to explain 
social disorganization in specific contexts (Shaw, 1930; Cressey, 1932; Sutherland, 1937; 
Whyte, 1943).  The findings of this study suggest that studying a narrow population by using a 
wider theoretical lens, as did the early social disorganization theorists, may prove helpful in 
advancing understandings of neighborhood level homicide.  Ethnographic studies which explore 
homicide from the perspective of a small, bounded neighborhood may provide both rich 




Policy and Practice Implications 
 Sampson (2012) recommended that effective violence interventions, instead of being 
targeted toward individual offenders, should instead address efforts to restore at-risk 
communities by improving both the physical and social infrastructure.  His recommendations 
included community policing, prisoner re-entry programs, repairs or renewal of physical 
structures, community economic development, and programs for early childhood development.  
These findings are similar to some of the homicide solutions proposed by Hollygrove residents. 
 One set of strategies Hollygrove residents envisioned involved repairing physical 
infrastructure.  These included eradicating blight, repairing streets, collecting trash regularly, 
refurbishing neighborhood parks, and building backyard storm water retention gardens to prevent 
flooding.  While somewhat unconventional as crime prevention strategies, the neighborhood 
understood them to be important tools of community revitalization which they connected to 
reduced homicide.  A second set of solutions they proposed addressed social infrastructure 
improvements.  These included community meetings, economic improvements, community 
policing, increased homeownership, and a variety of formal and informal educational strategies.  
The consonance between the solutions proposed by both Sampson and Hollygrove residents 
indicates that effective homicide reduction strategies focused upon building neighborhood capital 
may prove to be an important avenue for further study.  Building a healthy environment requires 
attention to both the physical infrastructure signaling neglect and thus attracting crime, as well as 
the social infrastructure which, when empowered, can internally combat violence through 
collective action. 
Anderson (1999) concluded that safe neighborhoods required political leadership capable 
of articulating the problems and working diligently to build coalitions with neighborhood 
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residents.  Likewise, Saville (2009) theorized that safe neighborhoods were ones where agents of 
formal control worked cooperatively with neighborhood residents by building their capacity to 
enact resident-driven prevention strategies.  Like Sampson, these authors recognized the 
importance of building resident social capital as part of any comprehensive neighborhood 
violence reduction strategy.  This study found that Hollygrove’s enhanced social capital was a 
component of collective efficacy leading to lower homicide conditions, which confirmed the 
findings of their research. 
Neighborhood violence occurs in settings of institutional and social neglect.  Combatting 
violence, therefore, requires ameliorating the conditions under which it thrives.  The legal 
cynicism experienced by Hollygrove residents was connected to their lived experience of neglect 
and impacted the neighborhood’s high homicide rate.  Residents developed a siege mentality 
toward outside agents and the police described themselves as an occupying force.  A vicious 
cycle of mistrust and antagonism existed between both sides.  This extended to politicians and 
service agencies with potential resources to build both physical and social infrastructure.  This 
condition changed after Katrina as residents were afforded the opportunity to re-envision their 
community in collaboration with politicians, police and outside agencies. 
 One avenue that proved especially effective during this period was Second Generation 
CPTED training.  Residents were taught to observe physical cues associated with neighborhood 
violence such as overgrown lots, blighted housing and poor street lighting.  At the same time, 
they were taught how to work collaboratively with politicians and the police to advance their 
own agenda of violence reduction.  Involving quality of life officers and leadership from the 
NOPD in the training improved relationships between residents and the department and helped to 
reduce legal cynicism.  The resulting improvement of social capital led to greater collective 
236 
 
efficacy and a reduction in the number of homicides.  This program may prove equally effective 
in other neighborhoods where structural marginalization coincides with high rates of homicide. 
 Another development that promoted neighborhood empowerment was the Livable 
Communities Academy which educated residents in effective engagement strategies.  The 
residents’ ability to collaborate with well-resourced agents and organizations such as their city 
councilmember and the Recovery School District led to the construction of a new senior center 
and school.  In addition, their newfound social capital led to relationships with Tulane University 
and Project NOLA who provided assistance developing backyard storm water retention ponds 
and neighborhood crime cameras.  The Livable Communities Model developed in Hollygrove 
was credited with a significant reduction in neighborhood homicide and has been replicated by 
AARP in other neighborhoods.  Equipping residents to engage resource-rich individuals and 
organizations is a strategy that could be easily adapted as a homicide reduction tool because the 
model already exists and is replicable in other high homicide communities. 
 St. Jean (2007) concluded his study of neighborhood crime by noting that “policy and 
programmatic attempts to address the problem must emphasize early intervention from multiple 
angles, including social, economic, and moral development and uplifting neighborhood space 
together with neighborhood people” (p. 225).  Study participants understood the confluence of 
social and economic marginality in Hollygrove to impact moral development and thus lead to 
conditions conducive to high homicide.  Residents envisioned solutions for prosocial values 
transmission including classroom instruction, community-based after-school programs, parenting 
classes, mentoring, church attendance, and a community public relations campaign.  While the 
connection between prosocial values and collective efficacy is clear in the study’s findings, this 
cannot be divorced from the structural conditions creating marginalization and cynicism.  This 
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connection has implication for policy and practices oriented toward homicide reduction; 
educating young, inner city residents about values may be insufficient unless accompanied by 
social and infrastructural improvements.  Wilson (2012) wrote, “it follows, therefore, that 
changes in the economic and social conditions of the underclass will lead to changes in the 
cultural norms and behavior patterns” (p. 159).  Prosocial values, while considered important to a 
safe neighborhood, cannot predominate in an environment of structural marginalization breeding 
cynicism and mistrust. 
 Venkatesh (2006) showed the complex interplay of the underground economy and 
structural marginalization.  While financial survival of those on the economic fringes of society 
may depend upon the illicit economy, he noted the practice leads to further exclusion from the 
social mainstream.  Bourgois (2003) noted that the street culture, which he found to be 
intertwined with the illicit economy, “emerges out of a personal search for dignity and a rejection 
of racism and subjugation [but] it ultimately becomes an active agent in personal degradation and 
community ruin” (p. 9).  Advanced capitalism has created places of limitation, like Hollygrove, 
where financial viability necessitates drastic choices, ones that violate privately-held prosocial 
values.  Residents understood that the choice to participate in the illicit economy and/or the 
Keeping It Real subculture was connected to economic limitations faced by many.  Their 
solutions included attracting more economic drivers such as the newly constructed Costco, 
livable wage jobs with benefits, and strengthening community entrepreneurship.  
 Entrepreneurship is a salient feature of the underground economy of Hollygrove.  To 
Bourgois (2003) drug dealers were “aggressively pursuing careers as private entrepreneurs” (p. 
326).  They possessed a wealth of inventiveness exercised in a market that is destructive 
personally and to the community.  Bourgois calls for dismantling of hostile bureaucracies that 
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punish the poor for working legally, coupled with “boosting the credibility of the legal economy 
as an alternative to crime” (p. 322).   
To brave the maze of complex bureaucratic regulations for small businesses requires a 
kind of social capital that many in Hollygrove lack.  Building on the entrepreneurial talents of 
those engaged in the informal marketplace would require a collaborative process between city 
agencies regulating small businesses and trainers who could teach entrepreneurial, small business 
development skills to budding entrepreneurs.  One such collaboration between the neighborhood, 
Tulane University’s City Center, the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, and the city 
councilperson led to the development of a linear park named the Hollygrove Greenline and 
showed that this type of collaboration is possible.  Developing small, entrepreneurial businesses 
in Hollygrove would require similar collaboration between the city’s Department of Economic 
Development and educators from one of New Orleans’ business schools, and would take place 
inside the neighborhood, allowing for greater participation.  Such a model has potential not only 
to redirect entrepreneurism from the illicit economy but also to provide economic engines and a 
source of jobs for neighborhood residents. 
In 2012 the City of New Orleans began NOLA for Life, a comprehensive program to 
reduce neighborhood level homicide.  A number of the solutions proposed by researchers and 
residents in this study are present in some form in the plan.  These include: promoting jobs and 
opportunity, improving relationships between the NOPD and neighborhoods, character building 
programs in schools, and neighborhood blight reduction.  Many of the strategies proposed by 
both researchers and residents are missing from the plan. 
One glaring omission from the NOLA for Life plan is a community listening tour.  As the 
residents of Hollygrove demonstrated, there is a wealth of knowledge in marginalized 
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communities regarding homicide, its reduction, and its prevention.  McKnight and Kretzmann 
(2002) proposed that any comprehensive neighborhood strategy begins with uncovering assets 
hidden in communities and then building upon them to create neighborhood change.  Hollygrove 
was full of assets waiting to be discovered.  When they were brought together and provided with 
resources they found their voice and discovered collective efficacy that led to neighborhood 
change.  Lao Tzu submitted that the first step of change started by learning from the people 
themselves.  This points to an important component consideration for homicide reduction, 
listening long enough to uncover hidden assets in disadvantaged communities. 
Through their violence reduction efforts Hollygrove residents became connected to 
outside agents that included politicians, police, and organizations with resources.  In the 
collaborative ventures that followed residents discovered that collective action had a powerful 
impact upon homicide reduction.  Cynicism and mistrust diminished and neighborhood 
boundaries became more porous.  Their social capital improved and confidence in prosocial 
values was bolstered.  This suggests that elected officials and agents of formal control that work 
collaboratively with a community may enhance a community’s collective efficacy and create 
conditions of lower homicide. 
Lao Tzu’s poem ends with an excellent description of collective efficacy: the people will 
say, “we did it ourselves.”  Hollygrove’s residents discovered that reducing neighborhood 
homicide cannot be the sole domain of outside agencies.  Waiting for others to fix the problem is 
a condition of advanced marginality and its accompanying hopelessness and helplessness.  
Instead they were able to move their neighborhood from a position of opposition, mistrust and 
marginality toward high collective efficacy, discovering in the process that these were the 
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Appendix II: Questions and Avenues of Inquiry for Interviews and Focus Groups 
Neighborhood Level Homicide and Social Disorganization Theory 
Suggested Questions and Avenues of Inquiry 
 
Personal history in Hollygrove  
 Talk about how you came to live in Hollygrove 
 Tell me about your family’s history in Hollygrove 
 What was the neighborhood like when you were younger 
 Talk about how the neighborhood has changed 
 
Strengths of the neighborhood  
 Talk about the things that make Hollygrove unique 
 Tell me about the places in Hollygrove that are special 
 Talk about the people here and how they sets the neighborhood apart 
 What institutions have shaped this community 
 
Life on the street in Hollygrove  
 Talk about what life is like on your block 
 Tell me some of the things you see that I might never see 
 Who are the unique, special people in the community 
 Talk to me about people who aren’t so great for the community 
 
Fear and safety in Hollygrove  
 Tell me some of the things that Hollygrove residents fear 
 The  neighborhood has a reputation for being dangerous, talk to me about that 
 More specifically, talk about the murders/shootings in our neighborhood 
 From your perspective, what prompts people to kill 
 Are there things that could be done to reduce violence 
 
Hot spot in neighborhoods  
 Certain parts of our community are more dangerous than others; from your perspective. 
which parts of the community are safe and which parts are more dangerous 
 Talk to me about what you think makes places safe and others dangerous 
 Certain corners have more shootings than others, talk to me about  you think are the 
reasons  
 Some places have gotten less dangerous; what do you think are the reasons  
 
Personal history with violence in Hollygrove  
 Tell me about your personal experiences with violence in the community 
 Talk to me about how violence shapes the way you act in the community 
 Has it changed the way you feel about the community this is a yes or no question 
 Talk about how the level of violence affects how you think about the community 




Compare Hollygrove to other safer neighborhoods  
 Some New Orleans neighborhoods are considered safe neighborhoods, talk to me about 
what makes one neighborhood safe and another dangerous 
 Tell me your thoughts about why Hollygrove is thought to be less safe than other 
communities 
 
What would make Hollygrove safer  
 Many people have ideas about how to make their neighborhood safer, tell me your ideas 
about how we could make life safer here 
 You may have heard other people’s great ideas about improving the neighborhood, talk to 
me about ideas others have had that would make Hollygrove safer 
 Perhaps you have heard of things the city is doing to make the city safer and thought that 
might work in Hollygrove, tell me about those things 
 
Your own future and Hollygrove  
 Talk about your future in Hollygrove 
 Tell me some things you would like to see happen here 
 
Questions for NGO officials and city officials who have some knowledge and experience in 
Hollygrove  
 Please talk about how you see the Hollygrove community 
 To you, what are the elements that make Hollygrove different from other, similar 
communities 
 From your perspective, what elements does Hollygrove share with other similar 
neighborhoods  
 From your experience, please talk to me about the people who live in Hollygrove  
 Tell me why Hollygrove is seen as a violent community (is this a valid/deserved 
reputation) 
 What is your theory about why some communities experience more homicides than 
others 
 Please talk about why homicide happens in Hollygrove 
 From your perspective, please talk about how a community like Hollygrove might lessen 
the number of homicides in the community 
 From your position, please talk to me about what must change for the quality of life of 
Hollygrove residents to improve 
 As  (name the position), talk about the things you know about that have improved in the 
community and why these improvements are taking place 
 Are you aware of other things that could be happening to  positively impact life for 
members of the neighborhood 
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